Thought experiments

[Lord Hugh]

Look at it like this: It's a fork.

If consciousness is identical with brain processes, then either consciousness does makes something happen that brain processes without consciousness wouldn't make happen, or else it doesn't. Hopefully you'd grant that much.

Look at it like this: it's not a fork. It's a spoon. There is no spoon.

If it does do something. How does it do it? No magical explanations allowed, remember, you're a physicalist. Why wouldn't the same brain process achieve exactly the same thing even if the person wasn't conscious?

Because you're not even trying to look at it from a different perspective. You're still considering consciousness as some external phenomenon that is "created" from somewhere and acts upon some "I" that is seperate from physical reality.

You haven't taken on a single of my points, nor answered a single question I've asked. At very very least give me an answer to: would you please point out a distinction between consciousness and the sensory integration and association we experience in the brain? (This is slightly changed from an earlier question).

And then to repeat the argument earlier on the thread: If as you claim phenomenal experience is identical with brain processes, why is that so? What sort of reason can be given for this? Is it a physical law: Is it a necessity? Why is this purely physical universe the kind of universe in which there is such a necessity or law or identity?

"Brain processes" I have stated that it is the composition of the system. At least you could say "specific brain processes" if you've been even listening instead of purely trying to pick holes.

Ok, phenomenal experience, in the physical world (I'm a Barbie girl), no floaty fuckin soul somewhere:

1) I am a body. There is no floating little soul out somewhere that is experiencing anything in a different way than occurs in my body.
2) This means that by definition, all things I experience I am experiencing somewhere in my body. No seperation of the experience to some floating little soul in an astral plane. I have a sense of "I". This therefore must be experienced somewhere in the body too.
3) I say that this "I" is somewhere in the brain.
4) I have stated multiple times why this is reasonable to assume, but let's try again:
- The brain is the centre of sensory integration
- The brain as we know it has the right kind of structure to allow for the aspects of consciousness that we experience to be explicable

Your fork analogy is exactly where it falls down. Because I don't think there is any fork. A spoon, a knife, one thing. You mention what "effect" consciousness has. I have said before to view it as a "thing" in itself is contradictory to my model, and completely unnecessary. It is the results of our brains becoming so complex and interconnected, all the senses and the memories and the reactions we have.

What you are asking for is a cause for consciousness to arise from physical processes. What I am giving is how consciousness is explained by physical processes. You are assuming that it is arising and is somehow nonphysical, which doesn't make any sense in asking me to explain it in physical terms, which I have done again and again.

If you still are going to argue the same old point of "where is it coming from and what happens if we don't have it" and so forth, at least then give me a clean definition of consciousness. Cause not a single fucking person seems willing to.

 

[Jorum]

I still don't get the "H20 isn't H20 it's XYZ"

"H20" is merely a description of water using certain orthographic symbols and based on specific methods of conceptualising, analysing, and describing matter.
E.g our modern physics and chemistry.
So there are two (or three) possible meanings

1) "imagine water is not water" - which is saying "imagine this arrangement of matter is not this arrangement of matter" (atoms, quarks, weird frozen energy wave states, any other way you want to conceptualise it, it doesn't matter), or "imagine a circle isn't a circle" - basically nonsensical and meaningless.

2) "imagine that we use a different symbols and method of describing what we call water instead of H2o" - which is so simple and banal as to be pointless.

3) "imagine that we have a different way of conceptualising states of matter and energy and that particular one we call water" - which is a bit deeper but essentially the same as 2.

Am I missing something?

 

[Lord Hugh]

4) "Imagine it's not water it's sand. If it's something completely different, how is everything different? People drinking sand? Ha what a funny concept!" But that one's bollocks too cus we wouldn't have developed as we are if there were shiteloads of sand around instead of water.

 

[Demosthenes]

OK, so, - if I read you correctly, you're denying both that consciousness does anything, and also that it doesn't do anything. And your argument for this is that consciousness is not a thing, - a position you attribute to me.

I find this quite odd, - as I'm not sure I claimed that consciousness was a thing, not in the physicalist sense of "thing"- in fact it was you who claimed it's a brain process.

So, from the above, it seems as if you don't have much respect for logic.
But fair enough. I find logic fairly tiresome myself sometimes.

You haven't taken on a single of my points, nor answered a single question I've asked. At very very least give me an answer to: would you please point out a distinction between consciousness and the sensory integration and association we experience in the brain? (This is slightly changed from an earlier question).

Now, this I find a whole lot stranger. As I've already pointed out several times, you haven't made any points at all, you've simply asserted your argument as your conclusion again and again, and ignored all counterarguments. The first time you said the above, I didn't take you seriously. But, I think I'm right in saying you've repeated this question, implying that you think there is no obvious distinction betwen consciousness and brain processes. (or, if we were to attempt to tighten up your claim, - conscious brain processes.), and you mean to be understood to be claiming this in all seriousness.

