Hegel

[articul8]

Hegel's speculative philosophy is not a product of pure thought as an activity (the word 'speculative' is very misleading, it isn't meant as some sort of guess at how things are) but rather it is logical in that it describes the necessary forms through which thought must pass.

what is logic except the mediation of thought's active process of reflecting on itself?

Of course the speculative in Hegel is not a product of romanticism, its a product of religion. It is about knowledge of the infinite rather than the mere finite. Again this is something that Marcuse seems to miss.

Romanticism is itself informed by quasi-religious pantheism. The infinite is in the mere finite!

Anyway the point isn't being a "Hegelian" - it's about recognising his courage in pushing the idealist project to the point where it reveals its own limitations.

 

[gorski]

If any analytic philosophers suppose that deductions with actual content can be made from pure formalities then they do not practice what they preach. They are in effect doing speculative philosophy if they attempt to do this. [In contrast with Hegel, I would see this implicit speculative content as a flaw rather than a virtue.]

But in anycase it is important not to mystify Hegel or to see him as standing opposed to this or that strain of philosophy. He saw himself as integrating philosophy not dividing it into immutable 'Anglo-American' strains and non-'Anglo-American' strains.

Oh, he speaks of the English utter misconceptions of what Philosophy is all about, how they smuggle stuff they allegedly go against, under the table and so on - just read his account of Bacon and co.... So, he does make this distinction by de facto developers of such a strand of thinking, which prevailed there, in those Philosophically poor parts of the world, back then... Btw, they still are, in more ways than one, sadly... People like A8, Phil and so on are an utter rarity... and attacks on speculative Philosophy are more than common place - they are the norm, as we can see...

If I could say succinctly where I think Marcuse is confused is that he sees speculative thought arising from the active engagement of the thinking subject. He sees it as mere reflection as Hegel would put it. Hegel's speculative philosophy is not a product of pure thought as an activity (the word 'speculative' is very misleading, it isn't meant as some sort of guess at how things are) but rather it is logical in that it describes the necessary forms through which thought must pass.

Is it? It is, almost literally, starting from the Whole, as opposed to the position that starts with elements, with "experience", with "sensations" etc. but accounting for and placing all other developements and positions into the development of Human Spirit. Again, read his account on Bacon and Newton and so on on get educated on the subject... In other words, Hegel knows and accounts for other possible approaches but in his opinion, following Kant, Fichte and Schelling...

Of course the speculative in Hegel is not a product of romanticism, its a product of religion. It is about knowledge of the infinite rather than the mere finite. Again this is something that Marcuse seems to miss. Mind you I haven't read much Marcuse, just enough to know that he isn't worth bothering with on this.

No, it isn't. It is the product of Humanity's/Subject's self-activity which happens in History and of which religion is but a part - but even that, however important, is given any meaning by Philosophy, which gives it its place in the Universal, Geist, Whole, Spirit, the Absolute etc.

The whole point is to show all the inner contradictions resolved as Subject's coming back to itself [via labour of notion and notion of labour], whereby the Subject/Geist recognises itself externalised and "reposesses" that which is essentially spiritual, i.e. belonging to Spirit, i.e. itself, i.e. its own product...

 

[Knotted]

A quick word on 'analytic philosophy'. I think the term is used to include philosophers such as Willard Quine, who renounced analytical philosophy. The term refers to the tradition rather than adherence to a doctrine.

 

[gorski]

Both you and articul8 misunderstand when I say technical by thinking that I mean formal. I haven't said anything about purely formal (ie. contentless) thought, I doubt it even exists.

Hegel is an extremely pedantic, schematic thinker, and yes I like that aspect of Hegel . I find it makes him easy to read once you are used to his schema.

To be honest, I don't think Marx was ever Hegelian. He was a 'young Hegelian' in his early days, but even then the young Hegelians used to see being called 'Hegelian' as an insult. The young Engels on the other hand was much more into Hegel. I can't imagine Marx ever writing this.

