Science and values etc.

[Demosthenes]

I believe that scientists have now finally admitted that "matter" isn't material, and have jettisoned the designation "materialist," preferring to call themselves "physicalists."

Are atoms material, or are they ideas? Is a very interesting question.

To me it's fascinating that Spinoza the arch-rationalist argues in his first chapter that that it's irrational to think that corporeal substance can be divided. Which he does in the face of the empirical "facts"/appearances that it can be. Things like this of course have led generations of empiricists to dismiss rationalism as irrelevant.

It now turns out from Bell's theorem, and the experimental proofs that it applies in the experienced world, + a big bang cosmology, that Spinoza was right.

 

[Jonti]

... all that materialism means is that matter/energy is the stuff of the universe. That there is no other stuff.

According to Hegel (above) in the methods of science definition is the first desideratum. It is in that spirit that we 'just say' that everything within space/time is matter/energy.

That's one possible interpretation of materialism and one that I think would be a good one.

However, normally, also smuggles in an extra notion, first that Energy/matter is the stuff of the universe, and then that this energy/matter does not possess mentality, (and further, that it's infinitely divisible, made of composite interacting but unconnected entities.)

Ah, well there's all sorts of "false flags" around. Sadly, the fact that someone claims a label, or to belong to a school of thought, means very little in practice.

I'm pleased you like my "Hegelian" take on materialism. The extra notions that you find folk often attach to the notion of materialism are worth examining. Because those extra notions are just plumb wrong

That is, if the world consists of matter/energy in space/time (and if minds exist!) then configurations of matter/energy in space/time both can and do give rise to mentality. That's just a fact -- if you accept the existence of mind that is, as well as the Hegelian "definitional" approach to materialism.

Also, it is not a materialist claim as such that matter/energy is infinitely divisible. In fact, this idea is explicitly rejected by modern physics. The stuff (whatever it is) turns out to come in discrete packets of a particular finite (but very very tiny) size. Physicists think matter/energy comes in little lumps called quanta. The science of these tiniest parts is called Quantum Mechanics. It's a very successful discipline whose theories underlie the functioning of many modern gadgets -- including your PC and mobile phone.

I'm no sure what you mean when you talk about composite interacting but unconnected entities. Perhaps you mean like the separate parts of a mechanical device of some sort? If that is what you mean, then again it is an idea explicitly rejected by modern physics. It turns out everything in the Universe is connected, that the Universe is non-local, albeit in a very precisely defined way.

So, yes, materialism is just the study of everything there is, a kind of pre-scientific position that one has to adopt to get started doing science at all. But no, theories about locality and the continuity of the matter/energy stuff are not essential parts of the materialist approach. They are empirical questions. And it turns out the world is non-local (it's an holistic sort of thing, not a clockwork sort of thing) and grainy (it's composed of discrete quanta of matter/energy).

 

[Demosthenes]

Well yeah, I agree. - your characterisation of what I was saying is what I meant, and I was aware that it was rejected by modern physics. -- The thing is, lots of people who think they're hard scientists don't seem to be aware of this.

The thing about non-locality was what I was referring to in my last post about Spinoza and Bell's theorem.

But you have to admit that for much of materialist science's history. Spinoza's philosophy looked as if it was obviously empirically false, and led most scientists (not of a philosophical bent) to think that rationalism was irrelevant and an intellectual dead end.

if the world consists of matter/energy in space/time (and if minds exist!) then configurations of matter/energy in space/time both can and do give rise to mentality. That's just a fact -- if you accept the existence of mind that is, as well as the Hegelian "definitional" approach to materialism.

there's a slight difference between that claim, and the claim that it's part of the essence of substance to possess mentality.
But I still think the way you've put it is a point worth making.
But when it's put that way, - I find myself thinking, well what you're really saying is that when you get the right kind of computation together, consciousness miraculously arises. And then I find myself imagining a harder-nosed materialist coming along and saying, - what rubbish- there's nothing miraculous about it at all. So I end up thinking that what the materialists in general seem to be saying is first that consciousness miraculously occurs, when you get the right kind of computation going, (sufficient complexity, right structure etc) - though they never say whether it's gradual, or an all or nothing, and then they seem to be saying, that it's not miraculous.

Which sounds like a contradiction to me.

