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emotions and ideas

That doesn't show that REASONING is affected by emotions. If anything, it shows that social functioning and at least some forms of decision-making are linked to emotions, or other things affected by the parts of the brain that also affect emotions. This might just mean that we can't function socially when these are brain damaged because we can't predict other people's behaviour, etc. That doesn't mean we can't reason (the cogito still works [or doesn't work, if you're willing to go down the postmodernist route], regardless of how you feel about it)

In an abstract sense, you might be right. However, in a practical real life sense, what use is reason without the faculty to make decisions? That's what we use our reason for, to engage with the world socially. If we can't do that without emotion, then it seems to me, that reason is inextricably bound up with emotion.
 
feelings might be a component in all we do and think - but it doesn't mean they are "the" (singular) foundation, and cause of all other aspects of our experience. They way we learn - through socialisation - to think, speak, communicate also effects how we feel.

Is "sadness" the same in a human, a goldfish and a cockroach? Or are the layers of emotion felt by humans in modern societies more variegated than a simple biological given?

I think feelings (and therefore emotion) are primary. It's all we know when we come into the world. Hunger, satiety, cold, warmth, touch or lack of it.
 
For example, a childs cry, which as you say may be at an experience of unpleasure, contains within it a knowledge that such expressions are likely to evoke caring behaviours from figures in the childs environment. Of course, this is an innate, unconscious knowledge.

N0 - crying is no doubt a stimulus-response reaction to unpleasure - but the child is not capable of recognising as "other" the source of that which meets its needs.

I’m not suggesting the child does recognise that which meets its needs as external to itself. I don’t know why you jumped to that conclusion...? However, I do see attachment behaviours - prior to the recognition of who or what these are directed to, and their separateness from the self – as nevertheless already containing within in them an innate knowledge. That is the emotional response, in this instance of a cry in relation to a frustration, say hunger, coldness etc., already contains a recognition of the other, prior to any representation of this to the subject (that is, prior to the structuralization of this other into the psyche). Attachment behaviours are innate responses or behavioural patterns that have evolved within social animals, hence already having within them this recogniton of other (I think the problem here may be a clumsy use if the word "recognition", theres likely a better signifer. Anyways, as I see it there is an appeal to this other, and this appeal is prior to the recognition of this other as a "not me" distinct desiring subject. Otherwise I agree with everything you said, but I'm interested to hear where and how your ideas converge - I'm still grappling with this.
 
I ask this because I think that reasoning is linked to self awareness - which (I think) depends upon first encounter with the Other.
 
the emotional response, in this instance of a cry in relation to a frustration, say hunger, coldness etc., already contains a recognition of the other, prior to any representation of this to the subject (that is, prior to the structuralization of this other into the psyche). .

As you're probably aware, this ultimately points to a huge controversy within psychoanalysis (the difference beween orthodox and object-relations schools). I'd agree that the infant's earliest basic biological/affective structure already contains a kind of receptivity to attachments, fragmented and incomplete elements which is a precondition for the psychic representation of the other to be forged into a unified image, gestalt etc.

This is not quite the same as "recogntion" though, as to recognise the other as other you'd need a concept of what it was other to, ie. self. I don't think we can call this receptivity to attachments a form of "knowledge" as it the infant can't yet relate these earliest primitive openness to object-relations to an identifiable other that lies outside its own desires. For this reason I wouldn't say it's meaningful to call this "innate, unconscious knowledge" - more an innate openess to attachments without which socialisation wouldn't be possible. But that isn't to say that all subsequent knowledge is somehow a mere continuation of what already exists. The nature of our feelings/emotions/attachments is crucially structured by our encounter with the desire of the Other - which does lie outside of the primary psychic processes.
 
Since we're on the subject: I think we need a special part of the forum, called a crèche, for people like Alde, butcher etc. so we could have a normal, mature debate...:rolleyes::rolleyes::D:D

Articul has a fairly well worked out ideas of it, I would have thought... Maybe it could be aided by Vygotsky...
http://tinyurl.com/596ccx

Salaam.

:D
 
No - adults can learn from infant development but there's nothing much to be learnt from mystical pig-headedness (sorry - that wasn't meant to be cultrually insensitive)

(I don't think butchers hates philosophy just philosophers :))

am sympathetic to Vygotsky from what I've read, but my views are influenced by psychoanalsis more than developmental psychology.
 