Marx becomes a proper Hegelian only after he accepts Capital as the logic/spirit of Capitalism, only after having studied the English Political Economy, which task was already done by Hegel, so stricto sensu, only the latter day Marx is a proper Hegelian!!! He criticises himself in his early works, as having misunderstood what the great man already knew but he hasn't yet grasped, 'till that moment [1848, if memory serves].

You really are confused, knotted and muddled...

 

[Knotted]

what is logic except the mediation of thought's active process of reflecting on itself?

I'll get back to you on that one.

Romanticism is itself informed by quasi-religious pantheism. The infinite is in the mere finite!

But not all religion is romantic, indeed Hegel is rejecting the romantic notions of an intuition of the absolute. See his rejection of Schelling's 'positive philosophy' for instance.

 

[articul8]

I'll get back to you on that one.

But not all religion is romantic, indeed Hegel is rejecting the romantic notions of an intuition of the absolute. See his rejection of Schelling's 'positive philosophy' for instance.

the great multitude should have a sensual religion. Not only the great multitude, but even philosophy needs it. Monotheism of reason and the heart, polytheism of the imagination and art, that is what we need!
First I will speak about an idea here, which as far as I know, has never occurred to anyone's mind-- we must have a new mythology; this mythology must, however, stand in the service of ideas, it must become a mythology of reason.
Until we make ideas aesthetic, i.e., mythological, they hold no interest for the people, and conversely, before mythology is reasonable, the philosopher must be ashamed of it. Thus finally the enlightened and unenlightened must shake hands; mythology must become philosophical, and the people reasonable, and philosophy must become mythological in order to make philosophy sensual. Then external unity will reign among us. Never again the contemptuous glance, never the blind trembling of the people before its wise men and priests. Only then does equal development of all powers await us, of the individual as well as if all individuals. No power will be suppressed any longer, then general freedom and equality of spirits will reign-- A higher spirit sent from heaven must establish this religion among us, it will be the last work of the human race

http://www.cross-x.com/vb/showthread.php?t=952111

 

[Knotted]

Oh, he speaks of the English utter misconceptions of what Philosophy is all about, how they smuggle stuff they allegedly go against, under the table and so on - just read his account of Bacon and co.... So, he does make this distinction by de facto developers of such a strand of thinking, which prevailed there, in those Philosophically poor parts of the world, back then... Btw, they still are, in more ways than one, sadly... People like A8, Phil and so on are an utter rarity... and attacks on speculative Philosophy are more than common place - they are the norm, as we can see...

You and Phil see him as implacably hostile to Bacon and the English empiricists. Its just not the case. They have their own place and importance. Hegel is not hostile to the French materialists (Helvetius, Holbach etc.) either.

Is it? It is, almost literally, starting from the Whole, as opposed to the position that starts with elements, with "experience", with "sensations" etc. but accounting for and placing all other developements and positions into the development of Human Spirit. Again, read his account on Bacon and Newton and so on on get educated on the subject... In other words, Hegel knows and accounts for other possible approaches but in his opinion, following Kant, Fichte and Schelling...

Nor is it the case that Hegel starts with the Whole, not literally, not almost literally nor even figuratively. This is a crude reading of Hegel, which draws out and exagerates his peculiarities.

Nor is it the case that he merely follows Kant, Fichte and Schelling. When Hegel is putting the polemical boot into something its usually because it is connected with Kant. For example I think his attack on Newton is to do with Kant's Newtonianism, he sees Newton as a bad influence on Kant. He rarely gets excited about English or French materialist/empiricist philosophy. Its 'critical philosophy' that's his main aim.

No, it isn't. It is the product of Humanity's/Subject's self-activity which happens in History and of which religion is but a part - but even that, however important, is given any meaning by Philosophy, which gives it its place in the Universal, Geist, Whole, Spirit, the Absolute etc.

