About that market shitty myth...
Or:
In Sweden, at least since the 1930s “experiment” started, the workers’ organisations were deemed not only perfectly legitimate but also necessary social and economic partners. G. Esping-Andersen (1985, p. 31) explains the process, “Social democratic class formation, therefore, is first and foremost a struggle to decommodify labour and stem market sovereignty in order to make collective action possible. Only when workers command resources and access to welfare independently of market exchange can they possibly be swayed not to take jobs during strike actions, underbid fellow workers, and so forth. Where the market is hegemonic, the labour movement’s future depends on its ability to provide an “exit” for workers that concomitantly ensures collective solidarity.” We need to mention that unionisation in Sweden is around 80%. Those workers know their strength and do have a very enviable culture of solidarity working for them.
In Scandinavian countries, among other things, the levels of trust between people are the highest in the world. By contrast, the lowest levels of trust (the percentage of people who agree that most people can be trusted) are in the countries with the dismally poor industrial and citizenship relations, adversarial societal model, the greatest social differences and highest levels of poverty (in Brazil, for instance the levels of trust are 10 times lower).
The correlation between levels of trust and investment is evident; the levels of growth are also lower than expected, given certain conditions, as explained by Stephen Knack (1996). There he mentions Robert Putnams’s and Ronald Inglehart’s pieces of research about civic-mindedness and trust and their relationship with economic performance and well-being.
Branko Milanović’s work on inequality shows that it is growing significantly, in global terms. In the US it made a significant jump in the 1980s, rather predictably (Held & Kaya, 2007).
According to Hart-Landsberg, Jeong & Westra (2007), De Rivero (2001) and The Economist (2005) – not known for its “left credentials” and opposition to this particular model of globalisation – conducted their own research. They found that since the beginning of this type of integration of world markets, based on Washington Consensus, the numbers of NVEs (Non-Viable Entities) and UCEs (Ungovernable Chaotic Economies) have risen significantly throughout the world. The Economist found 46 of them, in fact. Indeed, instead of the promised boost, today 50% of world’s youth (15–24 year olds) live in poverty.
Moreover, the Economist also found that, for instance, the social policy has nothing to do with the global pressures of “competitive” nature. In fact, they found that Singapore reserved only 20% of GDP for public spending. The US set aside 33%, Germany, 49%, and Sweden, 68%, of their GDP for public spending!
Hirst & Thompson (1996, p. 64) say, “Provided an economy remains competitive in the goods and services it trades internationally, it can choose high levels of social spending and does not have to be ‘competitive’ or drive down wages in the non-internationally traded sectors”.
“Yet,” they continue, “the concept can be used to undermine any attempt to maintain or improve domestic public services and welfare standards, in the belief that they will render UK private employers uncompetitive. We can begin to resist these arguments of a global economy dominated by ungovernable market forces, which is at variance with the evidence.” (ibid. P 64)