The First World War

[butchersapron]

...and when they did try and break out of Wilhelmshaven, the sailors mutined, recognising that they had very little real chance of any success but a large chance of death - thus starting the German Revolution and the end of the war.

 

[laptop]

The Baghdad Railway theme is a favourite of the hard right and conspiracy loons and people loking to project todays conflicts onto the past (and garf).

That'd explain the source, then - it was a link from some abiotic oil nutter...

I'm delighted to discover a new (to me) nutty flavour

I don't think there's much in it myself -

I apologise if I gave the impression that I believed it.

[Excellent summary]

There's substantial diplomatic evidence of these elements of the ruling class seeking to provoke this challenge through war for many years before WW1 and that it was a settled long term aim of the unified state. They were willing to provoke a local war with all the risks and potential for it to develop into a massive conflagration (two collapsing empires losing countol of their populations, growth of nationalisms, global economic blockades etc).

President Poincaré [of France] was asked if war could be avoided. He is reported to have replied: "It would be a great pity. We should never again find conditions better."

wikipedia quoting Michael Balfour, The Kaiser and his Times, Houghton Mifflin (1964) p. 434

 

[Roadkill]

...and when they did try and break out of Wilhelmshaven, the sailors mutined, recognising that they had very little real chance of any success but a large chance of death - thus starting the German Revolution and the end of the war.

Indeed.

 

[frogwoman]

>Italy actually switched sides during the war several times tho didn't it?

No. Italy was in a formal alliance with the central powers, but declared itself neutral in 1914, and then joined in on the Allied side in 1915.

Ah, ok

 

[Idris2002]

The Baghdad Railway theme is a favourite of the hard right and conspiracy loons and people loking to project todays conflicts onto the past (and garf). I don't think there's much in it myself - certainly not enough to carry the weight of being the main cause of WW1. At best the diplomatic wrangling over it was mrely a particular expression of the wider general conflict which was clearly based on developing economic conflict (the hunt for resources, markets, cheap labour, military positions to safeguard all this etc) between Germany and the old powers.

That really is the crux of the matter. Germany had reached the stage where it's continued growth led to it being in a position where it was necesarily challenging Britians economic dominance - or it was felt by significant sections of the ruling class that if it was to continue its developement then this challenge had to come at some point.

There's substantial diplomatic evidence of these elements of the ruling class seeking to provoke this challenge through war for many years before WW1 and that it was a settled long term aim of the unified state. They were willing to provoke a local war with all the risks and potential for it to develop into a massive conflagration (two collapsing empires losing countol of their populations, growth of nationalisms, global economic blockades etc). And pretty much every single potential limiting factor came down on the side of extending the war.

That challenge, when it came, was always going to lead to a war on an extended scale - when you have the worlds leading economies fighting each other in a context of massive interdependence (not to forget the alliance system) it was inevitable.

I read Churchill's book on the First WW a few months ago. As you can imagine, it's full of 'Winston is always right' stuff, especially over Gallipoli. I don't recall it mentioning the Baghdad railway at all, but the prewar crisis it mentions is the Agadir crisis of 1911, when Kaiser Bill tried to swipe a base on the North African coast - something that would allow it to threaten sea lanes in the Atlantic and directly challenge British naval, and commercial, supremacy.

About this:

There's substantial diplomatic evidence of these elements of the ruling class seeking to provoke this challenge through war for many years before WW1 and that it was a settled long term aim of the unified state.

Got any references?

 

[butchersapron]

About this:



Got any references?

Sure, let me grab a cuppa then i'll post some.

 

[danny la rouge]

Certainly, it's the point when modern, 'industrial' warfare came to Europe.

James Connolly wrote about the industrialisation of warfare. I'll see if I can dig out a reference.

(Sort of side point: I was reading some accounts of WWI recently; letters from troops, that kind of thing. And actually, one of the things that struck me was that this kind of material probably won't be available to future historians writing about our period: it's all on blogs etc, and will be gone as soon as the hosting account runs out).

 

[Donna Ferentes]

There's been a similar point made about correspondence: you're not going to get The Life And Emails Of.

Whether it's true or not...I don't know and I'd be sceptical. I mean most paper correspondence disappeared too.

 

[laptop]

one of the things that struck me was that this kind of material probably won't be available to future historians writing about our period: it's all on blogs etc, and will be gone as soon as the hosting account runs out).

www.archive.org

e.g. "new: Urban75 bulletin boards"

http://web.archive.org/web/20001206221700/www.urban75.net/cgi-bin/Ultimate.cgi

Bugger. Only the index pages. Postings lost and gone forever.

[/derail]

 

[danny la rouge]

Whether it's true or not...I don't know and I'd be sceptical. I mean most paper correspondence disappeared too.

True, most. But not all.

