Marx and anti-semitism

[Knotted]

But we don't have access to the "actuality" of the world. We only have access to the world as it appears to the human mind, to the subject. And the subject is a historical force, which changes and develops through time. And therefore so does its relation to the objective environment. So we cannot just pick one kind of relation between the subject and object and call it "correct," for that would be both ahistorical and undialectical.

Ann asks me, "what's Bob doing?"

I reply, "Bob is talking to Cat."

But wait!!! Can that be truth? Isn't possible that Ann could have asked, "what's Cat doing?" and I would have to reply, "Cat is talking to Bob."

Bob is talking to Cat and Cat is talking to Bob. They can't both be true!!

I don't know what truth is anymore.

What do we say. Un, Deux, Trois...

MERDE!

WHY DID SAUSURE FORSAKE US?!!

French philosophy is so easy.

 

[kyser_soze]

No, but I want one of those now

 

[butchersapron]

Wow, i didn't know marx could be so joyless.

 

[phildwyer]

No but without assuming this "actuality", even if it is ultimately unreachable, we end up in a dead end of irrational idiocy and solophist shite.

You are aware I take it that this is Kant's argument for the existence of God? You are now positing the existence of a reality that forever transcends human consciousness, and yet is more real than human consciousness. Pure idealism. Congratulations.

 

[DotCommunist]

there comes a point where you have to call a hairbrush a hairbrush and stop wanking on about how the word 'hairbrush' is in fact an abstract label. If we all sit around growing beards and quaffing real ale while discussing semiotics fuck all gets done

 

[kyser_soze]

there comes a point where you have to call a hairbrush a hairbrush and stop wanking on about how the word 'hairbrush' is in fact an abstract label. If we all sit around growing beards and quaffing real ale while discussing semiotics fuck all gets done

Ale is drunk and beards are grown...that's something, surely?

 

[Belushi]

there comes a point where you have to call a hairbrush a hairbrush and stop wanking on about how the word 'hairbrush' is in fact an abstract label. If we all sit around growing beards and quaffing real ale while discussing semiotics fuck all gets done

Thats what purges are for.

 

[DotCommunist]

Thats what purges are for.

*looks hard at people wearing glasses*

 

[Knotted]

I would have thought that to argue the making/finding distinction is in a sense to already conceive the metaphysical point. But then I've probably overdosed on Rorty and Gadamer recently.

I know that I'm becoming a bore, but you should read Putnam as a cure for Rorty. When philosophers lose their metaphysical innocence, when they realise that there can be no absolute account of concepts such as truth, matter, actuality etc., they go on to assume that these concepts have no use. But in doing so they are maintaining their metaphysical attitudes even after they reject the metaphysics. I suspect with Rorty it's a form of post-positivism and with Gadamer it is a form of post-Sausurianism that leads them to their relativist conclusions (I'm probably being unfair on Gadamer who I'm only vaguely familiar with). It's a "I saw mummy kissing santa" type syndrome. Yes philosophy does not give you final answers, get over it. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, philosophy seems to be trying to uncover something that was hidden in plain speach, but what possibly could be hidden in plain speach? The fact that you couldn't find any hidden secrets does not justify scepticism/relativism/sophistry.

 

[Fruitloop]

I like Putnam, however I'm not sure that the above is a fair representation of what Rorty is saying - at least recently. His thinking and Putnam's seem to be a large degree convergent, although I'm sure both would rather die than admit it. That's philosophers for you...

 

[Knotted]

I like Putnam, however I'm not sure that the above is a fair representation of what Rorty is saying - at least recently. His thinking and Putnam's seem to be a large degree convergent, although I'm sure both would rather die than admit it. That's philosophers for you...

Oh no, I think Rorty influenced Putnam a great deal and Putnam acknowledges this. Putnam is his own best critic, which is why he is good at criticising those who influenced him.

ETA: I'm probably merging Putnam's critique of Rorty with his critique of Derridda, though.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

But we don't have access to the "actuality" of the world. We only have access to the world as it appears to the human mind, to the subject.

This is, of course, true. But all your conclusions based on this truth are unjustified. There is no need to deviate from the scientific method, in fact, even given this truth. Evidence, testable hypotheses and experiment will tell you all you can know beyond the fact of your own existence. The fact of your existence will, I fear, remain a mystery. The pain of that mystery can and does produce the most remarkable art and stories, however, so it's not all bad.

 

[Fruitloop]

Oh no, I think Rorty influenced Putnam a great deal and Putnam acknowledges this. Putnam is his own best critic, which is why he is good at criticising those who influenced him.

ETA: I'm probably merging Putnam's critique of Rorty with his critique of Derridda, though.

Yeah they are becoming more distinct as time goes by, as a lot of Putnam’s criticisms of Derrida were probably also applicable to earlier Rorty, but Rorty in recent years has been moving in much more constructively pragmatist direction.

