You can read, can you?
Please tell me that you are not suggesting that the only reliable identification process is human observation?
particularly in one case i recall from the poll tax riot when the officer giving evidence admitted that to see the events he claimed he'd have had to see round several cornersPlease tell me that you are not suggesting that the only reliable identification process is human observation?
(The same human observation that has regularly been found wanting in criminal cases, to the point where for at least 25 years it has been treated with great suspicion ...)
We're highly visual, big-brained, social animals, and a lot of our brains are dedicated to facial recognition. Objectively tiny differences in, for example, the shape of eyes, lips and nose, in the hue of skin, and in the music of a body's movement loom large on our eyes. We're highly attuned to seeing patterns in these variables as well. Quite literally, we've evolved to recognise each other.Please tell me that you are not suggesting that the only reliable identification process is human observation?
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The point was addressed by explaining that the proposed cure is worse than the disease.
... and your point is?
No. But it really does all the bad things I listed. You claim it will stop people getting what they are entitled to ... but you can only justify that claim by stating that it will be implemented in a completely fuckwitted, "computer says no" way where if the biometric recognition system says no match then that is it, you get fucked off out of it. You have produced no evidence that that is how the system is intended to work. There is no reason why it would have to be.
You can read, can you?
You have NOT pointed out "my claims" are false ... you've invented some claims you wrongly allege I have made ... so apart from pointing out that you are mistaken (which is what I have done), what exactly do you expect me to do? Engage in discussing your fantasies?
Authenticating an individual means proving that each person has one and only one entry on the population register. It's easy to demonstrate that that job is not feasible for large populations.
That is a six page article which makes all sorts of claims and draws all sorts of conclusions. Some of them I agree with (mainly the descriptive stuff from the experts describing how things operate), some of them I don't (mainly the conclusions drawn which, for the most part, make all sorts of additional assumptions).
No. I restrict it to one topic at a time because experience shows it is impossible to keep any sort of focus otherwise - as you have demonstrated here by racing off in lots of different directions again ...
If the citizen is important (and I believe that they are of central importance - there is no point in a society other than to better the lives of the citizens - apart from the citizens there is no-one else who should gain from societies arrangements), why is being able to assert your identity not important? Why would it not matter if anyone could impersonate you in any particular situation they wished? I simly do not understand how you can say that that would not be important.
Of course the system will not be "perfect" - there will always be errors with anything that involves humans at any stage. But why are you assuming that the system will operate on an absolute "This system is perfect and this system say's no" basis? No other system we have ever invented does at the system management level (though sometimes it is difficult to engage individual fuckwit operators). The fingerprint system we have had for years manages to deal with occasional problems without any major meltdown - why do you assume that the ID system will be any different?
Yes ... but with massively more difficulty than forging a National Insurance number card or a birth certificate - surely you acknowledge that the system will be far, far more difficult to get around than what we have at the moment.
I take it that you have conceded that you have no argument then. Thanks.
ie by making points which you cannot answer.No. I restrict it to one topic at a time because experience shows it is impossible to keep any sort of focus otherwise - as you have demonstrated here by racing off in lots of different directions again ...
answered that one before. most of the time (eg to buy booze, get NHS treatment) I dont care, why should I? It matters when they are depriving me of something by 'impersonating' me. Will ID cards make that more difficult? Actually, no, not according to most industry workers (eg the microsoft blokes commnets jonti has already linked to) . Most of the time ID cards will NOT check back with the central database before giving a yes or no. So it will still be very very easilly forgeable.
Again you are assuming that will be the case. I have not seen concrete proposals for how the system is intended to be used in different contexts. But the point is that how it is used is different from what it is capable of.
Nobody is saying that it would be "easy" to change things on the central database ... but there is no reason why there cannot be acceptable protocols and procedures to deal with any issues encountered. You keep assuming there won't be ... but you provide no justification for why that must be the outcome. If you are simply pointing out that is a danger that it may be operated in a fuckwitted manner, with over-reliance on it's infallability, etc. then I would agree with you. But I would still say that that danger can be addressed and it is not a reason to bin all the potential advantages - that would be a very good reason to pull the plug on the internet too - do you argue that we should do that?
There have been some outline proposals, and we do know that there are three levels of card examination. The costs involved, as well as the privacy concerns, mean that it will be unusual for the most thorough examination to be used, and we can make some fairly reasonable assumptions as to what those will be.
But it must become more difficult to change the data, or there would be no point in doing it. Yes, of course there will be protocols put into place, tho these have not (to my knowledge) been issued yet, which should be a great worry as the cards are actually being issued already.
That's as maybe ... but as I say how it is used is not necessarily the same as what it is capable of ... and if the way it is used initially does not provide the necessary benefits then how it is used can be changed - the basic biometric link is there to facilitate that.
More difficult, yes. Not easy and not impossible. Certainly it shoud not be done without appropriate investigation / checks / sign-off. Undoubtedly problems will arise and loopholes will be identified and closed in processes and procedures - that is the human way of doing things!
I have no problem with you or anyone else holding that conclusion provided you acknowledge what the costs and benefits are in a realistic manner (as you, unlike some other posters, appear to have).
Perhaps not as rare as you think ... and increasingly a problem in my experience (but, like much fraud, no reliable statistics are maintained on the subject). Not sure that "most" professionals don't think it will help. Yes, many experts raise various issues - but most of them (like those quoted in The Register article linked to) are taking a single aspect of the possible / proposed system and raising issues which may already have been addressed and which there is certainly no reason why cannot be addressed. Yes, many experts point out that there are considerations that need to be taken into account and that there may still be some issues ... but most of those I encounter believe overall it is a step in the right direction.
but the extent to which it is used is very important, as it indicates both he numbers of people who have access to the data, and the number of machines that will be used to access it. the higher both are, the greater the risk of that highest level of security being breached. the lower they are, the greater the risk of much ID fraud carrying on as is.
"Verification checks of biometrics identifiers will be made against the card in most cases using the biometrics stored in the chip, for example if the facial image or fingerprint biometrics are verified as part of an immigration check at the border," said Hillier, Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Identity), Home Office, in a parliamentary written answer on 17 November 2008.
You've moved the goalposts again.
i honestly dont think its goalpost shifting, the extent of use will have a significant impact upon the useability of the sceme, and the possibility of fraud. Of course the scheme is, probably, technically possible - thats a pretty big part of the civil liberties argument.
In more general terms, please explain why, if we have a system of bank cards (which DON'T include any biometrics) which allow us to access our bank accounts and give us money from them within a second or two, which have been around for donkeys years and which have not been breached to any siginificant extent in terms of establishing who we are (except in relation to a cloned card), technology including biometrics shoud be so easy to breach?
worth repeatng the quote, it shows a very suprisingly lowexpected level of usage for third level checks. Tho as they cost around £2 each (I read somewhere, sounds about right ime) I guess the cost would just be prohibitive (not top mention the risks of interception/other data loss with so much data travelling back n forth)
I was saying that the kit could verify the data, etc. without the actual person operating it actually knowing the data (like the cashier doesn't actually need to know loads of stuff from your bank account when the little machine confirms your card transaction - it's all done behind the scenes as it were).