As far as I can see, taking you claim seriously, there are three possible conclusions I can come to.

1, you're a zombie, and make these bizarre claims because you don't know what consciousness is.

2, You don't understand english.

3, Despite claiming to want your point taken seriously, you already recognise that it can't possibly be.


If option 1 is true, then, there's no point in continuing the conversation, as you don't exist.

if option 3 is true, there's no point in continuing the conversation, as you're in bad faith, and not interested in having a genuine discussion.

If option 2 is true, then probably there's no point in continuing the conversation, but maybe there is, you might want to learn english.

Perhaps I've got it all wrong. If you do want to learn english, or, alternatively you want to reassure me that you're not a zombie, and you do already understand english well enough to have a conversation on these boards, could you answer me these questions?

You know the words "brain" and "mind", - what do you think they mean? And why do you think there are two different words?

 

[Demosthenes]

I still don't get the "H20 isn't H20 it's XYZ"

"H20" is merely a description of water using certain orthographic symbols and based on specific methods of conceptualising, analysing, and describing matter.
E.g our modern physics and chemistry.
So there are two (or three) possible meanings

1) "imagine water is not water" - which is saying "imagine this arrangement of matter is not this arrangement of matter" (atoms, quarks, weird frozen energy wave states, any other way you want to conceptualise it, it doesn't matter), or "imagine a circle isn't a circle" - basically nonsensical and meaningless.

2) "imagine that we use a different symbols and method of describing what we call water instead of H2o" - which is so simple and banal as to be pointless.

3) "imagine that we have a different way of conceptualising states of matter and energy and that particular one we call water" - which is a bit deeper but essentially the same as 2.

(the original is putnam's "the meaning of meaning" which I guess is online somewhere.)

(the original is hilary putnam, the meaning of meaning, which I imagine is online somewhere.)

Am I missing something?

I don't think you're missing anything. Like I say, I find the experiment really bizarre.

What it's supposed to show is that meanings aren't in the head.

The argument is, since it's possible, that me and twin earth me could have identical mental states, and yet, my thought about water has a different content or extension from my twin, then what you're thinking depends on what you're thinking about. It's called externalism, - and in its strong form it has the consequence that me and twin me, when we think, "water is wet", are not thinking the same thought. Tbh, I'm not sure I understand externalism, - because it's actually widely accepted, - but as far as I can see it's mainly plain wrong.

But interestingly, the argument doesn't depend on the water case, - he also says, imagine twin earth where everything is the same except what they call aluminium, and use as aluminium, is in fact molybdenum. And here it seems much harder to deny the possibility, - though the same consequences follow, (at least according to putnam) - the argument is we've got cases where you can have different senses but same reference, - - the morning star and the evening star, - so meaning can't depend on reference alone, and we've got cases where we've got the same sense and different references, - h20 or XYZ, so meanings can't be given just by senses.

(the original is putnam's "the meaning of meaning", which I guess is online somewhere

 

[Lord Hugh]

But, I think I'm right in saying you've repeated this question, implying that you think there is no obvious distinction betwen consciousness and brain processes.

Yes. You're right. Tell me the difference oh mr who-knows-it-all.

 

[Lord Hugh]

You know the words "brain" and "mind", - what do you think they mean? And why do you think there are two different words?

The words are in effect two descriptions of an observation of the same object.

One is the pure physical one which is observed from the outside of the system. The observer is an external bystander. The tools used for this observation are (for example) the eyes, a laser/detector setup, EEG, MRI, etc. The stuff which is observed is the physical entity in its entirety, or whatever the particular tool may see (eg the eyes sees photons bouncing off atoms, laser/detector sees the same in a different manner, EEG detects voltages, MRI bloodflow, whatever).

The other is what we say when the brain is "observing" itself, i.e. an observation from the inside. The observer is the brain itself. It is not an observation that can see the whole thing at once (though neither can we see the whole brain at once by looking at it from outside either). The flow of electricity through the brain, coming from the senses and from well loads of different places, creating some sort of pattern which is always flowing changing and interacting with itself and the new data coming in from the sensory input, is both observer and observed (tho these words are a bit flimsy in this context as they don't really work for a singular object, but man you don't seem to be getting a single jot of where I'm coming from so I'm trying to bend my ear to your point of view here). Every new "moment" is the reaction to the previous state that it was in for an infinitesimal amount of time. The tool for this observation, crudely (by which I mean don't take me literally with this observation metaphor), is the electricity that is flowing through the brain. The brain is observing itself, what its reactions to inputs at the present moment are, what its reactions to previous inputs were, the interaction between the previous inputs and current ones.