I did say that it was a product of religion, not exclusively about religion. I chose my words quite carefully. When he talks about knowledge of the absolute he makes it clear by talking about knowledge of God.

The whole point is to show all the inner contradictions resolved as Subject's coming back to itself [via labour of notion and notion of labour], whereby the Subject/Geist recognises itself externalised and "reposesses" that which is essentially spiritual, i.e. belonging to Spirit, i.e. itself, i.e. its own product...

I agree that's what he does, whether its the whole point is another question.

 

[Knotted]

Anyway the point isn't being a "Hegelian" - it's about recognising his courage in pushing the idealist project to the point where it reveals its own limitations.

I agree with you there!

 

[Knotted]

what is logic except the mediation of thought's active process of reflecting on itself?

The problem with this formulation is that thought is considered in its own right. It becomes the thinking subject thinking about the thinking subject. Hegel is concerned not just with the subject but also with the object. He is concerned not just with the determination of thought but of the determination of true thought. (The 'Idea' in Hegel is the objectively true 'Notion'.)

Perhaps the problem with certain interpretations of Hegel is that he is seen as the polar opposite of empiricism, that he stands opposed to objective truth and for subjectivity reflecting on subjectivity. This is a serious misconception.

Compare with Marx. If you weren't cautious, you might say that Marx thought that wealth is the product of labour. This is wrong, though. We need to remind ourselves that wealth is also a product of material nature ie. you don't get coal if there is no seam no matter how hard you labour. The active subject (the working class) does not simply reproduce wealth in the abstract.

 

[articul8]

The problem with this formulation is that thought is considered in its own right. It becomes the thinking subject thinking about the thinking subject. Hegel is concerned not just with the subject but also with the object. He is concerned not just with the determination of thought but of the determination of true thought. (The 'Idea' in Hegel is the objectively true 'Notion'.)

Perhaps the problem with certain interpretations of Hegel is that he is seen as the polar opposite of empiricism, that he stands opposed to objective truth and for subjectivity reflecting on subjectivity. This is a serious misconception.

Where do I say that mediation exists solely in thought? I only say that mediation occurs between subject and object - and this cannot occur without the subject realising itself in and through the object through the course its own free self-positing. The problem with naive empiricism, is that it establishes truth based on the immediate evidence of passively received sense-data, rather than through the mediation of the active consciousness of the subject.

Marx nowhere contradicts this.

 

[Knotted]

Where do I say that mediation exists solely in thought? I only say that mediation occurs between subject and object - and this cannot occur without the subject realising itself in and through the object through the course its own free self-positing. The problem with naive empiricism, is that it establishes truth based on the immediate evidence of passively received sense-data, rather than through the mediation of the active consciousness of the subject.

Like I say, for Hegel speculative philosophy is not a product of pure thought as an activity.

Empiricism is a philosophy not a practice. I don't believe naive empiricism exists anywhere in the world.

However if you read Hegel then you will see that passively (as in without intellectual effort) received sense-data is mediated. It is with active reflection that we see the immediate as mediated. The opposites had an identity.

If you see a cat and say, 'look there's a cat!' you have categorised this particular creature in the universal category of 'cat'. There is a mediation between particular and universal, of reference, of context, of meaning etc. However there was no active conscious thought process of all this.

Naive empiricism in practice does not look at facts from unmediated sense data, it looks at mediated sense data. Its just not aware of doing this.

Hegel:
'It is not only we who make this distinction of essential truth and particular example, of essence and instance, immediacy and mediation; we find it in sense-certainty itself, and it has to be taken up in the form in which it exists there, not as we have just determined it.'
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phaa.htm

Marx nowhere contradicts this.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ch01.htm

 

[gorski]

You and Phil see him as implacably hostile to Bacon and the English empiricists. Its just not the case. They have their own place and importance. Hegel is not hostile to the French materialists (Helvetius, Holbach etc.) either.