Do you save paper copies of postings or emails?

 

[butchersapron]

One other point about the industrialisation of war - neither side had any real experience of fighting against an enemy that was as developed technologically or militarily as they were, and so tactics to handle the new situation hadn't yet developed - this is partly why there was such massive loss of life in the early days of the war and why deadlock soon set in. The majority of the officer class was alos wiped out on both sides as a result = charging towards macnine guns, advancing through your own bombardment and so on. It took Ludendoroff to really grab hold of the potential that new technology offered before new approaches began to be worked out.

 

[Donna Ferentes]

True, most. But not all.

Do you save paper copies of postings or emails?

Online storage is much more extensive than it used to be.

 

[danny la rouge]

That really is the crux of the matter. Germany had reached the stage where it's continued growth led to it being in a position where it was necesarily challenging Britians economic dominance - or it was felt by significant sections of the ruling class that if it was to continue its developement then this challenge had to come at some point.

Yup, the old shorthand, A Race For A Place In The Sun, summed this up. The imperial resources had been pretty much carved up by this point, and we'd reached a stage where the European empires were competing directly for colonial plunder. This tension had been building since at least the 1880s, and was going to come to a head at some point.

Chomsky uses the analogy of Mafia bosses having a turf war. (He sees WWI as an episode in a much larger post-Columbian pattern).

 

[butchersapron]

About this:

There's substantial diplomatic evidence of these elements of the ruling class seeking to provoke this challenge through war for many years before WW1 and that it was a settled long term aim of the unified state.

Got any references?

Fritz Fischer uncovered a whole load of these, leading to what became know as 'the Fischer contoversy' in the 60s. Briefly, the mainstream consensus of German historians post-WW2 was that WW1 was not really the fault of Germany but the fault of all the combined combatants, no special blame was to be attached to the actions of intentions of the German state or govt etc. Fischer disagreed with this and claimed there was clear continuity of Imperial state aims from the Prussian discliplining of Austria-hungary (sometime in the 1860s) onwards that lead to the calculated risk iof WW1. (He also claims that this continuity extended into the nazi period as well.) For this he was physically attacked and academically ostracised, yet his ideas developed many suporters once past the shock of the initial overturning of dominant interpretations.

The document that has been discussed most in relation to this is the December 1912 War Council as recocrded by Alexander von Müller:

Sunday: summoned to the palace to see His Majesty at 11 o’clock along with Tirpitz, Heeringen (Vice Admiral), and General von Moltke. H.M. with a telegraphic report on the political situation sent by the ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowski. As Grey’s spokesman, Haldane informed Lichnowski that if we attack France, England will come to France’s aid, for England cannot tolerate a disturbance in the European balance of power. H.M. welcomed this message as providing the desired clarification for all those who have been lulled into a false sense of security by the recently friendly English press.

H.M. painted the following picture:

Austria must deal firmly with the Slavs living outside its borders (the Serbs) if it does not want to lose control over the Slavs under the Austrian monarchy. If Russia were to support the Serbs, which she is apparently already doing (Sassonow’s remark that Russia will go straight into Galicia if the Austrians march into Serbia), war would be inevitable for us. But there is hope that Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania—and perhaps even Turkey—will take our side. Bulgaria has already offered Turkey an alliance. We really went to great lengths to persuade the Turks. Recently, H.M. also tried to convince the crown prince of Romania, who stopped here on his way to Brussels, to come to an agreement with Bulgaria. If these powers ally themselves with Austria, it will free us up to throw our full weight behind a war against France. According to His Majesty, the fleet will naturally have to prepare for war against England. After Haldane’s statement, the possibility of a war against Russia alone—as discussed by the chief of the Admiralty in his last talk—will not be considered. So, immediate submarine warfare against English troop transports on the Schelde River or near Dunkirk, mine warfare up to the Thames. To Tirpitz: rapid construction of additional submarines, etc. A conference is recommended for all interested naval offices. Gen. v. Moltke: “I consider a war inevitable—the sooner, the better. But we should do a better job of gaining popular support for a war against Russia, in line with the Kaiser’s remarks.” H.M. confirmed this and asked the secretary of state to use the press to work toward this end. T. called attention to the fact that the navy would gladly see a major war delayed by one and a half years. Moltke said that even then the navy would not be ready, and the army’s situation would continue to worsen, since due to our limited financial resources our opponents are able to arm themselves more rapidly.

That was the end of the meeting. There were almost no results.

The chief of the general staff says: the sooner war comes, the better; however, he hasn’t concluded from this that we should give Russia or France, or even both, an ultimatum that would trigger a war for which they would carry the blame.

I wrote to the chancellor in the afternoon about influencing the press.

Here and in Fischers War of illusions and The Kaiser and his Court: Wilhelm II and the govt of Germany -J.C. G Rohl.