I have a feeling you are going to ask something like "what causes this observation" - the metaphor of observer implies an outside body, something like that. To that question, I state that this observation can be likened to throwing stones into a pond. What happens when you throw rocks in a pond is ripples. If you throw in another one, more ripples, and the previous ripples still then interact with the new ones. If you have rocks going into the pond all the time, a flow of stones being thrown in, you will have patterns emerging, which are formed from the current ripples spreading out, and also the ripples from all previous stones thrown in.

These patterns, in their reaction to their own self, and the new input, can be (loosely) likened to what I mean when I say "patterns in the brain". Sensory inputs like stones, electrical activity like ripples, complex dynamics like the patterns created. The entire pattern of ripples that emerges is that which we call "I", and the way that it is constantly changing in response to each wave's natural propulsion along the water and their interaction with each other, gives rise to the experience we call consciousness within "I".

Ok that's about as well as I can put it without going into talk of complex dynamic systems and needing to make pictures and stuff. I hope to jeebus that you can at least try and give that a think.

Tell me, do you think consciousness is a static thing?

I think consciousness is a process.

 

[8ball]

I think consciousness is a process.

One of the few points I agree with you on.

 

[Demosthenes]

The words are in effect two descriptions of an observation of the same object.

One is the pure physical one which is observed from the outside of the system. The observer is an external bystander. The tools used for this observation are (for example) the eyes, a laser/detector setup, EEG, MRI, etc. The stuff which is observed is the physical entity in its entirety, or whatever the particular tool may see (eg the eyes sees photons bouncing off atoms, laser/detector sees the same in a different manner, EEG detects voltages, MRI bloodflow, whatever).

The other is what we say when the brain is "observing" itself, i.e. an observation from the inside. The observer is the brain itself. It is not an observation that can see the whole thing at once (though neither can we see the whole brain at once by looking at it from outside either). The flow of electricity through the brain, coming from the senses and from well loads of different places, creating some sort of pattern which is always flowing changing and interacting with itself and the new data coming in from the sensory input, is both observer and observed (tho these words are a bit flimsy in this context as they don't really work for a singular object, but man you don't seem to be getting a single jot of where I'm coming from so I'm trying to bend my ear to your point of view here). Every new "moment" is the reaction to the previous state that it was in for an infinitesimal amount of time. The tool for this observation, crudely (by which I mean don't take me literally with this observation metaphor), is the electricity that is flowing through the brain. The brain is observing itself, what its reactions to inputs at the present moment are, what its reactions to previous inputs were, the interaction between the previous inputs and current ones.

I have a feeling you are going to ask something like "what causes this observation" - the metaphor of observer implies an outside body, something like that. To that question, I state that this observation can be likened to throwing stones into a pond. What happens when you throw rocks in a pond is ripples. If you throw in another one, more ripples, and the previous ripples still then interact with the new ones. If you have rocks going into the pond all the time, a flow of stones being thrown in, you will have patterns emerging, which are formed from the current ripples spreading out, and also the ripples from all previous stones thrown in.

These patterns, in their reaction to their own self, and the new input, can be (loosely) likened to what I mean when I say "patterns in the brain". Sensory inputs like stones, electrical activity like ripples, complex dynamics like the patterns created. The entire pattern of ripples that emerges is that which we call "I", and the way that it is constantly changing in response to each wave's natural propulsion along the water and their interaction with each other, gives rise to the experience we call consciousness within "I".

Ok that's about as well as I can put it without going into talk of complex dynamic systems and needing to make pictures and stuff. I hope to jeebus that you can at least try and give that a think.

Tell me, do you think consciousness is a static thing?

I think consciousness is a process.

I don't think human consciousness is a static thing. I don't think anyone does.

That's an interesting post, and as it happens, I think it's not a bad account of what the brain does. But I don't think it's a true account of what people mean by distinguishing between the mind and the brain.

By my consciousness, - I mean, how things seem to me. The pain in my toe, the colour in the screen, the sound of the sea, out there.

Lots of people think that this is caused by a brain process, - and even I don't want to deny that the way in which people are conscious has something to do with the brain.

But on the face of it, how the screen looks to me, is - about a foot in front of my face, pale grey blue, etc. And how the sounds seem to me, is over there, and over there, etc.

Unless without my noticing it, my brain has somehow splurged out to be in front of my face, then, how things seem to me, and my brain are in different places, as I generally assume that my brain is inside my skull, Whereas I'm not aware of much going in on my skull, except headaches, imaginary music, and inner speech. Most of what I consider to be "the contents" of my consciousness seem to be in a quite different place, so - on the face of it, taking how things seem at face value, there seems to be all the difference in the world between my consciousness and my brain processes, which is why I expressed disbelief at your claiming not to see any obvious distinction. I certainly don't see colour or hear sound - in my skull, I experience it out there. How about you?

