The Sustainability of U.S. Military Operations in Iraq.
A number of factors unrelated to progress in building a
functioning Iraqi state may also influence the debate on when and
how the United States will depart Iraq. Foremost is the willingness
of American society to provide a continuous stream of volunteers
to join the Army, Marine Corps, and their reserve components and
accept the likelihood of possible combat duty in Iraq. Should
the pool of military age volunteers permanently decline or even
evaporate, there is almost certainly no political will to restart
military conscription. Public opinion polls consistently demonstrate
overwhelming opposition to a draft. This opposition will almost
certainly become more intense should the prospect become more
likely. Politicians embracing the idea of restarting the draft would
be effectively ending their political careers. Furthermore, the process
of resolving draft-related controversies on such issues as conscripting
women, deciding what kinds of deferments to allow, and other such
matters would probably require a significant amount of debate prior
to congressional action. The Iraq situation may have fundamentally
changed by the time a draft is organized and implemented, and the
conscripted soldiers are trained and prepared for deployment.
U.S. public opinion about the Iraq War may also become an
important factor influencing the nature and timing of an exit strategy,
even without the possibility of a military draft. Most case studies of
U.S. public opinion behavior suggest that the American public will
endure ongoing military casualties and high monetary expenditures
in a sustained but limited war if they are able to see progress towards
military and political goals.133 Public support for the Iraq war peaked
when the Saddam Hussein regime fell in April 2003 when 76 percent
of those polled stated that the war was worth the sacrifice. By May
2005, a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll indicated that only 41 percent
of the American public believed the war was worth the sacrifice; 57
percent said that it was not.134 Support rebounded in July 2005 when
53 percent of those surveyed by the same polling organization said
the war was not a mistake and only 46 percent believed it was an
error. Surprisingly, only 37 percent of those surveyed in the July
poll believed that it would be possible to create a stable, democratic
Iraq. It may also be significant that temporary spikes in public
approval for the Iraq operation have been produced by events
such as Saddam’s capture and the January 2005 elections, but these
improvements failed to last due to the continuation of the insurgency
and the inability of the United States to reduce its commitments in
troops and resources to Iraq.
Against this background, the U.S. public may see increased
casualties or any requirement to boost troop strength in Iraq as
indications of a faltering U.S. effort in meeting its goals. Increasing
U.S. financial expenditures for the war, in addition to the hundreds of
billions of dollars already spent, may also become a future problem
for U.S. public opinion. As noted, a policy of “staying the course” in
a democratic society is most effective when the public can see clear
progress towards an acceptable result. If the public views the Iraq
conflict as showing little or no progress, the conflict may become
redefined by many U.S. citizens as a quagmire, and pressure to
withdraw would become nearly irresistible. Moreover, while many
hopeful signs of progress exist in Iraq, it is not clear that the public
will find them compelling if such progress does not lead to a situation
where the United States can begin withdrawing troops.
It has already been noted that a serious decline or even a
collapse in recruiting and retention for the U.S. Army and Marine
Corps could eventually influence the U.S. ability to sustain a large
military presence in Iraq.136 A series of problems in recruiting (but
not retention) started to appear in 2004 with the Army Reserve
and National Guard and later spread to the regular Army.137 The
most immediate impact of these problems involves a shortfall of
newly enlisted recruits, but there are other less visible and longerterm
effects should the United States accept large numbers of only
marginally qualified applicants, and these individuals remain in the
military as professional soldiers.138 Moreover, various journalists
have stated that strong opposition to the Iraq war among some
minority groups, and particularly African-Americans, has begun to
influence the Army’s ability to recruit minority soldiers.139 Since a
military draft appears politically unsustainable, it is not clear what
will be done if the Iraq war becomes increasingly unpopular, and
military enlistments take an even more dramatic fall. In response to
these types of concerns, Army Vice Chief of Staff General Richard A.
Cody has stated, “What keeps me awake at night is what will this all
volunteer force look like in 2007?”140
Recruiting problems nevertheless may be at least partially
reversible even under contemporary circumstances. In the face of
current problems, the military recruiting system has expanded,
and new methods to attract recruits have been implemented. Nearterm
solutions currently being pursued have involved increasing
enlistment and reenlistment incentives, making limited reductions
on educational requirements to enter the Army or Army Reserve,
seeking transfers from the Navy and Air Force, creating 15-month
terms of enlistment, and raising the maximum age for U.S. Army
Reserve recruits.
U.S. Army retention (reenlistment, rather than first-time
enlistment) is currently not a major problem when considering overall
numbers, although there are shortfalls in various important military
occupational specialties (MOS).142 Retention rates may remain high
so long as troops and their families feel that their sacrifice is serving a
long-term good. Nevertheless, some individuals may now be opting
to leave military service after 20 years with the minimum retirement
benefits, despite the fact that they had previously planned to stay
in the service longer. On an even more threatening level, retention
could collapse if a belief that the war is futile begins to dominate the
society, and this outlook then begins to influence troops who might
otherwise reenlist. Additionally, there are some disadvantages
today’s troops have when compared to soldiers fighting in earlier
wars. In Vietnam, for example, only those who volunteered to do
so served a second tour in combat, except in rare instances involving
career officers and soldiers. In Iraq (and Afghanistan), many troops
are required to perform a second or even a third combat tour as part
of normal unit rotations. These requirements increasingly could
cause soldiers to rethink the disproportionate burden that society is
placing on them, while the bulk of the population remains sheltered
and in some cases indifferent to the war.