Time?

[axon]

Read The Field by Lynne McTaggart, I know I always mention it but its the best starting point for people who want to know more (which only a small inquisitive percentage will)

The trouble with The Field is that it sets of fruitloopery alarm bells. Just look at the synopsis from Amazon.

"McTaggart, an investigative journalist (What Doctors Don't Tell You), describes scientific discoveries that she believes point to a unifying concept of the universe"
Obviously an investigative journalist is just the right person to to solve the deepest mysteries of physics.

"These fields ..... they control everything from cellular communication.."
This is quite simply bollocks.

"Physicists have been aware of the likelihood of this field for years, McTaggart writes, but, constrained by orthodoxy, they have ignored its effects,"
Aha ! It's a conspiracy, the evil physicists all conform to the orthodox view. Yes, quite, quantum physics, relativity, these are both well known areas of science that are constrained by orthodoxy and have never come up with any radicle hypothesese

"McTaggart asserts, "tiny pockets of quiet rebellion" against scientific convention are emerging, led by Ed Mitchell, an Apollo 14 astronaut and founder of the Institute for Noetic Sciences"
The Institute of Noetic Sciences. I've never heard of it but I did find this article in the latest edition of their magazine
"THE HOMEOPATHIC UNIVERSE: DISEASE AND HEALING AS MANIFESTATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS By Iris R. Bell
Homeopathy's proven effectiveness defies traditional scientific principles. The reasons may lie at the deepest intersection of the physical and the spiritual."
This tells me enough to know that the institute is certainly not about science (and that it is bollocks).

The last bit of the synopsis sounds about right, although I suspect it is a massive understatement.
"McTaggart writes well and tells a good story, but the supporting data here is somewhat sketchy"

 

[Azrael23]

Why are you so dependent upon what other people think? Is it a self worth issue? Personally I`d prefer to make my own judgements. Do you not trust yourself?

I love the way you think that shouting bullocks is in someway synonymous with having a point to begin with.

*awaits usual "yeah but your a loon" response.

 

[Crispy]

Who are you talking to?

I'm making my own judgements about someone who clearly doesn't understand the first thing about the science she's writing about. I trust myself not to get taken in by such unbased pseudo-science. I would gladly call it all bollocks to her face.

 

[axon]

Why are you so dependent upon what other people think?

What does this statement relate too???

 

[Azrael23]

Who are you talking to?

I'm making my own judgements about someone who clearly doesn't understand the first thing about the science she's writing about. I trust myself not to get taken in by such unbased pseudo-science. I would gladly call it all bollocks to her face.

Unbased? Some of the talk of Benvenistes experiments are dubious, I would agree. However you`ve not read the book and don`t have a clue what your on about. So I doubt she`d care what you ranted in her face.

My point was similar to Alberts.

"Great spirits have always found violent opposition from mediocre minds. The latter cannot
understand it when a man does not thoughtlessly submit to hereditary prejudices but honestly and courageously uses his intelligence."

IE I`m sick of people who cannot think for themselves and instead submit to petty social prejudice. Quantum Physics paints a far stranger universe than anyone here dare entertain, yet experts in this field are lauded rather than mocked for being fruitloops...why? You think they are the only branch of science that uses experimental method to explore/explain the extraordinary?

 

[Jonti]

But Azrael23, we are all dependent upon what other people think. You too -- you often quote people approvingly, or offer suggestions as to what folk should read. There's nothing wrong with that. Isaac Newton once said "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants."

He wasn't the first to talk in this way, and he certainly won't be the last. Knowing stuff is a social activity, not something an atomised individual does in isolation. That particular aphorism has a very long history. You can read about some of it here.

 

[Jonti]

I think time in being intrinsically linked to matter is about as real as matter is. How many people have had dreams or "experiences" ( ) where it seems to have been hours but when you awake you realise you`ve only been lying down for a few minutes?

Time is dependent upon the experience of the observer.

