Thought experiments

[Demosthenes]

Externalism has odd consequences if I've understood it correctly.

From what I've heard, - if you accept externalism about thought, then if for example, I'm thinking about shape-shifting lizards from another dimension, - then presuming that there aren't actually any shape-shifting lizards, - then, even though I think I'm thinking about them, actually I'm not, - because my thought has no content.

But maybe I've misunderstood it.

 

[Knotted]

Yes, - I think what I said about causal relations is wrong. The externalist idea about thinking is that if I'm thinking about the queen, then the content of my thought is the actual queen, rather than some internal mental representation of the queen, so a thought about X transcends the person who's thinking about X.

I think you have overstated it. The externalist says that meaning is not purely dependent on what goes on inside the head. I don't think the queen needs to exist at all. Perhaps in the twin world the queen is just a myth.

So you could have two people with exactly the same psychological state saying the same thing about the queen, but one will be making a true statement while the other is making a false statement.

[Edit to add: Consider the possibility that the queen is a myth in both worlds but in one world the myth is sustained by an imposter. The thought experiment requires no commitment to some sort of realism or theory of truth.]

This is saying more about the nature of meaning than it is about the nature of the mind. In fact I don't think it says anything at all about the nature of the mind beyond what we mean by "meaning".

Is meaning fixed? Can we pin it down and say this is what we mean when we talk about the queen? If we do pin it down say at a point of time for a particular person then is this really what we are talking about? In what sense can we translate someone's mental picture of the queen into words? If we can translate it would the words mean anything to someone else?

Whereas an internalist about thought would say it was the internal representation.

To be a bit more careful meaning can be purely described in terms of the inner workings of the mind. The image or the representation is not the meaning (unless you theorise that it is).

Well I can only say that I myself think that zombies are impossible. What I'm denying is that physicalism has the resources to justify this contention. On a purely physical account, explaining the structure and the behaviour of the constituent parts, explains the structure and the behaviour of the whole, - there's nothing for the phenomenal consciousness to explain, there's nothing for it to do, and there's no need for it to be there. It's redundant, unexplained and unexplanatory.

I prefer to narrow it down to 'subjective experience' rather than 'phenomenal consciousness'. This is simply because the only problem I see is with the 'subjective experience'. Everything else about consciousness strikes me as having a functional purpose. Its only what experience is to me that cannot have a physical explanation or for that matter any other explanation. What is there to explain?

This is perhaps where we don't see eye to eye. My zombies have less taken out of them.

But if this is the case then we have ceased doing philosophy and we are back to natural science.

I don't totally get the connection. I mean, could you unpack that a bit.? But my intuitions were always in the first place that meanings are "in the head.", and that it is in virtue of conforming to the the "meaning/mental stereotype" of some word, that the objects denoted by that word are objects of that type.

Maybe what I've written above helps. But the quote is beautifully clear and straightforward in my view. If I ask you to continue the series:
2,4,6,8,10,12,...
I would mean you to write "200" for the hundredth term. I would not necessarily have thought about the hundredth term at all. It is a statement about the meaning of meaning in its everyday use. There is no trick here. Its just asking you to consider how "meaning" works.

Whereas externalism seems to presuppose some sort of direct realism where how it is that an object is an object of its type is left unexplained.

I really don't think that's true. We could say that our notion of the queen is not to do with the actual queen, but its just a model that we fit in some sense to our sense data. Our model could still be demolished if the sense data disagrees with it. So until that point we could still have two different meanings associated with the same meantal state. One which has a meaning that is about to be falsified and the other with a meaning that is about to be verified. I think that all externalism requires is the possibility of you being surprised by something.

I think you are grabbing the wrong end of the stick. Its not about idealism or realism etc. Its about meaning.

On thought experiments in general, - I reckon they're useful, when they're constrained by possibility. I mean I think John Searle's chinese room thought experiment is extremely enlightening, - not because it proves anything one way or another, but because thinking about it in detail, causes insight about the problems being discussed, - makes you clarify what you think.

I never liked it, but I've come round to thinking that its significant. But then that was not by considering it.

I've come round to thinking that the twin earth argument is significant, but only by ignoring it.

I'm thinking that thought experiments are not particularly illustrative on their own. They are better for providing a battle ground for ideas than for introducing ideas or proving ideas. When the debate starts the thought experiment seems obscure, it then takes centre stage as the debate rages and finally it disappears if and when agreement has been reached.

Thought experiments are dependent on disagreement. Their use is essentially external.

