9. Preconditions for genocide and the selection of a target group
Staub, 1999 and Staub, 2000 sees the evolution of “evil” (extreme human destructiveness that is not commensurate with instigating conditions) in a society as starting with the “frustration of basic human needs and the development of destructive modes of need fulfillment” (Staub, 1999, p. 181). Basic human needs include security, positive identity, effectiveness and control over essentials, connections to others and autonomy, and an understanding of the world and our place in it. The frustration of these needs begins a search for a scapegoat, in the form of a target group that can be blamed for the dissatisfaction.
What Waller (2002) calls “our ancestral shadow” is the essential tribalism that sociobiology argues is part of the human condition. In the case of tribalism, ethnic, or religious difference, the target minority is often clearly visible or made so through official identification (e.g., badges, tattoos, or identity cards). Societies whose culture officially emphasizes differences among groups, e.g., Christian versus Jew (rather than merely German), Jew versus Arab (rather than merely Israeli or Semite), facilitate this process. Even relatively transitory or ephemeral characteristics can be identified and recruited to the task merely by promoting xenophobia, a basic human reaction experienced from infancy grounded in sociobiology (Dawkins, 1976 and Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In Cambodia, the target group was designated as “educated people” (defined as anyone above Grade 7 or those who wore glasses) who had “benefited” from a bourgeois existence. In Ukraine, it was those peasants who owned “prosperous” farms, who in actuality were no different from the less prosperous in landholdings and livestock, that were initially identified as enemies of the revolution, but eventually everyone was victimized as millions starved. Some writers argue that the Russian oligarchy's ethnocentricity that cast aspersions on Ukrainians played a part in the genocide (Conquest, 1986 and Dolot, 1987).
In Staub's (1999) model, the frustration of basic needs (e.g., material deprivation, political chaos, realistic conflict) constitutes an instigating condition for destructive process; the satisfaction of a basic need in a way that interferes with the satisfaction of other basic needs. This produces heightened in-group identification, particularly among authoritarian people who seek a strong leader, perception of out-group threat, and a destructive ideology. The latter presents an exclusionary world vision and is called, in extremis, an “ideology of antagonism.” When subordinate groups demand more, they threaten the basic need satisfaction of the dominant group whose “legitimizing ideology” is threatened and who then react with increasingly harsh acts of repression and aggression. Staub (1999) argues that two types of out-group stereotyping exist. The lesser is devaluation of the out-group. The more intense form specifically sees the out-group as having achieved gains through prior injustice. (Hitler saw the Jews this way and the Hutu extremists portrayed the Tutsi in this way, (note Davenport & Stam's, 2004, description of Rwanda).
Once initiated, violence generates an evolution in perpetrators; the personality of individuals, social norms, institutions, and culture all change in a way that makes greater violence easier and more likely (Staub, 1999, p. 182; Waller, 2002, p. 134). The usual moral principles that prohibit violence and protect people are replaced by “higher” values protecting purity, goodness, and well-being of the in-group and creating a better society by destroying the victims. A utopian vision is offered that excludes some people and justifies the exclusion in the service of the vision. A progressive restructuring of group norms occurs in line with this ideological shift. Behavior towards the victims that would previously have been considered inconceivable now becomes acceptable and “normal.” Eventually, killing the victims becomes the “right” thing to do. This process can be slow (in Turkey, Armenians had been persecuted for a long time before the genocide) or fast (in Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi were interconnected only a few months before the carnage, although a long history of tribal animosity existed). As the evolution progresses, the number of perpetrators spreads and the selected target group increases the range of its membership acceptable for purging. In the end, there is what Staub (1999) calls a “reversal of morality” (again, see Davenport & Stam's, 2004, description).