Aristotle would have agreed (I think ) And certainly, thought experiments which involve only a single consciousness in an unchanging universe reduce time to that being's subjective sense of duration, nothing more.

Roughly, modern science thinks of the world as a made out of matter and energy within a container of space and time. But it may well be that the world does not so much exist in time, as is made out of time.

 

[Crispy]

Okay, I revise my total discounting of this women's book to a very strong skepticism. Just as I would not trust britteny spears to tell me about C15th french cathedral architecture.

 

[axon]

Quantum Physics paints a far stranger universe than anyone here dare entertain, yet experts in this field are lauded rather than mocked for being fruitloops...why?

I think it might be because they are doing science, as opposed to baseless handwaving that adheres to their preconceived idea of how the universe is.

 

[Azrael23]

But Azrael23, we are all dependent upon what other people think. You too -- you often quote people approvingly, or offer suggestions as to what folk should read. There's nothing wrong with that. Isaac Newton once said "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants."

He wasn't the first to talk in this way, and he certainly won't be the last. Knowing stuff is a social activity, not something an atomised individual does in isolation. That particular aphorism has a very long history. You can read about some of it here.

I agree, Its not that I think i`m special in any sense, ego is the enemy afterall. It just annoys me when people dismiss things out of hand. Also when you get flak for going against preconceptions, preconceptions which are often based on faulty logic.

 

[Jonti]

suspend your preconceptions!

Sure, you're not alone in that either.

So what do you think of these definitions ...

Relative or human time, classical time, is that time which is measured by clocks and observations of movement. Without some change in the world of objects and movement (including within our brains, which are also bodies in the world of objects and movement) we are aware neither of time nor of our own existence and awareness (pace Aristotle). This classical, relative time is necessary owing to the nature of mind (pace Kant). The order of events in relative space-time is not the true order of things, for the speed of light is invariant to motion (pace Einstein).

Absolute time is true and mathematical time. It flows equably of itself and from its own nature, without relation to anything external (pace Newton). It is the order of things which cannot be reordered, the true or absolute order. True and absolute order is necessary by the mathematical structure of things. Its movement is silent, it conveys no information.

Consciousness is the relationship between absolute time and relative time. It relates the true order of things on the one hand, to events or changes in relative space-time on the other. In this relationship lies the exercise of freewill and the natural meaning of consciousness.

 

[Jonti]

You could say something stronger than this - computation would be impossible without the second law of thermodynamics.

Any ordering process will produce heat in accordance to laws of thermodynamics and the second law is one of the few time irreversable laws in physics. So computation and the passage of time are closely linked.

Mind you, you would still need some sort of memory which would require some sort of matter or energy in which to store it, presumably somewhere in space...

I am taking it as a given that consciousness involves some sort of computation - although that's not to say that this is all consciousness is.

Seems to me you must have some sort of computation ("information processing") going on for an organised consciousness alright. And its really handy if some processes are conscious. But that still leaves the "raw material of awareness" which is given shape by all that. Where does that come from?

I reckon it's got to come from adding information to a situation. That's advantageous for an organism: it gives it a bigger behaviour space. It gets to choose its future, rather than be an automaton.

 

[fogbat]

There is only the eternal moment of now.

Physics is getting closer to proving this as well.

I love the convergence of mysticism and science.

Oh, Azrael23, you're so versatile!
Is there any subject upon which you can't spew forth gallons of shit?

 

[Knotted]

Seems to me you must have some sort of computation ("information processing") going on for an organised consciousness alright. And its really handy if some processes are conscious. But that still leaves the "raw material of awareness" which is given shape by all that. Where does that come from?

I reckon it's got to come from adding information to a situation. That's advantageous for an organism: it gives it a bigger behaviour space. It gets to choose its future, rather than be an automaton.

I'm a hard core determinist but I could see how a notion of absolute time accessible to the mind but not to matter would be useful if you believe in free will so I can see where you are coming from. However, this would not prevent the mind from being an automaton following its own (distinct) rules.