Yes, they do and Hegel says as much. But when it comes to anything that's really important in Philosophy - they are poor amateurs.

Nor is it the case that Hegel starts with the Whole, not literally, not almost literally nor even figuratively. This is a crude reading of Hegel, which draws out and exagerates his peculiarities.

Wrong, sorry. You missed the meaning of speculative in this context, completely.

Nor is it the case that he merely follows Kant, Fichte and Schelling. When Hegel is putting the polemical boot into something its usually because it is connected with Kant. For example I think his attack on Newton is to do with Kant's Newtonianism, he sees Newton as a bad influence on Kant. He rarely gets excited about English or French materialist/empiricist philosophy. Its 'critical philosophy' that's his main aim.

No one said so ['merely follows']. He criticises their contradictions and inconsistencies, from his point of view, sure.

Besides, make your mind up about how he sees the English empiricist "contribution" to Philosophy, please...

It's all a bit of a lame thing to say, really, K...

I did say that it was a product of religion, not exclusively about religion. I chose my words quite carefully. When he talks about knowledge of the absolute he makes it clear by talking about knowledge of God.

No, you didn't chose your words carefully. God means something different to him, then, as it has nothing to do with what you just implied...

I agree that's what he does, whether its the whole point is another question.

Oh, yes, it is: that is how the whole thing develops [werden = becoming], therein lieth the inner logic of thinking and so on...

 

[gorski]

Where do I say that mediation exists solely in thought? I only say that mediation occurs between subject and object - and this cannot occur without the subject realising itself in and through the object through the course its own free self-positing. The problem with naive empiricism, is that it establishes truth based on the immediate evidence of passively received sense-data, rather than through the mediation of the active consciousness of the subject.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ch01.htm

WTF?!?

 

[articul8]

Like I say, for Hegel speculative philosophy is not a product of pure thought as an activity.

No, but it cannot be thought of without consciousness reflecting on itself.

Hegel:
'It is not only we who make this distinction of essential truth and particular example, of essence and instance, immediacy and mediation; we find it in sense-certainty itself, and it has to be taken up in the form in which it exists there, not as we have just determined it.'

ie. in raw sense-data the notions of immediacy and mediation are one phenomonelogically, but it is precisely in the "taking up" of such data as an activity of consciousness that allows philosophy to perceive and hence sublate the distinction.

Naive empiricism in practice does not look at facts from unmediated sense data, it looks at mediated sense data. Its just not aware of doing this.

Exactly my point! Awareness requires thought reflecting on itself! This is what differentiates critical philosophy from mere empiricism!

As for Marx and the Gotha Programme - his point is fundamentally the same as Hegel's - but where Hegel says "activity" meaning that of consciousness, Marx takes productive activity ("labour") in a wider sense. But for both, the active subject objectifies its own forces in order to realise itself and then re-disover itself-in-the-world as a purposeful unity.

The idea that thought thinks itself without any relation to the world is your misreading of Hegel. In the Gotha Programme Marx is agreeing with the real Hegel, not disagreeing with your straw man.

 

[Knotted]

'The rise of philosophy is due to these cravings of thought. Its point of departure is Experience; including under that name both our immediate consciousness and the inductions from it. Awakened, as it were, by this stimulus, thought is vitally characterised by raising itself above the natural state of mind, above the senses and inferences from the senses into its own unadulterated element, and by assuming, accordingly, at first a stand-aloof and negative attitude towards the point from which it started. Through this state of antagonism to the phenomena of sense its first satisfaction is found in itself, in the Idea of the universal essence of these phenomena: an Idea (the Absolute, or God) which may be more or less abstract. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the sciences, based on experience, exert upon the mind a stimulus to overcome the form in which their varied contents are presented, and to elevate these contents to the rank of necessary truth. For the facts of science have the aspect of a vast conglomerate, one thing coming side by side with another, as if they were merely given and presented — as in short devoid of all essential or necessary connection. In consequence of this stimulus, thought is dragged out of its unrealised universality and its fancied or merely possible satisfaction, and impelled onwards to a development from itself. On one hand this development only means that thought incorporates the contents of science, in all their speciality of detail as submitted. On the other it makes these contents imitate the action of the original creative thought, and present the aspect of a free evolution determined by the logic of the fact alone.'
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slintro.htm

