A commentary on a very small but very significant part of Gordon Baker & Peter Hacker's secondary text on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning.
For an incredibly wordy interpretation, we have to wonder why H&B clip what exactly Wittgenstein so succinctly says.
Notice how the original is about the word “meaning” whereas the interpretation is about the “meaning of a word” - as if a word can only have one meaning.
The point of B&H's discussion is about the qualification, 'though not all'.
Does the text say this? No. Wittgenstein is usually so careful to point out when he is making a grammatical remark, but here it is absent. (H&B are right about it not being a theory or a hypothesis – but for the wrong reasons, it’s not a general statement about the word ‘meaning’, it is merely a statement about some uses of the word ‘meaning’ and its this painfully clear conclusion that H&B are doing their utmost to undermine.)
‘Presumably’ being the key word.
If Wittgenstein had said, ‘For all cases in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language,’ then there would still be a distinction between 'meaning' and 'use'. Imagine if I said, ‘every rose is red’ then I would still be able to make a grammatical distinction between ‘rose’ and ‘red’ – I would not conclude, for example that ‘every red is a rose’. This is because I did not say, ‘every rose is identical with red’. Notice also the feebleness of the example - does Wittgenstein ever talk about the invalidity of saying 'use-blindness'?
Perhaps Wittgenstein had really meant to say, ‘For a large class of cases – though not all – in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is identical to its use in the language.’ Then the qualification makes the grammatical distinction between ‘meaning-blindness’ and ‘use-blindness’ in only certain circumstances. Of course Wittgenstein hadn’t meant to say something so silly.
ETA: It should be clear that this is not a grammatical remark in the sense that B&H mean in any case. There is only mention of the use of the word 'meaning', there is no mention of the use of the phrase 'use in the language' - it is simply used. There is no suggestion that the grammar of the word 'meaning' is being compared to the grammar of the phrase 'use in the language'.
Now why are B&H so keen to misinterpret Wittgenstein? I can only guess. Why is this passage so important to me? It is because the passages leading up to this look as if Wittgenstein has nailed a use theory of meaning. The very fact that Wittgenstein refused this theory is extremely significant at least to understand his method of resisting theoretical generalisations. Wittgenstein, among other things, is showing us how not to fall into bad habits. It is highly significant and hopelessly obscure that B&H consider theoretical generalisations to be not theoretical when they involve remarks about grammar. They clearly wanted an all embracing theoretical statement about semantics, and they clearly didn't get it. All they cared about was the idea that was supposedly expressed - and to hell with the finer points.
ETA: I would also like to note that B&H, in their twisting and turning, encourage a bad habit in the form: I define A thus: A is of character B, this means that by virtue of the fact that this is a definition that A is the same as the collection of all things with character B. That is to say it is a necessary and sufficient definition. This is a bad habit that is quite explicitly rejected elsewhere in the text.
I should point out that Hacker and Baker were (in the case of Baker)/ are (in the case of Hacker) great authorities on Wittgenstein's work. Yet it is clear they didn't even want to understand it properly. Hence these ridiculous arguments involving childish logical errors in order to pervert the text into something they wanted it to be. I should note that towards the end of his life Baker retracted this interpretation.
Please don't accept garbage like this as a substitute for the original. Its like accepting the Mona Lisa with a mustache and spectacles scribbled on it - you can argue that the original is still all there, but you just won't get it.
B&H said:
For an incredibly wordy interpretation, we have to wonder why H&B clip what exactly Wittgenstein so succinctly says.
Wittgenstein said:
Notice how the original is about the word “meaning” whereas the interpretation is about the “meaning of a word” - as if a word can only have one meaning.
The point of B&H's discussion is about the qualification, 'though not all'.
B&H said:
Does the text say this? No. Wittgenstein is usually so careful to point out when he is making a grammatical remark, but here it is absent. (H&B are right about it not being a theory or a hypothesis – but for the wrong reasons, it’s not a general statement about the word ‘meaning’, it is merely a statement about some uses of the word ‘meaning’ and its this painfully clear conclusion that H&B are doing their utmost to undermine.)
B&H said:
‘Presumably’ being the key word.
B&H said:
If Wittgenstein had said, ‘For all cases in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language,’ then there would still be a distinction between 'meaning' and 'use'. Imagine if I said, ‘every rose is red’ then I would still be able to make a grammatical distinction between ‘rose’ and ‘red’ – I would not conclude, for example that ‘every red is a rose’. This is because I did not say, ‘every rose is identical with red’. Notice also the feebleness of the example - does Wittgenstein ever talk about the invalidity of saying 'use-blindness'?
Perhaps Wittgenstein had really meant to say, ‘For a large class of cases – though not all – in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is identical to its use in the language.’ Then the qualification makes the grammatical distinction between ‘meaning-blindness’ and ‘use-blindness’ in only certain circumstances. Of course Wittgenstein hadn’t meant to say something so silly.
ETA: It should be clear that this is not a grammatical remark in the sense that B&H mean in any case. There is only mention of the use of the word 'meaning', there is no mention of the use of the phrase 'use in the language' - it is simply used. There is no suggestion that the grammar of the word 'meaning' is being compared to the grammar of the phrase 'use in the language'.
Now why are B&H so keen to misinterpret Wittgenstein? I can only guess. Why is this passage so important to me? It is because the passages leading up to this look as if Wittgenstein has nailed a use theory of meaning. The very fact that Wittgenstein refused this theory is extremely significant at least to understand his method of resisting theoretical generalisations. Wittgenstein, among other things, is showing us how not to fall into bad habits. It is highly significant and hopelessly obscure that B&H consider theoretical generalisations to be not theoretical when they involve remarks about grammar. They clearly wanted an all embracing theoretical statement about semantics, and they clearly didn't get it. All they cared about was the idea that was supposedly expressed - and to hell with the finer points.
ETA: I would also like to note that B&H, in their twisting and turning, encourage a bad habit in the form: I define A thus: A is of character B, this means that by virtue of the fact that this is a definition that A is the same as the collection of all things with character B. That is to say it is a necessary and sufficient definition. This is a bad habit that is quite explicitly rejected elsewhere in the text.
I should point out that Hacker and Baker were (in the case of Baker)/ are (in the case of Hacker) great authorities on Wittgenstein's work. Yet it is clear they didn't even want to understand it properly. Hence these ridiculous arguments involving childish logical errors in order to pervert the text into something they wanted it to be. I should note that towards the end of his life Baker retracted this interpretation.
Please don't accept garbage like this as a substitute for the original. Its like accepting the Mona Lisa with a mustache and spectacles scribbled on it - you can argue that the original is still all there, but you just won't get it.
I'd go even further...