 

[Jonti]

Yes, that's right. I'm looking for a way to understand how freewill (or better, the reality of choice) can exist in a regular and lawful world.

Of course, a hardcore determinist can always argue (as they do already, in the context of QM) that there could be unknowable determinist mechanisms that underlie the apparent underdetermined nature of events.

But, right now, as I often point out, a single unpredictable click of a Geiger counter is enough to dispose of hard core determinism. The null hypotheses, according to the present state of knowledge, is that future states of the universe are underdetermined by the present state. There is more than one future state of the world which could arise from present conditions.

 

[Knotted]

Yes, that's right. I'm looking for a way to understand how freewill (or better, the reality of choice) can exist in a regular and lawful world.

Of course, a hardcore determinist can always argue (as they do already, in the context of QM) that there could be unknowable determinist mechanisms that underlie the apparent underdetermined nature of events.

But, right now, as I often point out, a single unpredictable click of a Geiger counter is enough to dispose of hard core determinism. The null hypotheses, according to the present state of knowledge, is that future states of the universe are underdetermined by the present state. There is more than one future state of the world which could arise from present conditions.

I disagree, but that's sort of beside the point as I don't see how randomness allows the will to be free. The idea that the future is undeterminable even in theory suggests that our attempts to determine it freely are utterly doomed. Then, if there is a sort of extraordinary notion of time that our minds have access to in order to process extra information about the future then this is just bringing back hard core determinism by the back door!

 

[Jonti]

I disagree, but that's sort of beside the point as I don't see how randomness allows the will to be free. The idea that the future is undeterminable even in theory suggests that our attempts to determine it freely are utterly doomed. Then, if there is a sort of extraordinary notion of time that our minds have access to in order to process extra information about the future then this is just bringing back hard core determinism by the back door!

Perhaps I've added to your confusion by not explicitly saying I do not accept your charactarisation (here) of what I said. But I did not, and would not say absolute time (is) accessible to the mind but not to matter. I can't begin to imagine what that means -- as far as I am concerned, mind arises as a result of physical processes. We only have knowledge of embodied minds.

Yes, the existance of randomness does not imply that choice is real. Certainly not, if by random you mean random like the lottery. What I am asserting is this ... physical theory posits a world in whose future states are not predictable from its current state. That's a fact.

This fact by no means proves the reality of choice. But it does allow the possibility it may be a real phenomena, whereas LaPlacian determinism explicitly rules it out.

 

[Knotted]

Perhaps I've added to your confusion by not explicitly saying I do not accept your charactarisation (here) of what I said. But I did not, and would not say absolute time (is) accessible to the mind but not to matter. I can't begin to imagine what that means -- as far as I am concerned, mind arises as a result of physical processes. We only have knowledge of embodied minds.

OK. So according to you, consciousness involves accessing more information than an automaton can. So if the physical process involved in organising this additional information can be tracked down, understood, properly theorised and replicated then surely this new theory is likely to be able to predict and account for phenomenon that existing physical theory cannot predict?

 

[Jonti]

OK. So according to you, consciousness involves accessing more information than an automaton can. So if the physical process involved in organising this additional information can be tracked down, understood, properly theorised and replicated then surely this new theory is likely to be able to predict and account for phenomenon that existing physical theory cannot predict?

Well, there's nothing wrong with being ambitious

And I certainly argue that there's more to consciousness than Turing processes. For one thing, there's absolutely no need to imagine that any Turing process (any clockwork, determinist engine) has consciousness. There is nothing about the functioning of Turing processes that demands we should posit any such extra ingredient. So why bother? Facing up to the Problems of Consciousness is a damn good read in this context.