In contrast spinoza's metaphysic doesn't have this problem, as the consciousness doesn't arise miraculously, because it was always there.
And it seems to me that the explanation that it was always there, and - as Schrodinger said, - the sum total of all minds is one, - and that neural computers are local receivers, for channeling information for consciousness in general, is much more elegant and parsimonious.

 

[Demosthenes]

Just to add, - obviously - materialists don't in general say, "consciousness miraculously arises when you get the computation right"

I say that essentially their claim that it arises when you get the computation right, is logically identical to a claim that it arises miraculously, - they might as well say it, because within their scheme it arises without explanation, just as in mine.

 

[Jonti]

Heh! I agree.

I'm not of the view myself, that if you "get the computation right" consciousness somehow arises. It's my contention that there's not a shred of evidence -- nor any theory -- to show that's true. No-one can tell me (not even roughly) how to write a program to make my PC even ever-so-slightly conscious.

 

[gorski]

I agree with most of the above. I think you perhaps need to read Kant and Hegel a bit more carefully, but otherwise this all fine with me.

I did read them carefully, I assure you... I have a few exams and good marks to prove it...

However for me this is precisely why science is objective.

How so? "Objective" means what exactly? If we can see the alleged "objectivity" regularly questioned and overturned...???

There are many, many different ways to understand any given scientific theory. There are many, many different routes to arriving at a scientific theory. It is precisely because the theory forces agreement regardless of any particular set of values that it is value independent.

Again, the opposite of what I am saying... It can not "force" anything even within the part of the scientific community that shares the same, broadly speaking, political values, let alone outside it... Tesla, for instance, had a real issue with Einstein all his life and they did talk about the same thing at the highest level... [Btw, Einstein's wife, Mileva, did a lot of maths for him... not that she is mentioned... And once she was gone he was known to have made some even high school maths mistakes in his publications... Withdrawn, of course - but too late...]

"Value independent"? Given all the above I think you have to have your Reason surgically amputated to presume something like that...

If a theory is dependent on the values of the scientist not just partly a product of the values of the scientist then it should not survive the peer review process. The experiments should not be repeatable by other scientists who do not share the same values as the scientist in question.

Which peers? Have you any idea what some of the Philosophers/Scientists had to go against to change the way we see ourselves and our world? Peer review and radical change... Yeah, right... So many times we have seen a single man stand up against everyone, including those "respectable" peers of one, and say "This is a much better way of understanding things"... And get nothing but buckets of cold water thrown all over one... Something to ponder, methinx...

And what to do with the "experiments" of the thought kind?

I think it is generally agreed that in so far as the disagreement was about the scientific theory of the day, Einstein got it wrong.

Eh?

I'm not sure what disagreements you are talking about, but science is certainly not complete. We do not have an answer for everything. But given any particular coherent question then we should be able to come up with a scientific answer.

Darwinism's legacy is interpreted in a number of ways... Genetic relation to nurture in particular, too.

Scientific answers to philosophical questions/issues? Pull another one...

But what is the this supposedly absolute issue? Science or the philosophy of science or scientific ethics? The article you site is just slippery.

No, your "reasoning is "slippery". The article puts a good set of questions/issues forward for debate. Very uncomfortable for crude materialists full of "common sense/received wisdom/mythological "notions" of Science...

The issues regarding alleged Scientific objectivity and neutrality [value-wise] are screaming out so loud that some are just knocked over by it and they seem to be way too weak to hear it, let alone muster something meaningful and critically minded on the topic/issues...

 

[Jonti]

Why don't you just explain what ideological underpinnings and values are caught up in Fleming's Left Hand Rule?

Your *theory* says there must be such:- well, what are they?

If you really can't answer specific simple examples like this, then the reader is entitled to think that perhaps your theory is mistaken in some way!!

 

[nosos]

How so? "Objective" means what exactly? If we can see the alleged "objectivity" regularly questioned and overturned...???

That's pretty much what I was trying to say. Knotted, you mentioned Putnam earlier. Have you read him on internal realism? Objectivity can be established internal to a conceptual scheme. The denial of metaphysical objectivity doesn't entail judgemental relativism i.e. that there are no good reasons to choose between alternative accounts. It's just means that these reasons aren't written into the fabric of reality, potentially available to all properly rational observers anywhere. Contextualism doesn't entail voluntarism. It only seems voluntaristic if you evaluate it from within a quasi-platonic objective/subjective problematic (given it's not the former one thus concludes it must be latter).

