fudgefactorfive said:
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There has been some evidence (from studying deaf sign users who have suffered brain damage or strokes) that the origin of the brain signals controlling the arms and hands for peple whose first language is sign does not come from the motor function areas but the so-called "language centres", Broca's and Wernicke's areas IIRC (ie. people who have suffered loss of motor control can still sign, although they have trouble picking up objects). This is why someone who learns sign language as a child has such a head start compared to, say, me, who is fumbling along using his motor functions.
It's worth pointing out here that Broca's area is in fact a motor area (well pre-motor), which is responsible (roughly, and not exclusively) for controlling articulatory gestures. In the case of a signing individual the articulatory gestures relate not to the vocalisation apparatus but to the arms/hands+face. A signing person who has suffered a stroke which spares motor areas but selectively damaged Broca's area would certainly suffer from impaired signing.
Broca's area receives a lot of input from Wernicke's area, which itself has been increasingly found to be involved in (again roughly and not exclusively) the mapping of sound onto "meaning" (well, at any rate higher-level linguistic concepts than simply speech sounds).
As a result of the dense interconnections between the two (via one of the biggest fibre-tracts in teh brain the
arcuate fasciculus) there has been much focus on teh links between speech perception and speech production.
There is (somewhat outdated, but undergoing modification) theory of speech perception called the Motor Theory. It states that all auditory speech input is decoded to articulatory gestures (i.e. sound goes in and the brain processes it in terms of what mouth, tongue, lip, glottal etc actions it would need to execute in order to reproduce the sound). The theory horribly oversimplifies everything we know about the way the brain processes speech, but it does have some truth in it, and recent research has shown that Broca's area is more involved in the processing of difficult-to-understand (e.g. degraded speech) or difficult-to-produce speech sounds (e.g. foreign phonemes with which someone isn't familiar) than in easy ones.
People's own first language tends to shape their assumptions about all language, imo.
This is a very interesting point, and I think it alone puts paid to any notion that we think in words.
It has been shown that people who grow up truly bilingual have an improved meta-conception of language (i.e. they are less constrained by the grammar of a first language than are monglots, since they have learned from infancy that words and grammar are merely formalities, while the real meaning of language is just tagged by these).
To my mind langauge (by which I mean expressive langauge, which we use to communicate) is not the substrate for thought. Or at least, not for all thought. I certainly find that for some types of problem-solving I will think in words.
Of course we then need to examine what means we have for actually answering this question otehr than our introspection. Sadly, at the moment, very few. The problem with teh introspection method is that even if all thoughts ar ejust incredibly fast language (I dobt this very much) there are still thought processes that we cannot conciously apprehend. So, is that language?
In the same way that a picture can make you feel things non-verbally, surely it's reasonable to expect that internal processes (which, let's remember, are all predicated upon the same neuarl substrates as our perceptions of the outside world) also can function without language.
Or, we coull of course turn around and around a narrow definition of thought, which itself would hinge upon thought being something that can only be expressed linguistically. But then we go into philosophical territory which others are far better qualified to get into than I am.
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