But no, it's not a matter of accessing information. It's more a matter of being able to add information. This is something that, by definition, no Turing machine can do. When we imagine Laplacian determinism (the Newtonian billiard ball universe) then the future states of the system are entirely predictable from its present state. As indeed are all past states. Despite the Second Law, such a system has no arrow of time as such. It could run backwards. The arrow of time that arises from the Second Law is a statistical thing -- it's just very (^ googolplex) unlikely all the air molecules in this room will spend the next half hour in that corner ------>

So I am suggesting that there may exist processes whereby information can be added to a situation. It's worth reflecting that if an organism ever evolved this ability, then it would have access to a larger behaviour space than Turing competitors, and the facility would likely be favoured. It would have a degree of freedom. It would have some ability to make choices. And that (philosophically speaking) implies consciousness.

 

[Knotted]

Well, there's nothing wrong with being ambitious

And I certainly argue that there's more to consciousness than Turing processes. For one thing, there's absolutely no need to imagine that any Turing process (any clockwork, determinist engine) has consciousness. There is nothing about the functioning of Turing processes that demands we should posit any such extra ingredient. So why bother? Facing up to the Problems of Consciousness is a damn good read in this context.

But surely Chalmers violates the null hypothesis that consciouness is not a 'fundamental property' of the universe.

I'm as much a hardcore reductionist as I am a hardcore determinist. I tend to think that theories or interpretations of theories which say otherwise are just a cop out.

But no, it's not a matter of accessing information. It's more a matter of being able to add information. This is something that, by definition, no Turing machine can do. When we imagine Laplacian determinism (the Newtonian billiard ball universe) then the future states of the system are entirely predictable from its present state. As indeed are all past states. Despite the Second Law, such a system has no arrow of time as such. It could run backwards. The arrow of time that arises from the Second Law is a statistical thing -- it's just very (^ googolplex) unlikely all the air molecules in this room will spend the next half hour in that corner ------>

So I am suggesting that there may exist processes whereby information can be added to a situation. It's worth reflecting that if an organism ever evolved this ability, then it would have access to a larger behaviour space than Turing competitors, and the facility would likely be favoured. It would have a degree of freedom. It would have some ability to make choices. And that (philosophically speaking) implies consciousness.

If the mind can add information (presumably from nowhere) this means that
a) consciouness is a non-computable process but it still maybe a deterministic one. So its probably computability that you want to attack, not determinism.
b) the processing of existing information along with the additional infomation would be just as automaton-like as just processing the existing information. I would suggest that if you want to introduce some sort of free will, then aspect of the brain which produces consciousness should not be about producing or processing information [or quantum information for that matter] at all.

 

[Jonti]

If the World is open (meaning its future state cannot be calculated from its present state, which is the present scientific consensus) -- then hard determinism fails. Events may still be more-or-less predictable, and we may be able to understand and appreciate patterns. But perfectly detailed predictions of future events are impossible. That's just the way it is. You cannot (in principle) precisely predict when a particular atom of radioactive material will decay. Mind you, even in a situation of Laplacian determinism, one cannot in principle exactly predict the course of future events. The phenomena of Chaos sees to that. You can still adhere to determinism as a philosophical viewpoint, of course. But it's not that useful in modern physics (particularly QM, of course) or biology and many other sciences.

The added information could, I suppose, be balanced by its disappearance elsewhere, from an overdetermined process. There's no need to presume it comes from nowhere. I don't see any objection to the idea that consciousness adds information to creation, myself.

I don't follow your point (a) at all. If something, some outcome, cannot be computed from antecedent conditions (whether mechanically by gears and wheels, or electronically by switches) then in what sense do you hold that that outcome may nevertheless be determined? How would you know?

I'm happy to grant your point (b), but I do not see how the suggestion you go on to make folllows from the point. I'm interested in why you make the claim "... (the) aspect of the brain which produces consciousness should not be about producing or processing information... at all..." Can you explain that, please?

Good rap

 

[Jonti]

But surely Chalmers violates the null hypothesis that consciouness is not a 'fundamental property' of the universe.

Well, I think so. That's what the three definitions are about. Build it in from the start as you can never hope to derive it later.

But that deserves a thread to itself. Is it really the null hypothesis ... ?