 

[Knotted]

Here, I don't think I understand what you're saying. My kneejerk response is obviously it's possible to have two different theories that fit the same data, - for example, the theory that mutation occurs as a result of genetic copying error fits the data, but so does the theory that mutation occurs because minds cause alterations in their dna, or the theory that the major influence on selection is consciousness, by means of sexual selection.

I don't know enough about evolutionary biology to refute this claim here, but it seems obvious that these different theories would produce different predictions.

Incidently fitting data is not a good criterion for good science on its own. Having a theory that fits data is a triviality. All you need is a photocopy of the data and the audacity to claim that the photocopy is a theory.

It's very difficult, when it comes to arguments about the cause of mutation, and the main influences on selection, to see how you can devise experimental setups. Reading Pinker recently, he rejects a load of possible theories, purely on the grounds that they are lamarckian or neo-lamarckian, and all that malarkey, - the implication being, - we already know that anything that's lamarckian isn't true. I think some of the accounts he rejects are fairly obviously wrong, - but the argument by which he rejects them, - that they're lamarckian, is also wrong. Sure it's true that we don't have any account of how minds might cause adapative mutations, - but that doesn't prove it doesn't happen. When he rejects arguments that cultural evolution is lamarckian, "because it's lamarckian, and we already know that lamarck was wrong" he seems to me to be quite wrong, and his style of argument doesn't make sense, because the merit of a theory doesn't lie in whether or not it fits in with materialist orthodoxy, or what type of theory it is, but in whether it makes sense of the data.

Well no theory is absolutely 100% certain. Its possible that Darwinian evolution by natural selection is wrong and that there's an alternative, superior theory. Its extremely unlikely, but its possible.

The main reason by far for insisting that darwinian evolution is a proved fact and that all other theories are proved wrong, seems to be simply that if you accept materialist orthodoxy, - as defined in the post above to Jonti, then darwinian evolution is the most parsimonious explanation. If however you need first to prove that the darwinian theory of evolution is a proven fact in order to accept materialist orthodoxy, then the reasoning is obviously circular.

I'm astonished by the way posters are assuming that the practice of science means accepting materialist metaphysics. Its blatantly not true.

Yes, I can see why it seems like an odd claim, - The point I was trying to make is that Descartes' role in intellectual history was as a proto-scientist, trying to set materialist science on secure foundations in a perilous intellectual climate. By propounding the fairly ridiculous theory of substance dualism, he left science with the materialist/mechanist part of the quest for the knowledge, and the church with the care and knowledge of our immaterial souls, - and the church, being fairly stupid, accepted that, until it was too late, and scientists started getting interested in the mind as well. But by the time science started getting interested in the mind it was hypnotised by the materialist/mechanist foundation on which Descartes had set it.

By contrast to Descartes, Spinoza's philosophy makes more sense both from a scientific and a religious point of view, - but, despite the fact that the first chapter of Spinoza's ethics is devoted to proving that their can only be one substance, that it's the cause of its own existence, and is God, - in his time, Spinoza was accused of atheism, (because he appeared to be denying the transcendent God, in favour of the immanent) and if he had not lived in Holland, he would probably have been killed.

These are all fair points but I'm not sure where you are going with them.

 

[Knotted]

How so? "Objective" means what exactly? If we can see the alleged "objectivity" regularly questioned and overturned...???

As in not subjective. A good scientific theory cannot be falsified by some sort of examination of values of the science. It can only be falsified by an appeal to experiment and observation. Of course that are not so good scientific theories which perhaps rely on unstated assumptions but the peer review process should weedle these out.

Of course objective does not mean correct.

Again, the opposite of what I am saying... It can not "force" anything even within the part of the scientific community that shares the same, broadly speaking, political values, let alone outside it... Tesla, for instance, had a real issue with Einstein all his life and they did talk about the same thing at the highest level... [Btw, Einstein's wife, Mileva, did a lot of maths for him... not that she is mentioned... And once she was gone he was known to have made some even high school maths mistakes in his publications... Withdrawn, of course - but too late...]

I was answering you quickly in my lunch break (yes I'm doing it again ) and perhaps overstated my position. But anyway, of course science challenges our values, including the values of scientists such as Tesla and Einstein. So what? You can't force somebody to agree with a theory, but as I said in the OP you can still criticise them for the reasons they reject a theory.

I'm completely failing to see why this line you are taking is relevant.