 

[Jonti]

...
When you ask if somebody is conscious you are not asking if they have a brain process, you are asking if they exhibit conscious behaviour.

I'd prefer: you are asking if things are meaningful for them.

 

[8ball]

I'd prefer: you are asking if things are meaningful for them.

Hmmm - think that might be open to misinterpretation.

 

[Jonti]

...
If the world is one sensation after the next with no possibility of connection between the sensations then there would be no meaning to the world. We cannot meaningfully refer to pure sensation.

I'd use other words, but I think I agree. I think meaning comes from the integration of phenomenisca.

 

[Jonti]

Hmmm - think that might be open to misinterpretation.

Yeah, very much so I'm just happy with the consistency

 

[Jonti]

...
I prefer to narrow it down to 'subjective experience' rather than 'phenomenal consciousness'. This is simply because the only problem I see is with the 'subjective experience'. Everything else about consciousness strikes me as having a functional purpose. Its only what experience is to me that cannot have a physical explanation or for that matter any other explanation. What is there to explain?

This is perhaps where we don't see eye to eye. My zombies have less taken out of them.

But if this is the case then we have ceased doing philosophy and we are back to natural science.
...

Well I'm happy with that, but then again I think any decent philosophy of mind would be a kind of natural philosophy anyway, one that would pave the way for a scientific understanding.

All the same, doesn't it boil down to rejecting the "Why is there something rather than nothing?" question?

 

[Knotted]

I'd prefer: you are asking if things are meaningful for them.

In the every day use of the term is that right? We don't try to understand what it really means to be conscious when we usually use the term.

When we try to use it in a philosophical or scientific sense how much do we understand each other? When we try to pin it down doesn't it seem to loose some of its character?

 

[Jonti]

In the every day use of the term is that right? We don't try to understand what it really means to be conscious when we usually use the term.

When we try to use it in a philosophical or scientific sense how much do we understand each other? When we try to pin it down doesn't it seem to loose some of its character?

8ball was right, as I acknowledged; it's hardly an everyday use of the term. What does it mean to "exhibit conscious behaviour" anyway? Making choices that are meaningful to the body/mind is the hallmark of conscious behaviour.

Looked at this way, the idea of "meaning" has the potential to act as a bridging concept for the explanatory gap. That things have meaning is the 'subjective' aspect; the latter, conscious behaviour, is the 'objective' aspect.

What is meaning anyway? Well, it seems to be something to do with information, as in the adage (attributed to Djikstra, I believe) that the meaning of data is the information it contains. Information, like meaning, cannot exist in a vacuum. It's meaning or information for somebody. That body has to have some kind of information about the data in order to interpret it as meaningful.

There's an amusing thought-experiment to show this. It's realistic in the sense that it could actually be done. A computer program is just a very large binary number. But that binary could be two quite different applications, depending on the hardware (more strictly strictly, the operating system) on which it is run. The meaning of the program binary is not something in itself; it depends on the system's recognising it as information by treating it appropriately. The system has to have information about the data for it to be meaningful.

 

[Demosthenes]

I went to this talk the other day about externalism and internalism, and the guy giving the talk had a complicated argument that I couldn't follow for internalism, - but tbh, the whole thing kind of seemed to demonstrate the futility of philosophy, as all these experts seem to have got totally immersed in the terminology of de dicto and de re, but when it comes to even a very carefully crafted and exact argument, using the terms, it turns out none of them can agree about how they should be used.

But just in case anyone thinks that debates about externalism vs internalism, are abstruse discussions of no possible relevance to the real world, I thought I'd point out an amusing consequence that they could have. Coincidentally, it seemed like someone else noticed this, because in this talk, - someone (not me) started making some points concerning people who think wine is the blood of christ. (but they were slightly unclear.)

The thought I had, is - if you imagine some parallel universe where wine is illegal, and someone gets charged with intent to supply, and defends himself by saying that he intended to supply, not wine, but the blood of christ, - then
on an externalist account, this defence is no good, because basically it's quite irrelevant to the content of his intent, what description he intended to supply the wine under, - so the prosecution could get in an expert philosopher, - to testify to this, and then having established that the wine is wine, chemically, - the case is proved. But of course on an internalist account, the what he intended to supply depends not on what it actually is, but what he thought it is.