 

[Knotted]

If the World is open (meaning its future state cannot be calculated from its present state, which is the present scientific consensus) -- then hard determinism fails. Events may still be more-or-less predictable, and we may be able to understand and appreciate patterns. But perfectly detailed predictions of future events are impossible. That's just the way it is. You cannot (in principle) precisely predict when a particular atom of radioactive material will decay. Mind you, even in a situation of Laplacian determinism, one cannot in principle exactly predict the course of future events. The phenomena of Chaos sees to that. You can still adhere to determinism as a philosophical viewpoint, of course. But it's not that useful in modern physics (particularly QM, of course) or biology and many other sciences.

I wasn't really wanting to get too involved with debating determinism - I was just stating my position. Come to think of it I don't think there is any contradiction between determinism and free will. Free will isn't just random behaviour, if anything it just asserts that conscious behaviour is inexplicable in reductionist terms.

However I'm still cheerfully a hard determinist. The fact that it is problematic is no worry to me. Interpretations of physical theory should be problematic - physical theory is incomplete (or at least inexact). I'm actually more inclined to worry about general relativity and 'cosmic censorship' than I am to worry about the uncertainty principle.

I don't follow your point (a) at all. If something, some outcome, cannot be computed from antecedent conditions (whether mechanically by gears and wheels, or electronically by switches) then in what sense do you hold that that outcome may nevertheless be determined? How would you know?

There are processes both in the abstract and arguably in physics which are not Turing computable but deterministic. You might like to think of it as the computer would have to make an infinite number of computations every second in order to keep up.

Roger Penrose in particular makes a big point with respect to a version of Maxwell's wave equation which is deterministic and non-computable in The Emperor's New Mind.

I'm happy to grant your point (b), but I do not see how the suggestion you go on to make folllows from the point. I'm interested in why you make the claim "... (the) aspect of the brain which produces consciousness should not be about producing or processing information... at all..." Can you explain the reasoning behind this claim, please?

Good rap

I'm assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is some sort of 'reality of choice' even if I don't really believe in it. Deterministic physical laws will not help you (obviously), non-deterministic physical laws will not help you (almost as obviously), and even extra information (no matter how spooky the source is) will not help you because the decision process is still just as automaton like. If the mind is a (finite) information processor then it is a turing machine (cf Church-Turin-Post thesis). Furthermore this is true even if the processor is gaining extra information about itself with respect to solutions to the halting problem for various problems it is trying to solve.

Having said all that, even though I'm a physicalist or materialist reductionist I still might entertain a weak notion of free will in terms of hypercomputers - which would use deterministic but non-computable processes.

 

[Jonti]

Damn. I've read that book. I've even got it

I'm happy to accept the operational definition conscious behaviour is inexplicable in reductionist terms.

 

[Jonti]

wait up!

There are processes both in the abstract and arguably in physics which are not Turing computable but deterministic. You might like to think of it as the computer would have to make an infinite number of computations every second in order to keep up.

Roger Penrose in particular makes a big point with respect to a version of Maxwell's wave equation which is deterministic and non-computable in The Emperor's New Mind.

I guess you mean this bit ...

... Marian Bokyan Pour-El and Ian Richards have been able to show that even though solutions of the wave equation behave deterministically in the ordinary sense -- ie data provided at an initial time will determine the solution at all othet times --there exist computable initial data, of a certain 'peculiar' kind, with the property that for a later computable time the determined value of the field is actually not computable. Thus the equations of a plausible physical field theory (albeit not quite the Maxwell theory that actually holds true in our world) can, in the sense of Pour-El and Richards, give rise to a non-computable evolution!

... [but] ... Pour-El and Richards actually prove that non-computablity cannot arise for the wave equation if we disallow this kind of ['peculiar', not 'smoothly varying'] field ... It could have relevance only when measurements of arbitrarily high precision are allowed.