 

[Knotted]

Yeah they are becoming more distinct as time goes by, as a lot of Putnam’s criticisms of Derrida were probably also applicable to earlier Rorty, but Rorty in recent years has been moving in much more constructively pragmatist direction.

Fair enough.

 

[Knotted]

But we don't have access to the "actuality" of the world. We only have access to the world as it appears to the human mind, to the subject.

I know you're fond of Hegel's criticism of picture-thinking, isn't the above exactly this?

If we are talking about the truth of a statement or an argument, we are not talking about a picture that the individual conceives of and then attempts to match to reality. Isn't it precisely the point of Hegel's philosophy to show that such a primitive account of thought does not capture the true richness of logical thought?

See in particular:
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/sl_ii.htm

The flaw in your argument is that you assume thought to be immediate, private and subjective - like a picture in the mind. But the very framework in which thought is realised and expressed is historically mediated. That is your language, your traditions, your education and so on are implicit in your thought. That is your thought is a product not merely of you the subject, but you the social, historical object. We really do have access to 'actuality'. That your form of expression is relative to your culture does not mean that the content of your expression is relative to your culture.

As Marx said, "The main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism — that of Feuerbach included — is that the Object, actuality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism — but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, differentiated from thought-objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. In The Essence of Christianity, he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance. Hence he does not grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary’, of ‘practical-critical’, activity."

Note that Marx's criticism of Feuerbach's materialism consists exactly in doing what you say should not be done. That is "objectifying the subject". It was Feuerbach the contemplative materialist who failed to see the subject as object and Marx the consistent materialist who emphasised the importance of doing exactly this (as did Hegel the consistent idealist).

Note also that Marx highlights this curious connection with anti-semitism and Feuerbach's understanding of thought as mere subjectivity.

 

[Knotted]

I'm having one of my characteristic changes of heart about "On the Jewish Question".

Although Marx argues for perfectly sound democratic rights for Jews to practice their religion, Marx is really caught up on the theological character of Judaism. I was wrong to say Marx was stereotyping the Jews as a people. He's not talking about Jewish culture or identity he's talking about Jewish religion. He's not stereotyping at all, but giving a strange interpretation and critique of Judaism (ie. the religion). In this he is borrowing from Feuerbach wholesale. I think Marx is "anti-semitic" here, in a weak sense of seeing Jewish religion as being particularly "practical" and that this Jewish "pracitcality" ideologically dominates society (though he is not saying that Jews themselves dominate society). Compare with "islamophobia" today.

It is important to understand the peculiar connotations of "practical religion" in Feuerbach. Feuerbach sees Judaism as a religion where Jehovah exists for the purpose of manipulating nature in the egoistical interests of the Jewish people. You could well give this a Frankfurter gloss and substitute the word "practical" for the word "instrumental", Feuerbach himself uses the word "utilism" - the world is there for our utility. He contrasts "practical" attitude with the "theoretcial" attitude of the polytheistic Greeks who, according to Feuerbach, who looked at nature with a sense of wonder and sought to understand it in it's own right. We can see what revol68 calls aesthetic ethics loudly and clearly in Feuerbach.

See:
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/ec11.htm
I don't think it is possible to understand either "On the Jewish Question" or "Theses on Feuerbach" properly without reading this first.

It is clear that in "On the Jewish Question" Marx is completely enthralled by Feuerbach, and I think this is true of Marx's writings in the early 1840's. However, it is also clear that Marx rejects Feuerbach as of 1845 in the "Theses on Feuerbach" and "The German Ideology". In fact Marx explicitly rejects this practical/theoretical dichotomy in the first thesis on Feuerbach and even makes it clear that he rejects the anti-semitic overtones of this dichotomy in Feuerbach. (It is also implicit that Marx rejects "aesthetic ethics".)

This is something of an epiphany for me. I had long believed that the differences between Marx in circa 1843-4 and Marx in the late 1840's were slight. I now think he changed his views quite deeply and thoroughly circa 1844-5. I also suspect that this is largely to do with the influence of Engels. It is usual to assume that Marx influenced Engels more than Engels influenced Marx, but I think this wrong, I think the reverse is the case.

 

[Knotted]

Fuck!

I agree with Louis Althusser. Someone put me out of my misery.

 

[Fruitloop]

Where is the 'aesthetic ethics' thing from?

 

[Knotted]

Where is the 'aesthetic ethics' thing from?

That's from revol68's posts in the thread. I'm not 100% clear on what he means but it seems to be what Marx refers to as the "theoretcial attitude" in the first thesis on Feuerbach, which I have quoted in my reply to phildwyer.

 

[kyser_soze]

Where is the 'aesthetic ethics' thing from?

You do realise that if you hadn't replied knotted would have eventually argued himself to believe that black is white, don't you?

 

[Santino]

You do realise that if you hadn't replied knotted would have eventually argued himself to believe that black is white, don't you?

Do you understand black and white as a conceptual framework or black and white as they are understood in lived experience?

 

[kyser_soze]

Black and white as they are understood in lived experience

 

[Santino]

Very well.