Agreed, I was just trying to highlight the point that the excuses from the gobment basically boil down to that issue.
7/7 CCTV footage released
- Thread starter Badger Kitten
- Start date
Badger Kitten
oof
The report is seriously flawed and despite a huge amount of detail, manages to raise more questions than it answers. It is incredibly partisan - it's clear they started with the premise 'how can we show M15 not to blame' and worked backwards.
Never mind hindsight machines, it shows a very serious set of failings.
1. M15 do not pass on intel re. criminality to the police, even if they pick it up during an antiterror operation ( page 23, footnote).
2. Nor do the police share intel with M15 - M15 have to ask specifically for SB intelligence or records. So people fall through the gaps, as happened on 7/7 ( page 53).
3. Their IT and record systems are in shit shape and the police and security services are not able to go to a central computer and run checks on suspects that pulls together intel from different sources - this would have given m15 MSK's name much earlier. ( page 53)
4. The judgement that MSK was a peripheral fraudster actually shows the systemmic failings in action: he should have flagged code red based on his behaviour, contacts, meetings and history, all of which were in plain sight - but because of communication failings between agencies, the dots were not joined. They [M15] can blether on about resources and numbers of contacts who come up in an investigation all they like - but sift through the detail and the excuses and the following appalling errors emerge.
(i) Operation Crevice, which became the biggest surveillance op ever and led to the fertiliser bomb arrests success began as an investigation into a man called Mohammed Qayaum Khan aka 'Q' in Luton. He was an alQaeda fixer, who sent men, money and equipment to his Al Q contacts in the AfPak border. His emir was known as Abd al Hadi al-Iraqi and was seriously high up - reported in to Al Q's Director of External Affairs, the man in charge of operations in Europe.
(ii) Omar Khyam, the lead fertiliser bomber only came into view because of his contacts and meetings with Q. Like MSK, Khyam was a man raising money fraudulently for jihadi causes, who'd trained at camps and had meetings with Al Q figures - having been introduced by Q and sent by him to Afghanistan/Pakistan border.
(iii) Only when Omar Khyam was actually bugged discussing bombing the UK, and in the same week, a member of the public called in with a tip off about hundreds of kilos of fertiliser in a storeage warehouse did it dawn on M15 that there was a plan to attack the UK. A Pakistani-Canadian detonator maker called Khwaljah then flew over in the same month to talk through his remote detonation device, and he had a meeting with Khyam in Feb 2004. Later, for the select group of 8-10 close brothers in the network, including the detonator maker, there was a final meal before the detonator maker flew back to Canada. Present at that meeting, but not ID-d until later was MSK and Tanweer.
(iv) MSK then had a meeting with Omar Khyam and Q, remember, Q was the guy who kicked off the investigation.
So. Anyone who was
a) meeting initial target Q
b) Meeting Omar Khyam and Q together
c) meeting Omar Khyam and a specialist detonator maker at an exclusive meeting of a handful of serious terrorists when the detonator maker was in the Uk for only a few days
d) was mimicking and mirroring main-target Khyam's behaviour in almost every respect save actually being caught on TAPE talking about bombing the UK - the training camps, the fraud, the admiration for terrorism
...ANYONE falling into that category should have been flagging code red. Now there were not many people who fitted that description. So all the bollocks about how many hundreds of people had some vague connection with Khyam is just rubbish. If you know what you are looking for, the right people are not hard to spot.
MSK was in it up to his neck - the people, the places, the contacts, the behaviour, hell, he was even performing complicated counter surveillance manoeuvrings, driving hundreds of miles for specific meetings with the very key terrorists M15 were watching - but they did not see the signs. They did not join the dots.
They kind of admit it in the report, pointing out that since 7/7, m15 now look at 'networks' rather than individuals - MSK was part of a network, not a very big network, who all exhibited the same signs and did the same things. He was 2 steps lower down the ladder than Khyam and moving up fast. He was bottle-necked right behind him, and when Khyam was nicked, it was his turn to prepare to strike. He duly set off for final instructions and special training in November of 2004, 6 months after his mates were arrested. At the same camp was the 21/7 bomber leader, Mutkat said Ibrahim, also getting his instructions and peroxide explosives training. Fertilizer truck bombs didn't work, so the tack was changed.
Information about MSK was frustratingly there all along. The answer to M15's problems is not for M15 to have more resources; the answer to M15's problems is not hundreds more M15 people doing the same thing as they always do. It is for M15 to work smarter, use their imagination and intelligence better, understand how UK terrorism networks work and how radicalisation takes place, and use resources already there - police intel, community intel - to keep better records, to use IT more effectively, and to stop being so arrogant ( and so politicised) and question its own judgement more frequently. All of this si there in the report if you wade through it all, and know the timeline, backstory and what has been taken out and redacted.