 

[i-am-your-idea]

The thought I had, is - if you imagine some parallel universe where wine is illegal, and someone gets charged with intent to supply, and defends himself by saying that he intended to supply, not wine, but the blood of christ, - then
on an externalist account, this defence is no good, because basically it's quite irrelevant to the content of his intent, what description he intended to supply the wine under, - so the prosecution could get in an expert philosopher, - to testify to this, and then having established that the wine is wine, chemically, - the case is proved. But of course on an internalist account, the what he intended to supply depends not on what it actually is, but what he thought it is.

nice example!

let me check i've understood. so if someone is selling banana skins, thinking they are drugs then their intention is to sell drugs. an externalist would say they just intended to sell bananas?

but if one day, we found a way to really turn bananas into drugs, and he sold that, even tho his intentions were the same- this time he would be arrested by the externalist.

is there a middle ground between the externalist and interalists?

 

[Demosthenes]

nice example!

let me check i've understood. so if someone is selling banana skins, thinking they are drugs then their intention is to sell drugs. an externalist would say they just intended to sell bananas?

but if one day, we found a way to really turn bananas into drugs, and he sold that, even tho his intentions were the same- this time he would be arrested by the externalist.

is there a middle ground between the externalist and interalists?

Exactly:

Is there a middle ground? Well, I think it's unbalanced to be one or the other. But most people think the point of philosophy is to say which account is primary and which is derivative, - or alternatively, if one view is true then the other is false.

But I'm quite happy to say that it's true on the one hand to say he intends to sell drugs, and on the other hand it's true that he intends to sell banana-skins.

The problem is that if I say that without qualification, then i appear to be breaking the philosophical game-rule, - you shall not contradict yourself.

eta. I think that it's actually quite normal to oscillate wildly. That's what people do.

 

[i-am-your-idea]

eta. I think that it's actually quite normal to oscillate wildly. That's what people do.

>oooh no they dont!

oooh yes they do>

 

[Knotted]

The thought I had, is - if you imagine some parallel universe where wine is illegal, and someone gets charged with intent to supply, and defends himself by saying that he intended to supply, not wine, but the blood of christ, - then
on an externalist account, this defence is no good, because basically it's quite irrelevant to the content of his intent, what description he intended to supply the wine under, - so the prosecution could get in an expert philosopher, - to testify to this, and then having established that the wine is wine, chemically, - the case is proved. But of course on an internalist account, the what he intended to supply depends not on what it actually is, but what he thought it is.

I could be misunderstanding, but I think your account of externalism is of a very strong externalism. I don't think its saying that the content of a belief is determined by the object of the belief. Only that the content of the belief is dependent on how that belief would be revised through investigation.

I think that the original twin earth thought experiment was set in 1750 - ie. before the chemical formula for water was known (see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/). This is quite an important detail.

I'm also thinking there might be a difference between semantic externalism and intentional externalism. I think some of my comments might be a bit confused, I don't think its to do with the Wittgenstein quote. I think my account is too weak.

I'm not sure about it. I don't think its very dramatic either way.

By the way - I don't think there is a middle ground. Either intentional belief are purely internal or they are not. But I do think that you could have various different strengths of externalism.

 

[Knotted]

8ball was right, as I acknowledged; it's hardly an everyday use of the term. What does it mean to "exhibit conscious behaviour" anyway? Making choices that are meaningful to the body/mind is the hallmark of conscious behaviour.

Looked at this way, the idea of "meaning" has the potential to act as a bridging concept for the explanatory gap. That things have meaning is the 'subjective' aspect; the latter, conscious behaviour, is the 'objective' aspect.

What is meaning anyway? Well, it seems to be something to do with information, as in the adage (attributed to Djikstra, I believe) that the meaning of data is the information it contains. Information, like meaning, cannot exist in a vacuum. It's meaning or information for somebody. That body has to have some kind of information about the data in order to interpret it as meaningful.

There's an amusing thought-experiment to show this. It's realistic in the sense that it could actually be done. A computer program is just a very large binary number. But that binary could be two quite different applications, depending on the hardware (more strictly strictly, the operating system) on which it is run. The meaning of the program binary is not something in itself; it depends on the system's recognising it as information by treating it appropriately. The system has to have information about the data for it to be meaningful.

That's a good illustration. Its not easy. I'm not sure there is an explanatory gap per se. More just a lot of careful piecemeal working it out.

Semantics are just about 'mechanical' enough and just about 'human' enough to be a vital link in the chain. I feel that a really good theory of semantics is just out of reach.

 

[Knotted]

Well I'm happy with that, but then again I think any decent philosophy of mind would be a kind of natural philosophy anyway, one that would pave the way for a scientific understanding.

All the same, doesn't it boil down to rejecting the "Why is there something rather than nothing?" question?

