The "illusion" of consciousness

[phildwyer]

I've just been reading Donna Haraway on the formation of subjectivity. Can't say I agree with her, but I thought she might appeal to those of you who are more scientifically inclined, what with her being a biologist and all. Of course she isn't naive enough to claim that the origin of the self can be studied outside of historical and culturtal conext, as Jonti is trying to do, but other than that she seems to be the very rare kind of theorist that both scientists and philosophers could appreciate. Anyone else know her stuff?

 

[axon]

My pet idea: To construct a conscious being you will need:
1) Blank circuit board
2) Solder
3) Soldering iron
4) Sensory apparatus module
5) Interacting-with-physical-world apparatus module
6) Memory storage module
7) Imperfect but highly accurate connections between 4), 5), and 6).

I find myself in the strange position of agreeing with Dywer, that cultural and historical references are extremely relevent. These are the things that are providing the substance to the memory module. However, I do think it is theoretically possible to have a defined 'self' without cultural and historical references, so long as the intelligent being has had no interaction with culture or society (admittedly an unliikely situation).

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Is it possible to develop an idea of self without interaction with others?

"Before my teacher came to me, I did not know that I am. I lived in a world that was a no-world. I cannot hope to describe adequately that unconscious, yet conscious time of nothingness... Since I had no power of thought, I did not compare one mental state with another."
Helen Keller

A deaf-blind woman cut off from others for the first part of her life, Helen Keller 'did not know that I am', which suggests to me that you need to recognise the existence of others in order to differentiate yourself from them. Those with severe autism have difficulty recognising the existence of others, and so have a poor sense of self. Such an autistic person is not fully conscious, just like Helen Keller before she met her teacher. We are not born conscious; rather, consciousness is something that we learn.

 

[ska invita]

I find myself in the strange position of agreeing with Dywer, that cultural and historical references are extremely relevent. These are the things that are providing the substance to the memory module. However, I do think it is theoretically possible to have a defined 'self' without cultural and historical references, so long as the intelligent being has had no interaction with culture or society (admittedly an unliikely situation).

I asked phil to elaborate, but he didn't - could you? How do cultural and historical references alter our understanding on the fundamental nature of consciousness?

This whole subject is important becasue consciousness could prove to be a whole new dimension to the fabric of reality - if consciousness goes all the way down, it may lead to a view of the universe that adds to the "its all just energy" view to one of "its just energy and mind". This would have huge implications on answering the BIg question - where the fuck are we? WHat is all this stuff out the window? etc, as well as enormous implications for evolutionary theory.

...or not.

 

[GarfieldLeChat]

Descartes was right to insist "Cogito ergo sum".

Descartes also used this thinking to justify the existance of god summit which is bollocks...

 

[phildwyer]

I asked phil to elaborate, but he didn't

I did--post 45 above. Bascially I argued that we cannot speak of "consciousness" as though it were a single thing, because it takes many different forms, and those forms are determined by cultural and historical factors. So if we want to understand consciousness we must not neglect these factors that, in practice, determine it.

 

[ska invita]

Apologies - never noticed that post.

But there is a difference from a conception of the self and understanding the nature of the conscious mind.
Obviously the self changes culturally, as does the subjective understanding of consciousness - but a scientific view of the nature of consciousness is not culturally specific, beyond that all science is in some way relatively culturaly specific: Newton was still objectively right about many thigns, despite his cultural location.

I think you're mixing up objective consciousness and the subjective self. Understanding the subjective self in history gives some insight on psychology/the mind, but not on the nature of consciousness itself, does it?

 

[axon]

I asked phil to elaborate, but he didn't - could you? How do cultural and historical references alter our understanding on the fundamental nature of consciousness?

This whole subject is important becasue consciousness could prove to be a whole new dimension to the fabric of reality - if consciousness goes all the way down, it may lead to a view of the universe that adds to the "its all just energy" view to one of "its just energy and mind". This would have huge implications on answering the BIg question - where the fuck are we? WHat is all this stuff out the window? etc, as well as enormous implications for evolutionary theory.

...or not.