Like Freud, who read far and wide, philosophy included, Vyg reportedly studied Hegel and co... ;) That's where he got a lot of his ideas from, it seems, so by default I really dig the guy... :cool:

And no, there's nothing to be learned from or through pigheadedness, no, no...:( But it's a bit of a sport to some here...:hmm: An attitude that stinks, kinda....:rolleyes:
 
I'd agree that the infant's earliest basic biological/affective structure already contains a kind of receptivity to attachments, fragmented and incomplete elements which is a precondition for the psychic representation of the other to be forged into a unified image, gestalt etc....I don't think we can call this receptivity to attachments a form of "knowledge" as it the infant can't yet relate these earliest primitive openness to object-relations to an identifiable other that lies outside its own desires. For this reason I wouldn't say it's meaningful to call this "innate, unconscious knowledge" - more an innate openess to attachments without which socialisation wouldn't be possible.

Yeah definitely - I'd agree with this, and yes "innate unconscious knowledge" is a poor way of expressing what you have put very nicely, in terms of an openness to the possibility of, and behaviours facilitative of, object relatedness (this is what I was aiming for). And in fact I think this is always already implied in Freuds writing, though I'm no scholar of his work...

am sympathetic to Vygotsky from what I've read, but my views are influenced by psychoanalsis more than developmental psychology.

Though don't you feel there is a nice overlap developing, especially peter fonagy's work on mentalization. Also the Lacanian, Paul Verhaeghe seems very open to linking psychoanalysis to developmental research.
 
in fact I think this is always already implied in Freuds writing

I think in some sense Freud has to posit it, otherwise there's no explanation of why were not all trapped in an impermeably self-absorbed cocoon for all our lives.

Though don't you feel there is a nice overlap developing, especially peter fonagy's work on mentalization. Also the Lacanian, Paul Verhaeghe seems very open to linking psychoanalysis to developmental research.

I didn't mean to dismiss any contribution from developmental research - it's just that I don't know enough about what's happening on that side of things -and that my background is in the psychoanalytical traditition of exploring these issus. It does sound most interesting though - any links, or reading suggestions?
 
I found "On Being Normal and Other Disorders" by Paul Verhaeghe very good -particularly the last two out of three parts - though I didn't read it cover to cover. He seems to make Lacan comprehensible, but also, as I said, draws on some of the infant research and attachment theory, or at least highlights points of intersection. Peter Fonagy's book "Attachment Theory and Psychoanalysis" is also fairly good, and he has a number of books on mentalization - though I find his work a little dry. Perhaps you are familiar with both of these. Have you studied psychoanalysis?
 
I've read quite a lot of Freud and Lacan, some Klein, Bowlby, Laplanche etc. but I haven't been through analytic training.

I dislike the empiricism/determinism you can get in some developmental approaches - but where these dangers are avoided, I'm interested in what psychologists have to say

PS I'm led to believe that the work of French phenomenologist Michel Henry has a lot to offer in terms of philsophically thinking through the role of affect in rational thought, including a critique of orthodox Freudianism. Plan to investigate...
 
I dislike the empiricism/determinism you can get in some developmental approaches - but where these dangers are avoided, I'm interested in what psychologists have to say


I think psychoanalysis has a lot to offer in terms of making sense or meaning of the developmental research. And it is helpful to have some form of empiricial basis for psychoanalytic ideas - given the many many competing theories around.
 
I dislike the empiricism/determinism you can get in some developmental approaches

With Piaget it seems quite stern, seriously pre-determined...

[FONT=Geneva,Arial]Piaget's four stages:[/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial]Sensorimotor stage:[/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial]Preoperational stage:[/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial]Concrete Operations:[/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial]Formal Operations:[/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial]Sensorimotor stage: from birth until about two years of age. At this age children are only aware of objects that are directly[/FONT][FONT=Geneva,Arial] before them, thus the saying, "out of sight, out of mind." (Example: The game of "peek-a-boo" is enjoyed only by infants. Their joy in this game comes from their "finding" the adult -- who"hides" by blocking the child's view and thus "disappears" and "re-appears" as the child experiences it.)
[/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial]Preoperational stage: emerges when children are about two years old until they are about six to seven years old. This is the stage oflanguage development. Expanding childrens’ vocabularies reflect the many new mental schemes that are developing. This stage is characterized by a logical thinking, but not according toadult standards. A classic example is how young children cannot understand conservation of liquid. They will usually think that a taller glass has more water than a short glass even though both have been demonstrated to have the exact same amount of water.[/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial]Concrete operations: this third stage of cognitive development appears when children are six or seven years old and continues until they are about 11 or 12 years old. Children begin to think logically about conservation problems and other situations as well. However, they typically can applytheir logical operations only[/FONT][FONT=Geneva,Arial] to concrete, observable objects and events.[/FONT]

[FONT=Geneva,Arial]Formal operations: the fourth and final stage usually appears after children are 11 or 12 years of age and continues to evolve for several years after that time. During this time the child develops the ability to reason with abstract, hypothetical, and contrary-to-fact information.[/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial][It must be noted that some recent research does not confirm Piaget's four stages in their entirety.][/FONT]

But with Vyg - it's different...