Do you see that? Hegel has thought as incorporating the contents of science. He also has these contents imitate the action of original creative thought. Subject and object become indistinguishable. There is no antagonism with empirical science at all. It is rather that the philosophical theory of empiricism is one sided, as is its opposite - seeing the mind as standing above or outside nature.

 

[Knotted]

No, but it cannot be thought of without consciousness reflecting on itself.

Of course!

ie. in raw sense-data the notions of immediacy and mediation are one phenomonelogically, but it is precisely in the "taking up" of such data as an activity of consciousness that allows philosophy to perceive and hence sublate the distinction.

Exactly my point! Awareness requires thought reflecting on itself! This is what differentiates critical philosophy from mere empiricism!

But this is what analytic philosophy is all about. Reflecting on technicalities that ordinarily we wouldn't worry about - epistemology, theories of reference, theories of truth etc. Hence my comparison of Hegel with analytic philosophy.

The idea that thought thinks itself without any relation to the world is your misreading of Hegel. In the Gotha Programme Marx is agreeing with the real Hegel, not disagreeing with your straw man.

Huh? Where do you get the idea that I think either of those, or anything like them?

Hegel sees thought in relation to the world. Marx is not disagreeing with Hegel. That was my point.

 

[articul8]

well, who said that there was any contradition between critical thought and empirical science?

Yes, Hegel is quite right here. People who pursue empiricism as a philosophical method are stuck at the point of departure - they've missed the boat, and lost the plot

 

[Knotted]

Yes, they do and Hegel says as much. But when it comes to anything that's really important in Philosophy - they are poor amateurs.

You've learnt how to do yah-boo-sucks but without the sophistication.

Wrong, sorry. You missed the meaning of speculative in this context, completely.

I was right, sorry. See the quote. 'The rise of philsophy is due to these cravings of thought. Its point of departure is Experience...'

No one said so ['merely follows']. He criticises their contradictions and inconsistencies, from his point of view, sure.

He completely rejects critical philosophy. See
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/sl_iv.htm

Besides, make your mind up about how he sees the English empiricist "contribution" to Philosophy, please...

I don't believe I've contradicted myself.

It's all a bit of a lame thing to say, really, K...

You don't like it? Pity.

No, you didn't chose your words carefully. God means something different to him, then, as it has nothing to do with what you just implied...

Goddammit! Do I have to prove everything I say. I'll furnish you with quotes if you really want.

Oh, yes, it is: that is how the whole thing develops [werden = becoming], therein lieth the inner logic of thinking and so on...

As I say, I agree.

 

[Knotted]

well, who said that there was any contradition between critical thought and empirical science?

Yes, Hegel is quite right here. People who pursue empiricism as a philosophical method are stuck at the point of departure - they've missed the boat, and lost the plot

It looks like we've been talking at cross purposes then.

Mind you, I still don't know what 'critical thought' is if you want to argue some more...

 

[articul8]

Sorry, yes, I think the whole antinomy between experience and critical self-reflection is the point of what Hegel is trying to move beyond.

His criticisms of "Critical philosophy" in the Encyclopedia aren't a retreat to empricism as method - they are surpassing the Kantian problematic of things-in-themselves.

The main problem I'd have with your presentation is the apparent implication that truth already resides in nature, rather than the activity of embodied-consciousness.

 

[Knotted]

The main problem I'd have with Knotted's presentation is the implication that truth already resides in nature, rather than the activity of embodied-consciousness.