Another one, from 1899, is Prince Von Bulow's famous 'In the coming century the German nation will be either the hammer or the anvil' Reichstag speech when Foreign Secretary. I can't find any extended section on-line but it's in His Memoirs Vol 2.

 

[danny la rouge]

Also worth remembering is the "squaring up" during the Morocco Crisis (1906), during which Germany and France disputed control over Moroccan banking, finance and security. The two sides lined up behind on or other, with Britain backing France due to concerns over Germany's growing economic dominance; the Germans couldn't be allowed to carve up too much of Africa's resources.

This was supposed to be resolved by the Algeciras conference, but clearly wasn't as it flared up again in the Agadir Crisis in 1911.

All this and more builds up a picture of the European economic elites looking for a scrap.

 

[danny la rouge]

I think that WW1 kind of started the 20th century. America rose to prominence and the European powers where weakened. The Soviet Union was born out of the ruins.

Yes, but America was already an ecomonic force before the war. It was probably part of the squeeze that pitted Britain and Germany against each other. By 1914, Germany had overtaken Britain in production of pig iron and steel, and rivalled British coal production. But America, by that same year, was already producing more coal, steel and pig iron than either.

It's worth looking at Brooman, J (1985) The End of Old Europe (Longman) and Turner, LCF (1970), Origins of the First World War (Arnold). Interestingly, both build a strong case for the rivalry of the economic elites, but neither sees that as a convincing cause of war. Perhaps they both confuse 'cause' and 'trigger'?

 

[Belushi]

Yes, but America was already an ecomonic force before the war. It was probably part of the squeeze that pitted Britain and Germany against each other. By 1914, Germany had overtaken Britain in production of pig iron and steel, and rivalled British coal production. But America, by that same year, was already producing more coal, steel and pig iron than either.

iirc Britain had already agreed to US Naval expansion prior to WWI.

 

[danny la rouge]

iirc Britain had already agreed to US Naval expansion prior to WWI.

Yes, Britain already knew von Tirpitz's naval policy had put Germany ahead, and saw America as a bulwark against Teutonic naval domination.

 

[butchersapron]

Yes, but America was already an ecomonic force before the war. It was probably part of the squeeze that pitted Britain and Germany against each other. By 1914, Germany had overtaken Britain in production of pig iron and steel, and rivalled British coal production. But America, by that same year, was already producing more coal, steel and pig iron than either.

It's worth looking at Brooman, J (1985) The End of Old Europe (Longman) and Turner, LCF (1970), Origins of the First World War (Arnold). Interestingly, both build a strong case for the rivalry of the economic elites, but neither sees that as a convincing cause of war. Perhaps they both confuse 'cause' and 'trigger'?

What i think it signified was the handing over of global economic power. The US was already outproducing the UK and Germany in a whole range of areas and with technology well in advance of anything elsewhere. But all this was for the internal market, commodities were sold to the US market and US capital largely stayed in the US (in reality there was massive amounts of British capital behind their continental expansion but that's slightly OT). At the start of WW1 the British state actually had to lend the US money to stop their economy collapsing. By the end the roles were reversed and US capital was soon to be key to the reconstruction of europe. It marked the US entry onto the world market and as a global power that was clearly going to have a very large role to play in the future. The power was largely there already but never projected on a glabl scale.(Although the non-economc side reacted a few years later with isolationism ).

See also China today.

 

[frogwoman]

Cheers - that's really interesting stuff. It has occurred to me that America's development during the late 19th c is a lot like that of China today ...

 

[Roadkill]

I remember talking with someone a while back about how far you can liken the position of the United States now to that of Britain around the turn of the twentieth century. Politically still the top dog, but no longer as dominant as it was, facing growing economic competition and responding with a fair amount of bluster and belligerence. Like all historical analogies, though, it has its limitations. The world's a very different place now. Yet there's food for thought there, IMO.

 

[Belushi]

I remember talking with someone a while back about how far you can liken the position of the United States now to that of Britain around the turn of the twentieth century. Politically still the top dog, but no longer as dominant as it was, facing growing economic competition and responding with a fair amount of bluster and belligerence. Like all historical analogies, though, it has its limitations. The world's a very different place now. Yet there's food for thought there, IMO.

Boer Gold and Iraqi Oil...

 

[danny la rouge]

What i think it signified was the handing over of global economic power.

Yes. And this was Chomsky's thesis: that Western Europe made its wealth by exploiting what he terms the local 3rd World (eastern Europe), an internal 3rd World (the peasant and working class), and then the global south. The WWI period is fighting over what there is left of the global south to carve up. In the process the traditional West European powers (Britain and Germany) are weakened, and a new global power emerges: America. This he sees as in all but name a West European power.

 

[Malamud]

Yet there's food for thought there, IMO.