[FONT=Geneva,Arial][SIZE=+2]Vygotsky's developmental theory:[/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial]This Russian psychologist conducted numerous studies of children's thinking.
[/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial]Some of his most influential ideas are:[/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial]1. Complex mental processes began as social activities. As children develop, they gradually analyze these processes and can use them independently of those around him. Vygotsky called this process of social activities being internalized as mental activities "internalization."[/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial]2. Children can often accomplish more difficult tasks when they have the assistance of other people more advanced and competent than themselves.[/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial]3. Tasks within the zone of proximal development promote maximum cognitive growth. This is the zone of learning for a child where he can learn something with the assistance of others. Without such assistance he would not be able to learn the subject. [/FONT]
[FONT=Geneva,Arial]4. The idea of scaffolding learning comes from [/FONT][FONT=Geneva,Arial]Vygotsky's [/FONT][FONT=Geneva,Arial]zone of proximal development [/FONT][FONT=Geneva,Arial]theory. Scaffolding refers to learning situations in which adults and other more competent individuals provide some form of guidance or structure that enables students to engage in learning activities within their zone of proximal development.[/FONT]

http://teachnet.edb.utexas.edu/~lynda_abbott/Cognitive.html
 
I think psychoanalysis has a lot to offer in terms of making sense or meaning of the developmental research. And it is helpful to have some form of empiricial basis for psychoanalytic ideas - given the many many competing theories around.

Indeed. Reich and then Fromm and Marcuse, for instance, have many interesting critiques of Freud's position.;)
 
Depends.
Humans don't need learning how to eat or drink, they do learn what to eat and drink.

Anything that can be learnt is learnt from others - the capacity to eat and drink is just intrinsic, it isn't learnt. But we learn what is suitable "food" and what isn't - ie. why don't we eat dog, donkey, orang-utan? It isn't (for 99% of us) from "personal" experienc - but becuase they lie outside our culinary culture.

]QUOTE]Humans don't need to learn how to reason, they do learn how to express themselves in a way others understand or get informed about their reasoning. [/QUOTE]

"Reasoning" that no-one else can understand isn't reasoning. It's ir-reasoning, and the hallmark of psychopathology.
 
Since we're on the subject: I think we need a special part of the forum, called a crèche, for people like Alde, butcher etc. so we could have a normal, mature debate...:rolleyes::rolleyes::D:D

Articul has a fairly well worked out ideas of it, I would have thought... Maybe it could be aided by Vygotsky...
http://tinyurl.com/596ccx

Salaam.

:D


Who, impressive demonstration of inability to make use of brain functioning in order to come to reasoning.
Do you claim a baby can't reason and that everyone who speaks against this must by default be incorrect (even if they speak out of personal experience)? That makes you the prime example of an adult not able to pass the baby stage, then.

salaam.
 
Anything that can be learnt is learnt from others - the capacity to eat and drink is just intrinsic, it isn't learnt.

Which is exactly why reasoning is needed to be able to learn in order to make distinction between a breast nipple and a toy.

But we learn what is suitable "food" and what isn't - ie. why don't we eat dog, donkey, orang-utan? It isn't (for 99% of us) from "personal" experienc - but becuase they lie outside our culinary culture.

I didn't say anything else.

"Reasoning" that no-one else can understand isn't reasoning. It's ir-reasoning, and the hallmark of psychopathology.

False. Reasoning does not need to be expressed. You make everyone inter-dependent and not able to function as individuals.

salaam.
 
Indeed. Reich and then Fromm and Marcuse, for instance, have many interesting critiques of Freud's position.;)

They all fall short of Freud's position - essentially romanticising the unconscious as though all drives were inherently emancipatory unless repressed
 
Which is exactly why reasoning is needed to be able to learn in order to make distinction between a breast nipple and a toy.