I'll go with the "...or not". I certainly don't think that consciousness can lead to a new dimension to the fabric of reality. And if consciousness does "go all the way down" then by the time you get down low, then the definition of consciousness would have changed so much so as to be irrelevent to what we term consciousness. For example you could define consciousness as the abiltiy to sense, communicate, and interact with the environment. Which would mean we are conscious, and when taken down to a cellular level an individual cell would be deemed conscious. But the cells version of consciousness is so different in everyday interactions to our consciousness that the two become to mean different things. And it does not imply that individual cells have a grand "awareness" that we seem to have.

In terms of cultural references, I think that these are important because there is no fundamental property of consciousness, it is simply the interaction of memory, senses, and action. Thus if there are no cultural/society references there is nothing in the memory, and nothing that any new sensation can be compared to. I don't thinked I'd push this as far as (I think that) Phil would, that different cultural surroundings can lead to drastically different versions of consciousness; only that they lead, in simplistic terms, to different points of view given that any thoughts would be based on a different set of memories.

 

[axon]

Just seen post 67 niksativa. I don't think there is any difference between the subjective self and objective consciousness. I think that consciousness is only apparent because we can cross reference situations and sensory inputs with previous situations/inputs, or we can communicate with other conscious beings and attempt to cross reference with someone else's memories of previous situations/inputs.

 

[ska invita]

long beard stroking post...apologies in advance!

I dont disagree completely - perhaps that is right. But not for certain...

I am not certain that you can utterly boil down consciousness to "simply the interaction of memory, senses, and action" - this is certainly how we build up our understanding of the world and self, and once the conscoius mind works it fills with data - but is the data the same as the conscious mind?

(also memory/imagination is far from a simple concept in terms of science - if I picture a made up monster in my mind, where in a materialist conception of the mind is that monster to be found? )

*I would hold out for more from consciousness. - Lets imagine you get a woman, inject her with a strong desensitising, imobolising drug. She cannot move her body or feel physical sensation.

*Then we blind fold her and put her in one of those dark, water isolation tanks (just for good measure!).

*Now we scrambble her brain so she looses all her memory (not very possible, but memory loss is, so lets just say...)

*This should remove sense, action and memory (what you claim makes up consciousness) - would the woman still be conscious? Well, I cant guess what it would be like for her conscious mind, but as long as the injections etc., didnt fry her brain she should still have consciousness existing in her mind - somewhat devoid of information, but existing nonetheless, no?

I dont rule out groundbreaking, paradigm shattering developments in the future, it would be arrogant to believe we have come close to understanding fundamental truths of the universe, and consciousness may well be involved in that. What the fuck is the Big Bang, for example?

I sympathise with the "new mysterians" who say that it is highly improbable that humans could ever truly understand the nature of the universe
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Mysterianism
(Chomsky's point in that link is imporant - that cognitive capabilities of all organisms are limited by biology )

...lets not forget that we are likely very immature consciously, and it would certainly be possible for evolution to create a hugely superior conscious mind over time - this is less a cultural/historical point than a Chomskian biological one - its not so much about what fills that new super brain in terms of sense, memory and action, but what it is capable of thinking and understanding innately.

One last thing - most moments of genius often come not from logical conscious thought, but ideas coming down as if from above, complete. I think it is very likely that the conscious mind is capable of tapping in to "innate universal truths", seperate from cultural historical setting - but thats just the hippy in me! THose inate insights become interpreted through a prism of culture and history, but arrive in a pure form (perhaps!).

 

[ska invita]

For example you could define consciousness as the abiltiy to sense, communicate, and interact with the environment.

[;;;]

I think that these are important because there is no fundamental property of consciousness, it is simply the interaction of memory, senses, and action.

...dont buddhists,yogis and other transcendental meditators in fact go to great lengths to cut out all of the above in order to indulge in "pure" consciousness? are you certain that thats all consciousness is?

 

[axon]

*This should remove sense, action and memory (what you claim makes up consciousness) - would the woman still be conscious? Well, I cant guess what it would be like for her conscious mind, but as long as the injections etc., didnt fry her brain she should still have consciousness existing in her mind - somewhat devoid of information, but existing nonetheless, no?[/COLOR]

Good example. I tend to think that she would be devoid of consciousness, existing yes, but with nothing approaching consciousness happening. I think dreaming is a useful example of being semi-cut off from the world. When you dream all sorts of weird things can happen, I think these happen and appear coherent in the dream as their is no 'reality check' to confirm them so your brain just follows a windy tangent of thoughts. Of course in dreaming you also have access to memories, so without memories, and without sensory input I think she'd be a bit like a (very complex) computer that hasn;t been turned on.