Which peers? Have you any idea what some of the Philosophers/Scientists had to go against to change the way we see ourselves and our world? Peer review and radical change... Yeah, right... So many times we have seen a single man stand up against everyone, including those "respectable" peers of one, and say "This is a much better way of understanding things"... And get nothing but buckets of cold water thrown all over one... Something to ponder, methinx...

Sure peer review is not perfect.

And what to do with the "experiments" of the thought kind?

I would say much the same as I would about other kinds of experiment.

Eh?

Einstein's take on quantum mechanics has been experimentally falsified.

Darwinism's legacy is interpreted in a number of ways... Genetic relation to nurture in particular, too.

Of course. Evolutionary biology is not complete. It is, however, convergent.

Scientific answers to philosophical questions/issues? Pull another one...

Why not? Discussion of what we understand space to be used to be a philosophical question. Now it is a scientific question.

No, your "reasoning is "slippery". The article puts a good set of questions/issues forward for debate. Very uncomfortable for crude materialists full of "common sense/received wisdom/mythological "notions" of Science...

Most of the article makes very obvious and uncontroversial points. Its just unclear whether when the author mentions 'science' whether he means scientific institutions, scientific thinking, scientific methods for testing theories or science as a body of work.

The issues regarding alleged Scientific objectivity and neutrality [value-wise] are screaming out so loud that some are just knocked over by it and they seem to be way too weak to hear it, let alone muster something meaningful and critically minded on the topic/issues...

So you say...

 

[nosos]

Einstein's take on quantum mechanics has been experimentally falsified.

As I understood the issue it amounted to whether indeterminancy is an ontological or epistemic phenomenon. How do you experimentally falsify the claim that it's the latter?

 

[Jonti]

Readers should note that the design and workings of their PCs and mobile phones etc depend on aspects of QM that Einstein rejected on a priori grounds.

This is why we can say Einstein's take on quantum mechanics has been experimentally falsified.

 

[gorski]

As in not subjective.

Frog means not a cow? C'mon...

A good scientific theory cannot be falsified by some sort of examination of values of the science. It can only be falsified by an appeal to experiment and observation. Of course that are not so good scientific theories which perhaps rely on unstated assumptions but the peer review process should weedle these out.

Ermmm, what's a "good" scientific theory? Can you see the problem? Especially as you conceded that peer review is "not perfect"... Or maybe even moving largely in the sphere of the well trodden path?

Of course objective does not mean correct.

You are having a laugh now...???

I was answering you quickly in my lunch break (yes I'm doing it again) and perhaps overstated my position. But anyway, of course science challenges our values, including the values of scientists such as Tesla and Einstein. So what? You can't force somebody to agree with a theory, but as I said in the OP you can still criticise them for the reasons they reject a theory.

Bon apetit... Didn't you say that science's strength is in its capacity to force people to agree regardless of their values or words to that effect? And that was what I questioned. If that clears up the misunderstanding?

I'm completely failing to see why this line you are taking is relevant.

Because you "overstated your case"...

Sure peer review is not perfect.

You bet it isn't!

I would say much the same as I would about other kinds of experiment.

How many peers at any one time really understand cutting edge thinking?

Einstein's take on quantum mechanics has been experimentally falsified.

What Nosos said...

Of course. Evolutionary biology is not complete. It is, however, convergent.

"Evolutionary biology" applied to, for instance, "sexual practices" is a real laugh!!!

Why not? Discussion of what we understand space to be used to be a philosophical question. Now it is a scientific question.

It still is a philosophical question, as we are still "imagining" a helluva lot in the field. And we will for quite a while, it's reasonable to assume, I would say. [It's not like it's the Start Trek science & technology we are enjoying at the moment, is it? ]

Most of the article makes very obvious and uncontroversial points.

Can you break it to Jonti, please... But do it gently...

Its just unclear whether when the author mentions 'science' whether he means scientific institutions, scientific thinking, scientific methods for testing theories or science as a body of work.

Science is defined by it's subject and method. Go figure.

So you say...

You wish. Or I do. Alas, I did not invent it...

 

[Jonti]

Einstein's take on quantum mechanics has been experimentally falsified.

What Nosos said...