 

[weltweit]

... Most of what I consider to be "the contents" of my consciousness seem to be in a quite different place, so - on the face of it, taking how things seem at face value, there seems to be all the difference in the world between my consciousness and my brain processes, which is why I expressed disbelief at your claiming not to see any obvious distinction. I certainly don't see colour or hear sound - in my skull, I experience it out there. How about you?

Your brain has built models for all that which you experience. The sensory inputs of [the screen is blue grey] or [the sea is washing on the shore] etc are all input by your many and various sensors as multiple but simple inputs and processed in your brain (where else) after which you present them to yourself as 1) the screen is blue grey and 2) the sea is washing on the shore.

Most people are aware of the idea that not everything the brain does is conscious. In fact the majority may be subconscious. That there may be a sub conscious and a conscious mind, that we are unaware of the signals coming from the nerve endings on the skin of our legs unless the brain decides we need to be, perhaps to warn the conscious mind of some risk, getting burnt climbing into a bath that is too hot for example.

When I am asked a question I either answer the question or perhaps I cannot answer because I don't recall the answer. My subconcious mind often continues looking for the answer and often presents it to me at a later time. I was unaware I was still looking but my mind was not.

Whatever, it is all happenning in the grey matter between your ears. Where else could all that thinking and processing be taking place.

 

[Demosthenes]

Your brain has built models for all that which you experience. The sensory inputs of [the screen is blue grey] or [the sea is washing on the shore] etc are all input by your many and various sensors as multiple but simple inputs and processed in your brain (where else) after which you present them to yourself as 1) the screen is blue grey and 2) the sea is washing on the shore.

Most people are aware of the idea that not everything the brain does is conscious. In fact the majority may be subconscious. That there may be a sub conscious and a conscious mind, that we are unaware of the signals coming from the nerve endings on the skin of our legs unless the brain decides we need to be, perhaps to warn the conscious mind of some risk, getting burnt climbing into a bath that is too hot for example.

When I am asked a question I either answer the question or perhaps I cannot answer because I don't recall the answer. My subconcious mind often continues looking for the answer and often presents it to me at a later time. I was unaware I was still looking but my mind was not.

Whatever, it is all happenning in the grey matter between your ears. Where else could all that thinking and processing be taking place.

..
What are you saying?
Do you think I don't know that the brain and its sensory inputs have something to do with how things seem to me?
Why do I feel impelled to repeat the obvious point again and again, that the seeming to see the blue-greyness of the screen is not the same as the nervous substrate that underlies that experience.

The most you can say, scientifically, is that the brain-body-world interaction causes the seeming.
Then the question is, how and why?

 

[weltweit]

..
What are you saying?
Do you think I don't know that the brain and its sensory inputs have something to do with how things seem to me?
Why do I feel impelled to repeat the obvious point again and again, that the seeming to see the blue-greyness of the screen is not the same as the nervous substrate that underlies that experience.

I don't understand what you mean with "nervous substrate". A substrate for me is a piece of solid matter and I am not sure that you mean that in your usage of it.

If you mean the nervous data that underlies the experience of seeming to see the blue-greyness then I can understand what you mean. But it just brings me back to the brain processing that converts memories or inputs into top of mind awarenesses of them.

The most you can say, scientifically, is that the brain-body-world interaction causes the seeming.
Then the question is, how and why?

How and why does the brain generate visions of reality? so that we can interact with it (reality) with some semblance of order from the otherwise chaos of the billions of inputs that our subconcious brains are receiving.

 

[Demosthenes]

Well, that might answer the why, but it still leaves the how totally inexplicable from a physicalist point of view.

I can't believe that's not obvious.

 

[8ball]

Talking to zombies can be frustrating. The best approach is to either remove the head or destroy the brain.

 

[Lord Hugh]

Zombies; they're very shambly so they're easy to avoid. Unless you're in New York alone and you're Will Smith and the zombies set their dogs on you. Then you have to talk to mannequins.

Unless without my noticing it, my brain has somehow splurged out to be in front of my face, then, how things seem to me, and my brain are in different places, as I generally assume that my brain is inside my skull, Whereas I'm not aware of much going in on my skull, except headaches, imaginary music, and inner speech. Most of what I consider to be "the contents" of my consciousness seem to be in a quite different place, so - on the face of it, taking how things seem at face value, there seems to be all the difference in the world between my consciousness and my brain processes, which is why I expressed disbelief at your claiming not to see any obvious distinction. I certainly don't see colour or hear sound - in my skull, I experience it out there. How about you?

Honestly I'm generally quite conscious p) of the interplay between the outside world and my brain. I do experience things "out there" indeed, but I am pretty mindful that the "I" that is experiencing is an integration of all the sensory stuff coming in, which has been put together to make sense of it as best I can. The out-there-ness of it is sorta inherent in how the "I"-summation of senses is created - if we assume that the "I" that is experiencing is the big aul ripple pattern created (as I do) of my old post, then along the path from sensory input to highest-level processing comes the stages where these inputs are polled together to identify objects and their relative positions, etc. So the integration of the senses to give relative positions of stuff (and more than just spatio-temporal information, of course) is inherent in the creation/perpetuation of "I".

