OK, my take on Pribram's current state of mind is that he still denies that there is anything which we can call mind (whether substance, relationship, process or whatever) which can impact on the world. He is still a mechanist in that sense.
Do not be deceived by his talk of Quantum Mechanics. Although in QM, the future state of a system cannot in principle be calculated from its antecedent conditions, that is not how Pribram sees it. He ascribes to the minority Bohm interpretation which posits that there are underlying, unknowable, determinist processes to QM. Without going into details, most commentatators accept that Bohm's interpretation is not the natural choice (for one, it makes different, harder to justify, assumptions than standard QM). Physical experiments are in principle possible to rule out his ideas so they are scientific, but at the time of writing, these experiments are yet to be performed.
In other words, Pribram is speculatively pushing a mechanistic theory of mind, and obscuring that fact by the language he uses. According to Pribram's view, one may be conscious, but nevertheless lack any ability to choose or act. As he puts it ...
By the time they (a mental creation) get to be mental images, it's already pretty well set into space-time form.
So he's dressed what he says in the language of QM, usually understood as a non-determinist theory. He uses "spiritual" language, the type of language which is used to address the dilemas of human freedom and responsibility. But actually, he's still pushing a determinist theory of human behaviour. His is not a theory of mind as such. His is more a theory that minds have no function. In other words, he is using the language of spirituality and QM to disguise the fact that he is (now) what is called an
epiphenomenalist.
There is one very simple, very cogent, and for some, very difficult problem with the doctrine of epiphenomenalism. Daniel C Dennett gives the argument
here, in the section of the talk on
consciousness, seven minutes in.
It's amusing to see his poor interviewer trying (and failing!) to understand the fatal flaw of epiphenomenalism. But epiphenomenalism claims that consciousness cannot be detected or discovered by any physical process. Including, of course, brain processes. In other words, a person who is claiming to be conscious cannot be doing so as a result of epiphenomenalism. It does not, and cannot, explain why people claim to be conscious