Well perhpas its just a difference between something being unexplainable and something being indescribable.

I suspect that your synaesthesia is easy to explain. I don't think its profoundly difficult to understand what's causing it. At the same time could you ever give an adequate description of what its like?

Is the question "what is it like to be human?" answered when we answer the question "what is it to be human?" ?

 

[i-am-your-idea]

Is the question "what is it like to be human?" answered when we answer the question "what is it to be human?" ?

it is surreal how empty my mind feels in the face of this question.

... I'M human, but i cant tell you what its like to be one.

maybe it is that mysterious feeling that best describes the human experience. its all based on the unknown.

 

[Jonti]

Well perhpas its just a difference between something being unexplainable and something being indescribable.

With the fact of existence being beyond explanation; and that of consciousness being indescribable? I'd agree with the first. I could be wrong but I suspect "it's god wot dun it" or "well, it's just the way it is -- how else could things be?" is about as good an answer as one can get to the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?".

On the other hand, it does not much matter if consciousness cannot be described, as long as one can point to it. It can be taken as a primitive term, but one whose semantic content is directly available to each participant in discussions about its nature.

I suspect that your synaesthesia is easy to explain. I don't think its profoundly difficult to understand what's causing it. At the same time could you ever give an adequate description of what its like?

Ah, I was joshing earlier. I'm not a synaesthete, not under normal conditions of brain chemistry, anyway. Does that answer your question?

Is the question "what is it like to be human?" answered when we answer the question "what is it to be human?" ?

No, I don't think so, although the questions are very broad and may well provoke different responses from different folks. I'd suggest one should ask a poet to try to answer the first; and that one could consult a biologist about the second.

 

[Jonti]

That's a good illustration. Its not easy. I'm not sure there is an explanatory gap per se. More just a lot of careful piecemeal working it out.

Semantics are just about 'mechanical' enough and just about 'human' enough to be a vital link in the chain. I feel that a really good theory of semantics is just out of reach.

That seems to be Dennett's view, so you are in good company. All the same, it does not seem to be a view that is widely shared among philosophers. And among scientists, biologists seem to just accept that aminals have some kind of subjective experience -- that the sensorium allowed by a bat or dolphin's sonar may be experienced more like (our experience of) a visual field than (our experience of) an auditory space, for instance. And even the strong AI view that "consciousness is calculation" accepts there is something to explain. What is it that one is trying to work out anyway?

I do agree that semantics are a vital link in the chain. Godel has shown that syntax alone is insufficient.

 

[Knotted]

That seems to be Dennett's view, so you are in good company. All the same, it does not seem to be a view that is widely shared among philosophers. And among scientists, biologists seem to just accept that aminals have some kind of subjective experience -- that the sensorium allowed by a bat or dolphin's sonar may be experienced more like (our experience of) a visual field than (our experience of) an auditory space, for instance. And even the strong AI view that "consciousness is calculation" accepts there is something to explain. What is it that one is trying to work out anyway?

I do agree that semantics are a vital link in the chain. Godel has shown that syntax alone is insufficient.

Don't get me started on Godel's theorems and the mind. At the minute I can't even work out the twin earth question.

But have a look at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ai/ for a good introduction of the type of thing I'm talking about.

 

[Knotted]

Ah, I was joshing earlier. I'm not a synaesthete, not under normal conditions of brain chemistry, anyway. Does that answer your question?

Oh, OK.

No, I don't think so, although the questions are very broad and may well provoke different responses from different folks. I'd suggest one should ask a poet to try to answer the first; and that one could consult a biologist about the second.

But this is my feeling about the zombie thought experiment. Isn't it really demanding a scientific answer to a poetic question?

 

[Knotted]

it is surreal how empty my mind feels in the face of this question.

... I'M human, but i cant tell you what its like to be one.

maybe it is that mysterious feeling that best describes the human experience. its all based on the unknown.

Perhaps its more because its based on certainty? When we feel something we know it. But if it was certain was there anything to know?

I am just foolin' wid ya of course.

 

[Jonti]

And many a true word was spoken in jest! Mostly, we are just certain that other people have minds like us. We do not doubt they feel hunger and thirst; that they hear sounds, see sights, have orgasms. That they hope and despair just like oneself. All of these things are meaningful (in the broadest sense of the word) to oneself. We naturally presume this is true for others as well.

It's true we have no scientific understanding yet of what's going on in a body, when it is conscious. But that's just the way things are, right now. The fact we don't understand consciousness (although we can manipuate it in all sorts of ways) is just a reflection of the immaturity of science in this particular area.