The source you cited seems be saying that, yes, non-computable but deterministic processes are a theoretical possibility, but not a practical one. When we are talking about brains, we are certainly talking about practical possibilities! But thanks for pointing it out. I particularly like this tip You might like to think of it as the computer would have to make an infinite number of computations every second in order to keep up.

I won't forget the point again It seems we may have to say "countably computable (where countable means finite or countably infinite) implies determinist", and not "finitely computable implies determinist". I'm comfortable with that. I don't think it derails my line of thinking.

It's interesting how a discussion about time can so quickly head off into one about consciousness and freewill. I think we are jumping the gun quite considerably. As you said right at the start, discussions of computability (certainly of brains) have to presume the existance of space. So far all we've got is definitions of time and (raw) consciousness (if folk are happy with those). But to understand the relationship between the raw stuff of consciousness and an organised, structured consciousness, we need the processing that structures awareness. We need memory. We need the concept of a shared space.

 

[Jonti]

... I'm assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is some sort of 'reality of choice' even if I don't really believe in it. Deterministic physical laws will not help you (obviously), non-deterministic physical laws will not help you (almost as obviously), and even extra information (no matter how spooky the source is) will not help you because the decision process is still just as automaton like. If the mind is a (finite) information processor then it is a turing machine (cf Church-Turin-Post thesis). Furthermore this is true even if the processor is gaining extra information about itself with respect to solutions to the halting problem for various problems it is trying to solve.

Having said all that, even though I'm a physicalist or materialist reductionist I still might entertain a weak notion of free will in terms of hypercomputers - which would use deterministic but non-computable processes.

The thing about determinist processes and information is, I think, far simpler than this. An analogy: in the cellular automaton game "Life", devised by John Conway, a live cell can be taken to represent one bit of information. Clearly, "Life" is determinist (even if the only way to see what happens is to run the game). But allow that information can be added into the "Life" matrix, and the outcome no longer follows from the initial conditions. The added bit of information diverts the course of events.

Of course the question of how that bit of extra info is added immediately grabs the attention. But without going into the mechanics of that, the metaphor illustrates that adding information to a situation is a mechanism for diverting the course of events.

 

[Knotted]

I guess you mean this bit ...

If I understand Penrose correctly, and I am not sure I do on this particular point, then a new theory of quantum gravity might theorise this strange type of field. It wouldn't be altogether surprising - given that general relativity allows for singularities. Not that I'm familiar with Pour-El and Richards' model. Looking back Penrose does not make such a big point of this as I remembered...

I won't forget the point again It seems we may have to say "countably computable (where countable means finite or countably infinite) implies determinist", and not "finitely computable implies determinist". I'm comfortable with that. I don't think it derails my line of thinking.

I don't think you have to introduce countability into the question and its not entirely clear to me what infinite computability is - other than it isn't finite computability. Although hypercomputers are hypothetical, be wary of trying to think of them as infinitely fast turing machines - they are just machines that can use some sort of mechanism to solve the halting problem. Let's just stick with computable implies deterministic but not necessarily the other way round.

Incidently, one reason I find the idea that the mind is a hypercomputer attractive is that a hypercomputer has what could be described as 'self-awareness' in that it can solve a class of problems which are essentially self-referential.

But yes I don't think any of this derails your line of thinking - it just offers an alternative.

It's interesting how a discussion about time can so quickly head off into one about consciousness and freewill. I think we are jumping the gun quite considerably. As you said right at the start, discussions of computability (certainly of brains) have to presume the existance of space. So far all we've got is definitions of time and (raw) consciousness (if folk are happy with those). But to understand the relationship between the raw stuff of consciousness and an organised, structured consciousness, we need the processing that structures awareness. We need memory. We need the concept of a shared space.

I'm certainly not happy with your definition 'absolute time' - apart from anything it is not a definition but a description and it seems to be a description of the Platonic world of forms - and if anything Plato's theory of forms is a theory of the unchanging and timeless.