I dont rule out groundbreaking, paradigm shattering developments in the future, it would be arrogant to believe we have come close to understanding fundamental truths of the universe, and consciousness may well be involved in that. What the fuck is the Big Bang, for example?

The idea that consciousness could be linked to some underlying reality of the universe I find distasteful. To me this seems like the 21st century version of the anthropomorphism that used to suggest the Earth was the centre of the universe. Just because we are conscious, why should that be linked to the underliying reality of the universe?

...lets not forget that we are likely very immature consciously, and it would certainly be possible for evolution to create a hugely superior conscious mind over time - this is less a cultural/historical point than a Chomskian biological one - its not so much about what fills that new super brain in terms of sense, memory and action, but what it is capable of thinking and understanding innately.

To have a superior consciousness I suggest would simply involve beinag able to correctly "connect more dots" between all the disparate pieces of information in out head. I don't think there is much/any (I dunno) innate understanding, only that which has come about through experience.

 

[Jonti]

... consciousness ... is simply the interaction of memory, senses, and action...

Computers have memory chips; and can be fitted with webcams and robotic peripherals. Are such machines then conscious?

 

[phildwyer]

Computers have memory chips; and can be fitted with webcams and robotic peripherals. Are such machines then conscious?

No. Only human beings are *self*-conscious. Niksativa: I am going to respond, hang in there...

 

[axon]

Computers have memory chips; and can be fitted with webcams and robotic peripherals. Are such machines then conscious?

I think they would be if they had the memory approaching what we had, and the abiltity to access it in the way we do. And if their webcams and peripherals were permenately on, and linked in a self-referential network which is constantly comparing situations and striving to reach certain goals.

 

[axon]

No. Only human beings are *self*-conscious. Niksativa: I am going to respond, hang in there...

No, don't think they are. And even humans are not self conscious 100 % of the time.

 

[phildwyer]

No, don't think they are. And even humans are not self conscious 100 % of the time.

They have the capacity for self-consciousness. What other animal or cyborg has that?

 

[Jonti]

I think they would be if they had the memory approaching what we had, and the abiltity to access it in the way we do. And if their webcams and peripherals were permenately on, and linked in a self-referential network which is constantly comparing situations and striving to reach certain goals.

I can see how this would explain how information is discriminated, integrated, acted on and even reported. But I do not see how this explains how it is experienced.

Whence blueness?

 

[axon]

My old cat who would pretend to be 'just stretching in the vicinity' if caught near some food she knew she wasn't allowed. Dogs. Presumably higher primates.
Don't know of any conscious cyborgs though.

 

[Jonti]

heh!

You may enjoy reading about Zombies on the Web

 

[axon]

I can see how this would explain how information is discriminated, integrated, acted on and even reported. But I do not see how this explains how it is experienced.

Whence blueness?

I think that experience is exactly "discrimination, integration, reaction, and reporting".
As for blue, well at the simplest level there must be a particular neuronal signature that encodes "have detected photons with wavelengths around 480 nm." This would then be integrated and then compared to the "things that are blue" database. Then other properties of whatever is blue can be identified, leading to identification of the blue object. The objects spatial and temporal context can then be compared to the blue database.

To try and think of 'blue' in the head without any reference to blue things is very hard. It's difficult (for me at least) to think of the concept of blue without picturing the blue colour of something, even if that something is a two dimensional representation of a blue surface. I also think of a dog, when I was a kid we has a dog named "Blue".

 

[axon]

Now how's this for a coincidence, this in todays Nature Neuroscience.

Memory modulates color appearance pp1367 - 1368
Thorsten Hansen, Maria Olkkonen, Sebastian Walter & Karl R Gegenfurtner

Have only read the abstract but it seems to be that people perceive the colour of fruit as how they think it should be coloured not just as the colour it actually is.

 

[Jonti]

Ah,

so you want the inverted commas taken out of the thread title?

You should start your own thread

 

[Jonti]

I can see how this would explain how information is discriminated, integrated, acted on and even reported. But I do not see how this explains how it is experienced.


Whence blueness?