 

[Jonti]

I am pretty mindful that the "I" that is experiencing is an integration of all the sensory stuff coming in, which has been put together to make sense of it as best I can.

You say your sense of "I" is just an integration of all the sensory stuff.

But this sounds a bit circular to me. If the "I" is the result of the integration, how can it also be doing the integration to make sense of things for itself?

It seems too much of a tautology, just another way of saying "I" am the sum of my perceptions and thoughts. Well, OK, one can talk that way, I suppose. But one can still enquire what is going on in such an integration that causes the sensation of "I" (whatever) to arise.

So what is going during such integration, that causes the sense of "I" to arise? What's your theory?

 

[Jonti]

Talking to zombies can be frustrating. The best approach is to either remove the head or destroy the brain.

This could turn out to be a tad unethical, if it turned out that one's interlocuter was just *pretending* to be a zombie by playing word games. Not that any philosopher would dream of deriving personal amusement (and publicity) by such trolling.

Of course no!

 

[Jonti]

Your brain has built models for all that which you experience...

Why should it? The world is right at hand, ready to be consulted and measured directly. What need then for a model of it?

Evolution does not need a model of reality in order for evolutionary processes to be able to adapt organisms better to fit their environment. So there would seem to be no logical basis for claiming that the brain needs to make a model of reality to adapt the individual organism better to its environment and circumstances.

Perhaps the "model of the world in the brain" view is right. But it is an assumption that you have made -- things don't actually have to be working that way at all.

And anyway, how does the brain "feel" the model that (you hypothesise) it has constructed?

 

[Jonti]

... Consciousness has no "stuff"...

Agreed.

What I meant by "it is just a name" was that often we separating one thing happening into two things, ie physical brain activity and consciousness. And I say there is no difference. ...

But there is a difference. Plenty of brain activity takes place in the absence of consciousness.

...it ain't nothin more than what's happenin in my body...

Agreed

 

[Jonti]

Zombies; they're very shambly so they're easy to avoid. Unless you're in New York alone and you're Will Smith and the zombies set their dogs on you. Then you have to talk to mannequins.

Honestly I'm generally quite conscious p) of the interplay between the outside world and my brain. I do experience things "out there" indeed, but I am pretty mindful that the "I" that is experiencing is an integration of all the sensory stuff coming in, which has been put together to make sense of it as best I can. The out-there-ness of it is sorta inherent in how the "I"-summation of senses is created - if we assume that the "I" that is experiencing is the big aul ripple pattern created (as I do) of my old post, then along the path from sensory input to highest-level processing comes the stages where these inputs are polled together to identify objects and their relative positions, etc. So the integration of the senses to give relative positions of stuff (and more than just spatio-temporal information, of course) is inherent in the creation/perpetuation of "I".

This is the "consciousness as calculation" view. It's a hypothesis, and I think it's the best that can be done without invoking a new physical principle. At least it recognises there is an explanatory gap. And it does have a lot to offer; consciousness is certainly something to do with information. But how would one go about disproving the conjecture (that consciousness is just sufficiently complex calculation)?

There just doesn't seem to be any way to do that. And that means all we have is an empty definition that gives us no traction on reality. That's not good, whether you're an engineer or a philosopher!

 

[weltweit]

Why should it? The world is right at hand, ready to be consulted and measured directly. What need then for a model of it?

Why though interpret it from basic data every time you percieve it.

First a child sees a red ball, the blue sky, a green shirt, but at its early stages the child will not be able to communicate about these colours because it will have no language for them, at kindergarden or home the child is taught - this is red - that is blue - etc lucky that though because if a child grew up thinking green was red that could cause problems at traffic lights. So there is a developed human system in place to ensure that we, all humans, agree what wavelength is red etc.

Then there is a model or perhaps even a memory. A basketball player has seen and handled the basketball so many times he knows its colour, texture, weight, bounce, size, surface patterns, momentum etc .. does he, when the ball is passed to him today, work out all this data again from scratch or does he simply know from the mental model (the memory of earlier sensory inputs) what the ball is like and how it handles and thus just focus solely on doing what he wants to do with the ball.

Evolution does not need a model of reality in order for evolutionary processes to be able to adapt organisms better to fit their environment. So there would seem to be no logical basis for claiming that the brain needs to make a model of reality to adapt the individual organism better to its environment and circumstances.

The reality that you and I perceive is totally formed by the type of beings that we are, by our array of senses and our size and shape. It is a model of our reality, built by us mentally, of the sensory inputs that are available to us. If we were a bat, or a mole, or a blue whale, or had very different senses, the model of the same world, (perhaps the same reality), would likely have a very different appearance.