You could see the differentiation of nipple and toy as a very early stage in the development of reason, yes - but its hardly "reasoning" in anything like a developed sense. And it's not inherent in babies - babies have a receptivity towards object attachments - but the breast is not automatically differentiated from self, and in so far as the breast later gets differentiated, it would be far from obvious to a baby that all objects aren't breasts (good object is the good, plentiful, nourishing breasts - bad objects the asbent, unyielding breast). Melanie Klein is excellent on this. They need to learn that a toy is not a breast, because they are not born with "reason". Such things are second order, culturally derived, accomplishments.


False. Reasoning does not need to be expressed. You make everyone inter-dependent and not able to function as individuals.

It's only because we are inter-dependent that we can function as individuals with a sense of subjective identity etc. Instances of reasoning don't need to be uttered. But thinking must be intersubjectively expressible - and therefore culturally mediated - even if, not necessarily, in discursive terms - to count as "reasoning".
 
They all fall short of Freud's position - essentially romanticising the unconscious as though all drives were inherently emancipatory unless repressed

Not so. Marcuse and then Fromm make a distinction right there: non-repressive sublimation... ;) [They do know that some repression is quite good for us...:D]

But they owe a great debt to Reich for putting together Freud with Marx.... Without him it would have been very difficult!

Btw, Alde is a good fun, innit? :rolleyes: :D :D
 
Which is exactly why reasoning is needed to be able to learn in order to make distinction between a breast nipple and a toy.

IME (having an 8 month old daughter), babies don't hugely make a distinction. Babies are comforted by having something to suck, that can be a nipple or a dummy or a finger. Obviously only a nipple will give milk, but feeding isn't the only purpose that the breast has.
 
You could see the differentiation of nipple and toy as a very early stage in the development of reason, yes - but its hardly "reasoning" in anything like a developed sense. And it's not inherent in babies - babies have a receptivity towards object attachments - but the breast is not automatically differentiated from self, and in so far as the breast later gets differentiated, it would be far from obvious to a baby that all objects aren't breasts (good object is the good, plentiful, nourishing breasts - bad objects the asbent, unyielding breast). Melanie Klein is excellent on this. They need to learn that a toy is not a breast, because they are not born with "reason". Such things are second order, culturally derived, accomplishments.

Klein is very interesting, but IMO, psychoanalytical theory only really starts making sense when you go into therapy yourself. Having a baby and observing them is fascinating too.
 
You could see the differentiation of nipple and toy as a very early stage in the development of reason, yes - but its hardly "reasoning" in anything like a developed sense.

The ability to reason is necessarily present to even come to recognize milk as satisfying biological need for food, and even to recognize that need being satisfied and hence stop drinking.

And it's not inherent in babies - babies have a receptivity towards object attachments - but the breast is not automatically differentiated from self, and in so far as the breast later gets differentiated, it would be far from obvious to a baby that all objects aren't breasts (good object is the good, plentiful, nourishing breasts - bad objects the asbent, unyielding breast). Melanie Klein is excellent on this. They need to learn that a toy is not a breast, because they are not born with "reason". Such things are second order, culturally derived, accomplishments.

All this is founded in speculation if the person describing it does not have remembrance of own experiences at that age.
I have very good remembrance of my early childhood and I sure as hell knew that a toy was no bringer of food and a breast full of milk was not my body and that I didn't want to be fooled by a rubber substitute for a nipple.

It's only because we are inter-dependent that we can function as individuals with a sense of subjective identity etc. Instances of reasoning don't need to be uttered. But thinking must be intersubjectively expressible - and therefore culturally mediated - even if, not necessarily, in discursive terms - to count as "reasoning".

Looks as if you are saying that self-reflection as means to define identity needs a mirror to be able to exist and thinking needs to be met with response of others in order to count as reasoning.
If you mean that, then I disagree, because self-reflection has as subject the self in context of the self - with incorporation of the relation to others/the world or without that and by preference without it - and thinking can't be anything else but (one of the) result(s) of the ability to reason.

salaam.
 
IME (having an 8 month old daughter), babies don't hugely make a distinction. Babies are comforted by having something to suck, that can be a nipple or a dummy or a finger. Obviously only a nipple will give milk, but feeding isn't the only purpose that the breast has.

Some babies are, others most definitely are not. I wasn't.
At about the age you mention I saw very clearly what was dangerous to touch. I remember looking at an object with sharp metal edges and how I knew very clearly I could hurt myself with that and that others should not touch it. When someone picked it up I expected him to get hurt. I even remember where it was. So if that was not reasoning, then what was it? I can give many of such examples.

salaam.
 
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