Similarly with your definition of 'relative time', its just a description, although its a reasonable enough description.

Your definition of consciousness, if I take 'the true order of things' to mean the Platonic world of forms has a certain attractiveness as far as I am concerned but even if I were to accept some form of Platonism, I don't see why a brick does not relate between absolute and relative time any less than the human mind. It would be odd to ascribe the brick as having free will!

However, to go back to my original point, it is surely uncontroversial that the operation of the brain involves some sort of ordinary computation at some point and thus dependent on both some sort notions of time and space.

 

[Knotted]

The thing about determinist processes and information is, I think, far simpler than this. An analogy: in the cellular automaton game "Life", devised by John Conway, a live cell can be taken to represent one bit of information. Clearly, "Life" is determinist (even if the only way to see what happens is to run the game). But allow that information can be added into the "Life" matrix, and the outcome no longer follows from the initial conditions. The added bit of information diverts the course of events.

If you take any corner of the universe including a computer calculating a game of Life then of course it is open and can be modified by something from outside that corner of the universe. Right now I am adding information to a Turing machine by tapping on keys. Its still a Turing machine!

Of course the question of how that bit of extra info is added immediately grabs the attention. But without going into the mechanics of that, the metaphor illustrates that adding information to a situation is a mechanism for diverting the course of events.

Surely if the universe is non-deterministic then this is the same as saying that information is being added from a source outside the universe. Which is possible I suppose but it places a pessimistic restriction on questions that science can answer. As I said before, this is just a cop out.

 

[Jonti]

If you take any corner of the universe including a computer calculating a game of Life then of course it is open and can be modified by something from outside that corner of the universe. Right now I am adding information to a Turing machine by tapping on keys. Its still a Turing machine!

Surely if the universe is non-deterministic then this is the same as saying that information is being added from a source outside the universe. Which is possible I suppose but it places a pessimistic restriction on questions that science can answer. As I said before, this is just a cop out.

It's a metaphor, not a cop out! And it's a bit rich of you to complain. Didn't you say (of your own, determinist philosophy) The fact that it is problematic is no worry to me. But no amount of reductive analysis enables one to understand a movie, or a poem. I mean, cut me the same slack, huh?

You seem to hold that information can neither be created or destroyed. That's by no means a certainty is it? Readers may think about the planet now, compared to a few thousand million years back. There's a lot more going on, a lot more detailed events happening. Is there really no more information at play? That's not an easy thing to believe.

I'm sure you have a clear idea of what you mean by information. But there is a sense in which the beholder ("reader") decides what is and what isn't information. Remember the old joke about punch cards -- the less card there is left, the more information it contains! More generally, the information contained in a binary file (for example) depends on how it is read. If it were a program file, it could, in theory, result in quite different programs when run on different systems.

Surely if the universe is non-deterministic then this is the same as saying that information is being added from a source outside the universe. Which is possible I suppose but it places a pessimistic restriction on questions that science can answer.

Nah, this does not follow. It really depends on what you want your science to do. Anyway, consider that the addition of random noise to otherwise determinist processes would result in a non-determinist universe. The conventional interpretation is that phenemena such as radioactive decay do just that. You don't seem to accept that

Or what about meteorology? Chaos will always limit how far ahead we can make accurate weather predictions. But I don't see that as placing a pessimistic restriction on questions of meteorology. The fact we cannot minutely predict the weather in Brighton ten years in advance hardly matters. There's still a very great deal to learn about the dynamics of weather systems, on other planets too.

Agreed, the operation of the brain is dependent on notions of time and space. That's what makes understanding time such an interesting project, and demands that consciousness be included.

 

[Jonti]

I don't see why a brick does not relate between absolute and relative time any less than the human mind. It would be odd to ascribe the brick as having free will!

<kicks brick>

Bricks are well real to us, they offer opportunites and constrain possibilities. But they are not themselves able to choose to divert the flow of relative time, in the sense of sending events down one path rather than another. They are not agents in the ordering of events.