Perhaps the "model of the world in the brain" view is right. But it is an assumption that you have made -- things don't actually have to be working that way at all.

No I accept things don't have to be working this way, and I know that I don't know what I am talking about but I know that I have learnt many things complex things like walking driving talking thinking itself and I do not have each time to go into details about the next step I take or the next action because I have learnt memorised and automated those actions, those sensory imputs are perhaps unrequired as I know what to do and it is now almost a subconscious action .. unless something unexpected ocurrs I will probably not even notice that the sky is blue today, it is there in my vision but it is not relevant to the act of driving so the model, the data set I am working with has or is ignoring that piece of data for the time being.

And anyway, how does the brain "feel" the model that (you hypothesise) it has constructed?

How does the brain feel? the model it has constructed.. ?

Well the brain does not always feel everything. If you were to add up just all the sensory inputs into the brain and try to feel them all at any point in time I expect you would get a big headache.

imho the brain is always filtering out or zoning out information (sensory inputs or thoughts or whatever) which are not required in the conscious mind at that moment. What I feel is that the brain is in charge of what it feeds to the conscious mind at any moment. If a person is driving and there are no threats or difficult hazards the brain may permit certain types of data into the conscious mind, if a hazard raises its head it is likely to switch to focus a high level of attention on that.

How does a human feel anything? surely through interpretation by the brain of data that may have been provided by the nervous system or from memory stores.

 

[Jonti]

How does a human feel anything? surely through interpretation by the brain of data that may have been provided by the nervous system or from memory stores.

Yeah, I think interpretation is a large part of it. But interpretation as such does not require consciousness -- not all interpreters are conscious. Interpretation can just mean the mechanical translation of symbols. There's no role for consciousness in that!

The only thing I can think of (what the mind/brain does that requires it to be conscious) is that it makes choices, that it affects the course of events for the choosing body.

One can't really talk about somebody being able to make meaningful choices without also talking about that body as having consciousness of some sort. And there's no point in having consciousness (or so it seems to me) unless it is to exercise choice. A passive, epiphenomalist type of consciousness that does nothing and is completely ineffective in the world (like that of the "consciousness is calculation" view) seems to me absurdly contingent, "just one of those things".

It seems far more sensible to me to accept that consciousness can be effective in making interventions in the world, that conscious choices affect the course of events.

 

[Demosthenes]

In fact, I kind of forgot that maybe there's a connection between the two thought experiments I introduced at the start of the thread.

I'm wondering if realist philosophers quite like to be externalists about meaning, since it gives them a good argument that meaning can be reduced to whatever physical event or object is referred to by a word. So, for example,
- sound, denotes a particular physical event and movement of air molecules, and so no berkeleian problem arises.

But, on the other hand, the old theory was that meanings are senses, - abstract mental objects, which pick out their referents.

The problem with this kind of theory of meaning, -of sense and reference- where sense is primary, for some philosophers, - is that it's dualistic in implications, (though not necessarily leading to substance dualism) since there are these strange abstract or mental entities (senses, or modes of presentation)

It's much simpler to go along with a strong externalist account, where meaning is just reference, and then you don't end up with these problematic different levels of description. In fact, if you accept externalism about meaning, then you're in a good position to claim, as Lord Hugh did, that "consciousness" means -a brain process- If it doesn't seem like that that for us, well all that shows is that we haven't understood properly.

But on the face of it, I think it's fairly absurd to claim that meanings aren't in the head, and - furthermore, it's generally been accepted that the argument for externalism was first made by the XYZ thought experiment.

I'm not entirely sure I've got this right, and this is a bit of a compressed account, anyway, but if anyone reckons they know what this is all about, I'd be glad to hear.

 

[Knotted]

Well, I suppose in a way, it is conceivable that water is XYZ, in the sense that it could turn out that we're mistaken about water being h20, -- but, assuming that water is h20 in this world, - what I'm saying is inconceivable is that it could turn out not to be h20 in some twin earth, which seems to be what Putnam claimed in "the meaning of meaning" - which has been foundational for externalist accounts of meaning.

I think you might be conflating meaning with truth. It might be true that water is H2O but we don't need to know that in order to talk meaningfully about water.

But what I'm interested in is the whole use of philosophical thought experiments, - I'm more or less coming round to the view that logical possibility is an irrelevant possibility, and should be contrasted with metaphysical possibility, which is of much more significance.

I think I take the opposite view, though I'm not sure on the terms you use.

The zombie thought experiment is an absurdity. I find it just as meaningful to talk about zombie rocks as I do about zombie people. Without going into an infinite regress, what are the criteria for being a zombie?

The twin world thought experiment on the other hand is near trivial. My biggest concern with it is that its hard to conclude very much from it. It doesn't support much weight.