I think that experience is exactly "discrimination, integration, reaction, and reporting".
As for blue, well at the simplest level there must be a particular neuronal signature that encodes "have detected photons with wavelengths around 480 nm." This would then be integrated and then compared to the "things that are blue" database. Then other properties of whatever is blue can be identified, leading to identification of the blue object. The objects spatial and temporal context can then be compared to the blue database.

To try and think of 'blue' in the head without any reference to blue things is very hard. It's difficult (for me at least) to think of the concept of blue without picturing the blue colour of something, even if that something is a two dimensional representation of a blue surface. I also think of a dog, when I was a kid we has a dog named "Blue".

I meant the blueness (blues? ) I see on my screen.

 

[axon]

This is too many smilies in a row for me to understand!

 

[phildwyer]

My old cat who would pretend to be 'just stretching in the vicinity' if caught near some food she knew she wasn't allowed. Dogs. Presumably higher primates.

They're not conscious of themselves as individual subjects. They can't be, because they don't have language, and thus don't have concepts. So the first person singular or the concept of the self are unknown to our feline, canine and primate chums. Of course this means that they are very lucky: they don't know that they are going to die.

 

[phildwyer]

I think you're mixing up objective consciousness and the subjective self. Understanding the subjective self in history gives some insight on psychology/the mind, but not on the nature of consciousness itself, does it?

But the "nature of consciousness itself" has no existence beyond its manifestations in subjective selves, and so cannot be studied in isolation from said selves. And the subjective self is, as you say, always culturally determined. So it is not possible to discuss the nature of consciousness in itself: we must conclude that subjectivity lies beyond the purview of science.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

They're not conscious of themselves as individual subjects. They can't be, because they don't have language, and thus don't have concepts. So the first person singular or the concept of the self are unknown to our feline, canine and primate chums. Of course this means that they are very lucky: they don't know that they are going to die.

You make the same mistake Wittgenstein made. Of course you can have concepts without language. Just look at the puzzle-solving abilities of various animals. You are too imprisoned by the habit of representing concepts to yourself using language to be able to imagine doing it without language. There are three ways for you to see this for yourself: meditation, contracting an illness that makes you delirious or taking a large dose of acid.

 

[axon]

They're not conscious of themselves as individual subjects. They can't be, because they don't have language, and thus don't have concepts.

I disagree. First, I don't think language is a necessity of consciousness (although it is extremely advantageous), although I do think the ability to communicate is virtually a necessity as it is required for feedback with other conscious beings. Second, I don't know whether cats have language but I think that certain song birds, primates, and whales could have language. Third, it is a complete non-sequiter that concepts cannot be perceived in the absence of language, please explain your working, using diagrams where necessary.

Fourth, I'm actually disagreeing with you on a very minor point in the context of the thread.
Fifth, there is no fifth.

 

[Jonti]

... the first person singular or the concept of the self are unknown to our feline, canine and primate chums.

Oh, really?

This from A Sense of Self

A fundamental feature of cognition is the ability to separate self from others, or to recognize oneself as an entity, separate from the environment. This issue of the internal nature of self-representation is difficult to get at experimentally, and really one one approach has been used successfully. This approach uses a mirror and markings.

When your dog or cat walks past a mirror, it may respond to the image in the mirror, but the it does not recognize the image as itself. This can lead to a humorous escalation in play or aggression, depending on the predisposition of your animal. If you put a piece of pet clothing on the dog or cat--a collar, a hat, or a sweater--your pet's perception of the image in the mirror does not change. This clearly differentiates self-awareness in dogs or cats from human self-awareness.

But what about other animals? In chimpanzees, perhaps a few other primates, killer whales, and bottlnose dophins, changing the image in the mirror causes the animal to behave in a way that suggests self-recognition. In chimpanzees, marking the chimp with a spot of paint or dye will cause the chimp to, when viewing the image, touch the marked spot. This suggests that the chimp sees the image in the mirror as itself, and that it can recognize the change in itself by exploring that change. Marine mammals, of course, lack appendages for self-exploration, but at least a few marine mammals show behavioral responses to changed mirror images that suggest self-recognition.

Seyfarth and Cheney (2000) argue that monkeys which fail the mirror test (for example, vervets, baboons, or macaques) still have a sense of "social self" defined by their ability to recognize other members of their social group as individuals, to remember the gender and dominance status of those other animals, and to define their place in the social order accordingly.