Does causality only work forwards in time?

[Knotted]

the grue problem shows, that even a statement like "this ball is blue" is an inductive inference when you consider the ball in the dimension of time as well as physical space

I don't think this is anything new at all. I'm pretty sure a traditional empiricist would say that "this ball is blue" is an inductive inference. I genuinely think you have grabbed hold of the wrong end of the stick here.

I would say that the importance of the grue paradox is that it shows inductive reasoning to be falacious even when background information is taken into account.

 

[max_freakout]

I'm pretty sure a traditional empiricist would say that "this ball is blue" is an inductive inference.

really?



'this ball' implies that we are talking about an obseved instance of ball-hood


whereas inductive reasoning is when we reason about unobserved instances


(ie: "therefore all balls must be blue")

 

[Knotted]

really?



'this ball' implies that we are talking about an obseved instance of ball-hood


whereas inductive reasoning is when we reason about unobserved instances


(ie: "therefore all balls must be blue")

'This ball' could imply that we are talking about 'this ball' when we are not looking at it - 'this ball in the box' or 'this ball in ten minutes'. If we keep checking the ball and observing that it is still blue then using inductive inference works we say that 'this ball is blue'.

Its not my intention to defend inductive inference, though. I'm just baffled why you think that the grue paradox says we do not know when we are making an inductive inference.

 

[rogue_lettuce]

the grue problem shows, that even a statement like "this ball is blue" is an inductive inference when you consider the ball in the dimension of time as well as physical space

Surely that's a failure to differentiate between "this ball is blue" and "this ball is and always will be (and perhaps always was) blue"?
If you're observing at the point after it changes colour, then it IS blue; if it were not, it could never be grue, because to be grue is to be green then change colour to blue at a certain point. Thus to be grue requires the object to be green, and then to be blue afterwards. If you judge the statement "this is blue" to be false after the colour change, then you have to judge the statement "this is grue" to be false too, in which case (if it really is blue/grue) you're left with a ball that has no colour descriptor applicable to it whatsoever.

 

[max_freakout]

'This ball' could imply that we are talking about 'this ball' when we are not looking at it - 'this ball in the box' or 'this ball in ten minutes'.

i disagree, 'this' is a demonstrative pronoun, therefore the examples you give here ^ are gramattically incorrect


you should say
"the ball in the box"

and

"the colour of this ball in 10 minutes"

If we keep checking the ball and observing that it is still blue then using inductive inference works we say that 'this ball is blue'.

it only 'works' in the present moment, same as all inductive inferences

I'm just baffled why you think that the grue paradox says we do not know when we are making an inductive inference.

it says that we do not know which inferences are inductive, and which arent

 

[max_freakout]

Surely that's a failure to differentiate between "this ball is blue" and "this ball is and always will be (and perhaps always was) blue"?

that is the crux of the argument, when people say "this" they often fail to realise that it only applies to the present moment

 

[Knotted]

i disagree, 'this' is a demonstrative pronoun, therefore the examples you give here ^ are gramattically incorrect


you should say
"the ball in the box"

and

"the colour of this ball in 10 minutes"

That's a fair point.

it only 'works' in the present moment, same as all inductive inferences

But this has always been the case, though. This is nothing new. That's not to say that there is nothing new in Goodman's argument, of course.

it says that we do not know which inferences are inductive, and which arent

That sounds good, but I don't see it. I suspect that Goodman had another argument along these lines, but the grue paradox says nothing like this.

 

[max_freakout]

But this has always been the case, though. This is nothing new. That's not to say that there is nothing new in Goodman's argument, of course.

thıs ıs what Goodman's argument establıshed

That sounds good, but I don't see it. I suspect that Goodman had another argument along these lines, but the grue paradox says nothing like this.

ıt ıs precısely what Goodman establıshed wıth the grue paradox, whether you say the ball ıs blue, or grue, makes no dıfference, you cannot tell whether the ball ıs blue or grue