I fear that it's the food for eating that will decide it.

 

[Idris2002]

Fritz Fischer uncovered a whole load of these, leading to what became know as 'the Fischer contoversy' in the 60s. Briefly, the mainstream consensus of German historians post-WW2 was that WW1 was not really the fault of Germany but the fault of all the combined combatants, no special blame was to be attached to the actions of intentions of the German state or govt etc. Fischer disagreed with this and claimed there was clear continuity of Imperial state aims from the Prussian discliplining of Austria-hungary (sometime in the 1860s) onwards that lead to the calculated risk iof WW1. (He also claims that this continuity extended into the nazi period as well.) For this he was physically attacked and academically ostracised, yet his ideas developed many suporters once past the shock of the initial overturning of dominant interpretations.

The document that has been discussed most in relation to this is the December 1912 War Council as recocrded by Alexander von Müller:



Here and in Fischers War of illusions and The Kaiser and his Court: Wilhelm II and the govt of Germany -J.C. G Rohl.

Another one, from 1899, is Prince Von Bulow's famous 'In the coming century the German nation will be either the hammer or the anvil' Reichstag speech when Foreign Secretary. I can't find any extended section on-line but it's in His Memoirs Vol 2.

Thanks for that, very interesting. Down by the docks in
Auckland there's a small war memorial put up either by a refugee from Hitler's Germany or a holocaust survivor (I can't remember which). It thanks the British Empire for its help in both world wars, which I suppose would mean linking German militarism in the first with one with German fascism in the second one.

The trouble with this one is that it allows apologists for the first world war to project the perception of the second war as a 'good' war back on to the first war. Which is probably not a good idea.

 

[chainsaw cat]

Obviously the arms race between Germany and Britain was a huge factor in our deciding to go to war. But there have been arms races between other countries that haven't escalated in such a way, and this thing had been going on since the late 1880s.

The whole assassination of Franz Ferdinand wasn't the immediate cause of the war, which would probably have started anyway - there would have been something else. I know a bit about the Balkan stuff but why else was Europe on the edge in 1914?

And also, if, as I've heard, if most people assumed the war would just drag on until Christmas, why did it end up lasting four years and taking as many lives as it did?

My knowledge of WWI is pretty sketchy as opposed to what I know about WWII, and I know loads of urbanites know loads about this, it would be an interesting subject for a thread as well ...

xx

Technological reasons rather than political ones.

or rather, the technology gave a status quo which the politicians were unable or unwilling to overcome.

The people doing the fighting - i.e. the soldiers and their families at home - were never politicised enough to make a great difference to events.

The fighting was entirely different from any previous European war, and the forces so very finely balanced that nothing really happened at all on the western front for season after season (I know that's an awful thing to say given the bloodbath, what I mean is that every offensive came to nothing).

 

[likesfish]

Wire of Death - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The name 'Wire of Death' is an English rendition of one of its popular Dutch names; Dodendraad which literally means "Wire of the dead". As the war continued and more and more victims fell to the electric fence it became known as simply De Draad meaning "The Wire". To the German authorities it was officially known as the Grenzhochspannungshindernis ("High Voltage Frontier Barrier"). Parallels have been made between the 'Death Wire' and the later Iron Curtain.[1]

Construction[edit]​

The end of the wire near the Scheldt.

The wire near a Belgian farm, including a German patrol.
As Germany invaded neutral Belgium, Belgians began to cross the border to the Netherlands en masse. In 1914 one million Belgian refugees were already in the Netherlands, but throughout the war, refugees kept coming and tried to cross the border. Many wanted to escape German occupation, others wanted to join their relatives who had already fled, and some wanted to take part in the war and chose this detour to join the forces on the Western Front.

Construction began in the spring of 1915 and consisted of over 200 km (125 mi) of 2,000-volt wire with a height ranging from 1.5 to about 3 m (5 to about 10 ft) spanning the length of the Dutch-Belgian border from Aix-la-Chapelle to the River Scheldt. Within 100–500 m (110–550 yd) of the wire, anyone who was not able to officially explain their presence was summarily executed.

Result and legacy[edit]​

The number of victims is estimated to range between 2,000 and 3,000 people. Local newspapers in the Southern Netherlands carried almost daily reports about people who were 'lightninged to death'. However, many also succeeded in overcoming the fence, often by employing dangerous or creative methods, ranging from the use of very large ladders and tunnels to pole vaulting and binding porcelain plates onto shoes in an attempt to insulate themeselves.

rather a bastard thing to do

 

[not-bono-ever]

ive just recalled the links between the white feather movement and the predominantly posho womens movements of the time. strange bedfellos at first glance but not really

 

[Hollis]

Interesting one..

 

[rubbershoes]

This moving piece from a German veteran illustrates the dehumanising nature of war