Philosophy never says very much, so thought experiments shouldn't say very much either. The zombie thought experiment says nothing other than don't take this thought experiment seriously. The twin world thought experiment counters the idea that meaning is reference. I don't really understand this internalism versus externalism thing - I don't think this is properly a philosophical question.

 

[Knotted]

In fact, I kind of forgot that maybe there's a connection between the two thought experiments I introduced at the start of the thread.

I'm wondering if realist philosophers quite like to be externalists about meaning, since it gives them a good argument that meaning can be reduced to whatever physical event or object is referred to by a word. So, for example,
- sound, denotes a particular physical event and movement of air molecules, and so no berkeleian problem arises.

But, on the other hand, the old theory was that meanings are senses, - abstract mental objects, which pick out their referents.

The problem with this kind of theory of meaning, -of sense and reference- where sense is primary, for some philosophers, - is that it's dualistic in implications, (though not necessarily leading to substance dualism) since there are these strange abstract or mental entities (senses, or modes of presentation)

It's much simpler to go along with a strong externalist account, where meaning is just reference, and then you don't end up with these problematic different levels of description. In fact, if you accept externalism about meaning, then you're in a good position to claim, as Lord Hugh did, that "consciousness" means -a brain process- If it doesn't seem like that that for us, well all that shows is that we haven't understood properly.

But on the face of it, I think it's fairly absurd to claim that meanings aren't in the head, and - furthermore, it's generally been accepted that the argument for externalism was first made by the XYZ thought experiment.

I'm not entirely sure I've got this right, and this is a bit of a compressed account, anyway, but if anyone reckons they know what this is all about, I'd be glad to hear.

In my poor understanding, externalism says that meaning needs context and that there are different levels of explanation. You seem to think its the opposite. Maybe we are just confusing ourselves with jargon.

Perhaps we should just drop the isms and think it through?

'Consciouness' certainly does not mean 'a brain process'. If it did then it would just be a meaningless abrievation - it would be just as meaningful to say 'B.P.'. It might be a brain process but that's not the meaning of 'consciousness'.

When you ask if somebody is conscious you are not asking if they have a brain process, you are asking if they exhibit conscious behaviour.

 

[Knotted]

Perhaps we should consider that a meaning can be bound together with a phenomenal thread but without an inferential thread.

We cannot infer the actual experience of colour from the study of light. When we talk about 'red' we have two simultaneous references which have no logical connection whatsoever. But (to correct what I said on the other thread) there is only one meaning. We use 'red' consistently.

We can say something meaningfully when we can doubt. Otherwise it would be a statement of pure logic - ie. pure syntax.

If red light were not an objective phenomenon then we could not investigate it. We could not test how it interacts with other light or how it can be created from white light using a prism. There would be no connections to make. If there were no connections to make then we would not be surprised when our connections fail or exceptions are found.

If the world is one sensation after the next with no possibility of connection between the sensations then there would be no meaning to the world. We cannot meaningfully refer to pure sensation.

 

[Demosthenes]

Bother, you seem to be as much in the dark about this as I am.

But I kind of agree, perhaps we should just drop the isms and think it through.

Here's what's weird;

If I've understood it correctly, externalism about meaning is thinking that meaning is primarily or exclusively reference. The meaning of "the queen" is the person who is the queen, rather than some mental image of "the queen".

From this you can also get an externalism about thought, where, thinking about the queen is in some way, a relationship between me and the queen - in some important way, the thought is not just "in my head." because there's some causal relationship between the queen and me in virtue of which I'm thinking about the queen, and if that causal relationship doesn't hold, say I go to buckingham palace and meet a double, because she's on holiday, or something, then I'm not actually thinking about the queen, even when I think I am.

To me, what this all points to is that to be a strong internalist or externalist is unbalanced, - and if you try to emphasise one, then you'll soon be pulled into the other. But lots of philosophers take the view that this talk of balance that I have is really just an attempt to embrace contradiction, in a way that philosophy should avoid, (I think that's what they think.)

On the zombie question, it seems to me that if the universe is just a physical question, then the question why aren't we zombies is a very good one, and one that a physicalist can't answer, - but I've said that enough times I guess.

But in a way the question about meaning is a similar question. Why isn't meaning just a matter of reference:? Or is it? And if it is, does that mean we can say consciousness is just a brain process, or do we inevitably get pulled into the opposite viewpoint, - where we think that since meaning is just reference, then it turns out that thinking is something that reaches outside people's heads, - thinking about something is being in the right kind of intentional relationship with some object in the external world. Thinking then isn't in the head, and so neither is consciousness. ?

 

[Knotted]

Bother, you seem to be as much in the dark about this as I am.

But I kind of agree, perhaps we should just drop the isms and think it through.

Here's what's weird;

If I've understood it correctly, externalism about meaning is thinking that meaning is primarily or exclusively reference. The meaning of "the queen" is the person who is the queen, rather than some mental image of "the queen".