Hmmm. Readers may like to consider the comments of the Professor of Physics at the University of Washington's Department of Physics ...(emphases added)

Albert Einstein disliked quantum mechanics, as developed by Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Dirac, and others, because it had many strange features that ran head-on into Einstein's finely honed intuition and understanding of how a proper universe ought to operate. Over the years he developed a list of objections to the various peculiarities of quantum mechanics. At the top of Einstein's list of complaints was what he called "spooky actions at a distance". Einstein's "spookiness" is now called nonlocality, the mysterious ability of Nature to enforce correlations between separated but entangled parts of a quantum system that are out of speed-of-light contact, to reach faster-than-light across vast spatial distances or even across time itself to ensure that the parts of a quantum system are made to match. To be more specific, locality means that isolated parts of any quantum mechanical system out of speed-of-light contact with other parts of that system are allowed to retain definite relationships or correlations only through memory of previous contact. Nonlocality means that in quantum systems correlations not possible through simple memory are somehow being enforced faster-than-light across space and time. Nonlocality, peculiar though it is, is a fact of quantum systems which has been repeatedly demonstrated in laboratory experiments.

Source

 

[Jonti]

What is interesting about this discussion is the way the relativists insist their theory is true (science is value laden) but refuse to discuss actual examples. I find this odd.

The theory (that science has no objectivity, but like theology, is imbued with human value judgments and ideology) fails, when challenged, to produce any examples. Yet the best possible way for the relativists to make their case would be to give a few examples. Simple as that!

I've asked for an explanation of how Fleming's Left Hand Rule is "value laden". There's been no answer as to what value system is smuggled into our minds by Fleming's Left Hand Rule! Fact is, Fleming bequeathed all the world (regardless of religious and political opinion) the understanding of how electrical flows and magnetic fields interact to produce a force. And anyone, regardless of their political or social or religious views can verify it for themselves!

So that's a revealing silence from the relativists. How about the calculation of the energy stored in a body due it being raised high in the air? The potential energy of a building, for example is mgh/2 (that's 'mass' x 'the gravitational constant' x 'height' / 2) where h is the height above ground of the structure's centre of gravity.

Can anyone give examples of how this formula (one which anyone can verify for themself) smuggles a value system into the calculations. Please? Pretty please??

Guys, if your theory has practical implications which are not met -- there's simply something wrong with your theory!

 

[gorski]

More ostrich games, vicar?!? Knock yerslef out...

 

[Knotted]

That's pretty much what I was trying to say. Knotted, you mentioned Putnam earlier. Have you read him on internal realism? Objectivity can be established internal to a conceptual scheme. The denial of metaphysical objectivity doesn't entail judgemental relativism i.e. that there are no good reasons to choose between alternative accounts. It's just means that these reasons aren't written into the fabric of reality, potentially available to all properly rational observers anywhere. Contextualism doesn't entail voluntarism. It only seems voluntaristic if you evaluate it from within a quasi-platonic objective/subjective problematic (given it's not the former one thus concludes it must be latter).

Apologies for not replying earlier. I'm working on a first come first served basis.

I've read Putnam's book called Renewing Philosophy or something similar. I don't remember him mentioning internal realism in this book but he pulled apart metaphysical realism quite effectively. Putnam changes his views quite often - this is something I think is to his credit - so its quite possible that he had rejected internal realism by the time he wrote this book.

Scientific statements are not internal. Nor are they necessarily 'representations' of the world. The starting point of a theory does not mean that reality has the same starting point or that reality has the same starting point at all. However scientific statements are subject to correction by experimentation. Science is not merely a semantic/grammatical exercise. I think Putnam favours a more subtle realism rather than rejecting realism as such.

Incidently if you think science is partly subjective and you reject relativism then surely you must be accepting some sort of Lysenkoism?

 

[Knotted]

As I understood the issue it amounted to whether indeterminancy is an ontological or epistemic phenomenon. How do you experimentally falsify the claim that it's the latter?

This was a minor point of disagreement, but yes it cannot be falsified.

See Jonti's post for the reason Einstein was simply wrong on QM.

 

[Knotted]

Ermmm, what's a "good" scientific theory? Can you see the problem? Especially as you conceded that peer review is "not perfect"... Or maybe even moving largely in the sphere of the well trodden path?

This is a spurious argument. You criticise peer review not for accepting poor science but for rejecting too much presumably good science. I agree that peer review can be over zealous and I agree that the occasional brilliant outsider theory will be rejected for no good reason. This does not mean that peer review fails to weedle out dodgy science.

You are having a laugh now...???