Truth is about nature, it doesn't reside in nature. It isn't the actvity of embodied consciousness either. It doesn't exist in its own right.

 

[Knotted]

Sorry, yes, I think the whole antinomy between experience and critical self-reflection is the point of what Hegel is trying to move beyond.

I agree completely!

 

[articul8]

Truth is about nature.

what else is there for anything to be about? That is strictly a meaningless statement

 

[Knotted]

what else is there for anything to be about? That is strictly a meaningless statement

It is a meaningless statement (ie. it has no sense), but it isn't a nonsense statement. You couldn't say 'cardboard is about nature'. That would be nonsense rather than lacking in sense. What my statement reveals is how the word 'truth' can be used rather than any particular thesis on what truth is.

I think Hegel has truth corresponding to facts but without theorising what truth is, (I think he calls it sublime at some point). This is another instance of where Hegel is quite uncontroversial.

Hegel isn't a theoriser. When it boils down to it, he isn't saying much as Alex B said in the OP. Its rather he puts things into their places within his system and he does it rather boringly well.

 

[articul8]

Hegel is important becuase he [edit - unintentionally!]reveals the violence inherent in the concept - its remorseless subsumption of particulars under universals.

The aesthetic interests of the early German Romantics and the very early Hegel point to the value of sensuous particularity, of non-identity and resisted totalisation as inherent to the struggle for subject-object reconciliation

[edit - this was badly put. What they share is a sense of Fichte's inadequacy of making the self into everything and the world nothing - the issues of nature, sensuous particularity etc are raised by both Hegel and the Jena romantics - but their responses are opposed (Hegel: incorporated into a more complete system, Jena Romantics: accept fragmentary sub-absolute nature of knowledge).

 

[Knotted]

Hegel is important becuase he reveals the violence inherent in the concept - its remorseless subsumption of particulars under universals.

The aesthetic interests of the early German Romantics and the very early Hegel point to the value of sensuous particularity, of non-identity and resisted totalisation as inherent to the struggle for subject-object reconciliation

That's an interesting take. I haven't read any of his pre Phenomenology work. I've never thought of Hegel as a romantic, although people around him obviously were. How does this relate to Schelling's work?

 

[articul8]

How does this relate to Schelling's work?

I need to think about this. It sounds like the kind of question which might take half a lifetime to answer!

 

[Knotted]

I need to think about this. It sounds like the kind of question which might take half a lifetime to answer!

Fair enough. I've got Hegel's letters somewhere. I feel inspired to look through them.

Have you read Lukacs on the young Hegel? I wasn't sure what to make of it (in terms of its accuracy).

 

[articul8]

Fair enough. I've got Hegel's letters somewhere. I feel inspired to look through them.

Have you read Lukacs on the young Hegel? I wasn't sure what to make of it (in terms of its accuracy).

I have - though I'd like to re-visit again. Lukacs is presumably writing with the rehabilitation of the early Marx in mind (no bad thing) - but probably tends to over-emphasise with the difference between early Hegel and the later, allegedly more conservative Hegel (a popular myth that Pinkard undermines).

 

[Knotted]

Yes, they do and Hegel says as much. But when it comes to anything that's really important in Philosophy - they are poor amateurs.

Hegel on empiricism:
'In Empiricism lies the great principle that whatever is true must be in the actual world and present to sensation. This principle contradicts that ‘ought to be’ on the strength of which ‘reflection’ is vain enough to treat the actual present with scorn and to point to a scene beyond a scene which is assumed to have place and being only in the understanding of those who talk of it. No less than Empiricism, philosophy (§ 7) recognises only what is, and has nothing to do with what merely ought to be and what is thus confessed not to exist. On the subjective side, too, it is right to notice the valuable principle of freedom involved in Empiricism. For the main lesson of Empiricism is that man must see for himself and feel that he is present in every fact of knowledge which he has to accept.'
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/sl_ivpi.htm

See, everything you thought you knew about Hegel is wrong.