From this you can also get an externalism about thought, where, thinking about the queen is in some way, a relationship between me and the queen - in some important way, the thought is not just "in my head." because there's some causal relationship between the queen and me in virtue of which I'm thinking about the queen, and if that causal relationship doesn't hold, say I go to buckingham palace and meet a double, because she's on holiday, or something, then I'm not actually thinking about the queen, even when I think I am.

I don't see the necessary connection between causal relations and reference.

I'm even more confused about what an internalist is supposed to be.

To me, what this all points to is that to be a strong internalist or externalist is unbalanced, - and if you try to emphasise one, then you'll soon be pulled into the other. But lots of philosophers take the view that this talk of balance that I have is really just an attempt to embrace contradiction, in a way that philosophy should avoid, (I think that's what they think.)

The problem would be that you don't see the contradiction when there is one. Not that I have any opinion on this.

On the zombie question, it seems to me that if the universe is just a physical question, then the question why aren't we zombies is a very good one, and one that a physicalist can't answer, - but I've said that enough times I guess.

I've tried to give a pure philosophical reply rather than a naturalistic reply. What is the difference between a zombie and a non-zombie? What has been taken away? Is there anything to think about? You might well feel that there is a difference but you will not be able to construct an argument out of it and I will not be able to counter a feeling. Where can we go from here?

But in a way the question about meaning is a similar question. Why isn't meaning just a matter of reference:? Or is it? And if it is, does that mean we can say consciousness is just a brain process, or do we inevitably get pulled into the opposite viewpoint, - where we think that since meaning is just reference, then it turns out that thinking is something that reaches outside people's heads, - thinking about something is being in the right kind of intentional relationship with some object in the external world. Thinking then isn't in the head, and so neither is consciousness. ?

I think this is where externalism comes in. Externalism sees meaning partially outside our heads.

I've been relying on Wittgenstein a lot - I'm going through a phase. But here's a particularly nice point:

"When I teach someone the formation of the series... I surely mean him to write ... at the hundredth place." - Quite right; you mean it. And evidently without necessarily even thinking of it. This shews you how different the grammar of the verb "to mean" is from that of "to think". And nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity!
Philosophical Investigations, 693.

In my understanding that's fairly and squarely an externalist point of view. Is there anything more to externalism than the above?

 

[Knotted]

Thought experiments seem to generate discussion. But I've developed a distaste for them and that's despite myself.

I had thought that it was something that philosophy shares with mathematics like with reductio ad absurdum - assume something and show that the assumption is impossible. But philosophy is very odd. The more you conclude something the less it makes sense. If philosophy looks like maths this is not a good sign. It means we're getting happily lost.

 

[Demosthenes]

I don't see the necessary connection between causal relations and reference.

Yes, - I think what I said about causal relations is wrong. The externalist idea about thinking is that if I'm thinking about the queen, then the content of my thought is the actual queen, rather than some internal mental representation of the queen, so a thought about X transcends the person who's thinking about X.

I'm even more confused about what an internalist is supposed to be.

Whereas an internalist about thought would say it was the internal representation.

I've tried to give a pure philosophical reply rather than a naturalistic reply. What is the difference between a zombie and a non-zombie? What has been taken away? Is there anything to think about? You might well feel that there is a difference but you will not be able to construct an argument out of it and I will not be able to counter a feeling. Where can we go from here?

Well I can only say that I myself think that zombies are impossible. What I'm denying is that physicalism has the resources to justify this contention. On a purely physical account, explaining the structure and the behaviour of the constituent parts, explains the structure and the behaviour of the whole, - there's nothing for the phenomenal consciousness to explain, there's nothing for it to do, and there's no need for it to be there. It's redundant, unexplained and unexplanatory.

I think this is where externalism comes in. Externalism sees meaning partially outside our heads.

I've been relying on Wittgenstein a lot - I'm going through a phase. But here's a particularly nice point:

"When I teach someone the formation of the series... I surely mean him to write ... at the hundredth place." - Quite right; you mean it. And evidently without necessarily even thinking of it. This shews you how different the grammar of the verb "to mean" is from that of "to think". And nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity!
Philosophical Investigations, 693.

In my understanding that's fairly and squarely an externalist point of view. Is there anything more to externalism than the above?

I don't totally get the connection. I mean, could you unpack that a bit.? But my intuitions were always in the first place that meanings are "in the head.", and that it is in virtue of conforming to the the "meaning/mental stereotype" of some word, that the objects denoted by that word are objects of that type.

Whereas externalism seems to presuppose some sort of direct realism where how it is that an object is an object of its type is left unexplained.

On thought experiments in general, - I reckon they're useful, when they're constrained by possibility. I mean I think John Searle's chinese room thought experiment is extremely enlightening, - not because it proves anything one way or another, but because thinking about it in detail, causes insight about the problems being discussed, - makes you clarify what you think.