Hardly. If true meant objective and objective meant true then we would not have two different words.

Bon apetit... Didn't you say that science's strength is in its capacity to force people to agree regardless of their values or words to that effect? And that was what I questioned. If that clears up the misunderstanding?

From the OP (with emphasis added):
"I am saying that any view on the nature of science and the subject matter of science that anybody has come up with so far and that is free from obvious absurdities would say that the theories of relativity are empirically well supported."

"The assumptions might be difficult to test and so there is plenty of room for philosophical debate about the underlying values."

Also note:
"Science is far from perfect."

Because you "overstated your case"...

Not in the OP.

"Evolutionary biology" applied to, for instance, "sexual practices" is a real laugh!!!

I think you are talking about evolutionary psychology here. I don't expect evolutionary psychology to come up with a complete view of human behaviour on its own. I do expect it to provide some insights. Its a relatively new area and its bound to have teething problems. If science was complete then scientists would be out of a job.

It still is a philosophical question, as we are still "imagining" a helluva lot in the field. And we will for quite a while, it's reasonable to assume, I would say. [It's not like it's the Start Trek science & technology we are enjoying at the moment, is it? ]

I don't undertand what you are tyring to say here. Are there any modern philosophers who talk about physical space?

Can you break it to Jonti, please... But do it gently...

Has Jonti said anything about this article?

Science is defined by it's subject and method. Go figure.

I keep making distinctions between science as an institution (has values), science as a set of methods (has values given any particular method) and science as a body of work (should have no values). You keep ignoring these distinctions. This does not amount to argument, just obfustication.

 

[Knotted]

I've asked for an explanation of how Fleming's Left Hand Rule is "value laden". There's been no answer as to what value system is smuggled into our minds by Fleming's Left Hand Rule! Fact is, Fleming bequeathed all the world (regardless of religious and political opinion) the understanding of how electrical flows and magnetic fields interact to produce a force. And anyone, regardless of their political or social or religious views can verify it for themselves!

This is a good question. Remember that the argument is that all science is inherently imbued subjective values. Fleming's Left Hand Rule is not difficult. This should be an easy question to answer.

 

[gorski]

This is a spurious argument. You criticise peer review not for accepting poor science but for rejecting too much presumably good science. I agree that peer review can be over zealous and I agree that the occasional brilliant outsider theory will be rejected for no good reason. This does not mean that peer review fails to weedle out dodgy science.

Not much of a comfort to G. Bruno and co... Or when a man insists all physicians must wash their hands and boil their instruments/tools before the delivery of a child and is ridiculed and shunned so much he takes his own life... And so forth... That's my point. The principle is wrong because truth does not come by agreement - even Habermas has such ideas but I beg to differ here...

Hardly. If true meant objective and objective meant true then we would not have two different words.

True and correct [and that is what you used] are very different notions, though - you must agree...

I think you are talking about evolutionary psychology here. I don't expect evolutionary psychology to come up with a complete view of human behaviour on its own. I do expect it to provide some insights. Its a relatively new area and its bound to have teething problems. If science was complete then scientists would be out of a job.

Not a "complete view" - but very little, if anything at all, as we can turn against our nature so badly it hurts... until one feels nothing any more... "Some insights" is so very broad - and you will agree if careful - it means nothing at all... Your last sentence, methodically speaking, sounds like one of those myths one hears on these boards every so often... As if Science can answer anything deeply Human on its own - at all...

I don't undertand what you are tyring to say here. Are there any modern philosophers who talk about physical space?

There are others who are much more qualified to speak on the subject than me. But yes. And many Q's here: from the "what's space to us" onwards...

Has Jonti said anything about this article?

Much. All blunders. I bet he will say now that he was only teasing me. I think if he had any sense we should have another Sun now. On Earth. Him blushing wildly...

I keep making distinctions between science as an institution (has values), science as a set of methods (has values given any particular method) and science as a body of work (should have no values). You keep ignoring these distinctions. This does not amount to argument, just obfustication.

Rubbish! The last point and your conclusion, that is. Good we agree on the first two, which is a rare moment on the forum. You must read the article more carefully, re. the last one. I think it's in the very beginning of the article, as in what kind of context Science requires to BE [at all]...

There. Have a nice day, must rush, loadsa things to do, MA to enjoy...

 

[Jonti]

Has Jonti said anything about this article?

Much. All blunders.

I've said nothing about the article in this thread. But here's my favourite quote from it.

(we are not obliged) to abandon science or objectivity, or to embrace an uneasy relativism.

The reader can decide for themselves who is trying to misrepresent the piece in question.

 

[nosos]

This was a minor point of disagreement, but yes it cannot be falsified.

See Jonti's post for the reason Einstein was simply wrong on QM.

You mean this: At the top of Einstein's list of complaints was what he called "spooky actions at a distance". Einstein's "spookiness" is now called nonlocality? Surely both sides to the dispute accepted the phenomena of non-locality but Einstein argued this was mere appearance: a product of an incomplete theory. Whereas Bohr and co accepted the phenomena as ontologically grounded. The former was moved by a methodological commitment to realism whereas the latter was moved by a methodological commitment to empiricism. Surely the dispute was one of methodology? Neither side could hold their theory up to quantum reality and see how well it matches up because both sides had a commitment to the constitution of quantum reality which was prior to any attempt at verification. Hence why I’m still confused as to how it can be experimentally falsified. Or how Einstein can be 'simply wrong'.

 

[nosos]

I think Putnam favours a more subtle realism rather than rejecting realism as such.

That's why I brought him up: the rejection of scientific realism* doesn't entail the abandonment of a thorough-going realism sufficient to ground scientific inquiry.

Incidently if you think science is partly subjective and you reject relativism then surely you must be accepting some sort of Lysenkoism?

I don't think science is partly subjective! I think it's the most objective kind of human inquiry.

*Just to clarify: I don't mean this in the sense of realism about science. I mean it in the sense of Scientific Realism as explicit philosophy of science

 

[nosos]

I keep making distinctions between science as an institution (has values), science as a set of methods (has values given any particular method) and science as a body of work (should have no values).

I still don't understand the status you're according science as a body of work. Your criteria for its value-neutrality seems to be that accepting the values of the scientists (institution) who produced it (method) is not a necessary condition for accepting/understanding the body of work itself. Well, yes, I just don't see what's significant about this. If you want to teach science or disseminate its findings, you're inevitably going to want to render the work in a way that makes it as open as possible.

 

[Jonti]

You mean this: At the top of Einstein's list of complaints was what he called "spooky actions at a distance". Einstein's "spookiness" is now called nonlocality? Surely both sides to the dispute accepted the phenomena of non-locality but Einstein argued this was mere appearance: a product of an incomplete theory. Whereas Bohr and co accepted the phenomena as ontologically grounded. The former was moved by a methodological commitment to realism whereas the latter was moved by a methodological commitment to empiricism. Surely the dispute was one of methodology? Neither side could hold their theory up to quantum reality and see how well it matches up because both sides had a commitment to the constitution of quantum reality which was prior to any attempt at verification. Hence why I’m still confused as to how it can be experimentally falsified. Or how Einstein can be 'simply wrong'.

Well, there's Bohm (not to be confused with Bohr), who thinks there is an underlying determinism to QM. But his theory is more complicated, and it relies on hidden variables (a methodological no-no in science) so it is not favourite.

But the main trouble with Bohm's approach is that ... Bell's inequality ... demonstrates that there is no local hidden variable theory that is compatible with quantum mechanics (per the Wiki article on the Bohm interpretation) and QM is one of the most stupendously accurate and successful theories ever.

This is the sort of thing that is meant when scientists say that Einstein has been proven wrong about QM. As far as we can tell God does in fact play dice with the Universe, much to Einstein's discomfiture.


.

 

[kyser_soze]

OOO, Bohm...you need to talk to Merlin Wood about him

 

[Knotted]

Rubbish! The last point and your conclusion, that is. Good we agree on the first two, which is a rare moment on the forum. You must read the article more carefully, re. the last one. I think it's in the very beginning of the article, as in what kind of context Science requires to BE [at all]...

Allchin does not make any philosophical arguments on this point. He merely gives historical examples of bias in science. So what? Nobody is claiming science is perfect.

 

[nosos]

OOO, Bohm...you need to talk to Merlin Wood about him

Yeah when I came across the implicate order it immediately struck me how similar it is to what Merlin Wood's saying.

(at least how I read both of them)

 

[Fruitloop]

Moreover, there always has been bias and personality clashes in sciance. Newton could apparently be a right bastard when career issues etc were at stake, it doesn't mean you don't use his mechanics if you want to send a rocket into space.

Scientists are only human after all.