As to why this didn't get the coverage it deserved - that cunt of a Speaker resigned that very same day. Half an hour before our press conference, (and 3 hours after I called back Jacqui Smith's PPS and declined a meeting with her that afternoon on the grounds that if she was not prepared to offer an inquiry there was no point: we had interviews to do. I'll go and see her next week, if she is still there.) We did get quite a bit of coverage though, and we got the Mail to call for an inquiry, which is a big breakthrough
I took some time out after it all to let the dust settle because I'd worked flat out for weeks every weekend and evening and I needed a break from it all. I will get round to writing up a critique but it's something I'm working on with lawyers, ex police officers and other expert witnesses and I'd rather keep powder dry: there's more coming up on this in a few week's time, and this time, we get to control the timing. Judicial review proceedings still in play. Legal proceedings preclude me from saying more.
Never mind hindsight machines, it shows a very serious set of failings.
1. M15 do not pass on intel re. criminality to the police, even if they pick it up during an antiterror operation ( page 23, footnote).
2. Nor do the police share intel with M15 - M15 have to ask specifically for SB intelligence or records. So people fall through the gaps, as happened on 7/7 ( page 53).
3. Their IT and record systems are in shit shape and the police and security services are not able to go to a central computer and run checks on suspects that pulls together intel from different sources - this would have given m15 MSK's name much earlier. ( page 53)
4. The judgement that MSK was a peripheral fraudster actually shows the systemmic failings in action: he should have flagged code red based on his behaviour, contacts, meetings and history, all of which were in plain sight - but because of communication failings between agencies, the dots were not joined. They [M15] can blether on about resources and numbers of contacts who come up in an investigation all they like - but sift through the detail and the excuses and the following appalling errors emerge.
(i) Operation Crevice, which became the biggest surveillance op ever and led to the fertiliser bomb arrests success began as an investigation into a man called Mohammed Qayaum Khan aka 'Q' in Luton. He was an alQaeda fixer, who sent men, money and equipment to his Al Q contacts in the AfPak border. His emir was known as Abd al Hadi al-Iraqi and was seriously high up - reported in to Al Q's Director of External Affairs, the man in charge of operations in Europe.
(ii) Omar Khyam, the lead fertiliser bomber only came into view because of his contacts and meetings with Q. Like MSK, Khyam was a man raising money fraudulently for jihadi causes, who'd trained at camps and had meetings with Al Q figures - having been introduced by Q and sent by him to Afghanistan/Pakistan border.
(iii) Only when Omar Khyam was actually bugged discussing bombing the UK, and in the same week, a member of the public called in with a tip off about hundreds of kilos of fertiliser in a storeage warehouse did it dawn on M15 that there was a plan to attack the UK. A Pakistani-Canadian detonator maker called Khwaljah then flew over in the same month to talk through his remote detonation device, and he had a meeting with Khyam in Feb 2004. Later, for the select group of 8-10 close brothers in the network, including the detonator maker, there was a final meal before the detonator maker flew back to Canada. Present at that meeting, but not ID-d until later was MSK and Tanweer.
(iv) MSK then had a meeting with Omar Khyam and Q, remember, Q was the guy who kicked off the investigation.
So. Anyone who was
a) meeting initial target Q
b) Meeting Omar Khyam and Q together
c) meeting Omar Khyam and a specialist detonator maker at an exclusive meeting of a handful of serious terrorists when the detonator maker was in the Uk for only a few days
d) was mimicking and mirroring main-target Khyam's behaviour in almost every respect save actually being caught on TAPE talking about bombing the UK - the training camps, the fraud, the admiration for terrorism
...ANYONE falling into that category should have been flagging code red. Now there were not many people who fitted that description. So all the bollocks about how many hundreds of people had some vague connection with Khyam is just rubbish. If you know what you are looking for, the right people are not hard to spot.
MSK was in it up to his neck - the people, the places, the contacts, the behaviour, hell, he was even performing complicated counter surveillance manoeuvrings, driving hundreds of miles for specific meetings with the very key terrorists M15 were watching - but they did not see the signs. They did not join the dots.
They kind of admit it in the report, pointing out that since 7/7, m15 now look at 'networks' rather than individuals - MSK was part of a network, not a very big network, who all exhibited the same signs and did the same things. He was 2 steps lower down the ladder than Khyam and moving up fast. He was bottle-necked right behind him, and when Khyam was nicked, it was his turn to prepare to strike. He duly set off for final instructions and special training in November of 2004, 6 months after his mates were arrested. At the same camp was the 21/7 bomber leader, Mutkat said Ibrahim, also getting his instructions and peroxide explosives training. Fertilizer truck bombs didn't work, so the tack was changed.
Information about MSK was frustratingly there all along. The answer to M15's problems is not for M15 to have more resources; the answer to M15's problems is not hundreds more M15 people doing the same thing as they always do. It is for M15 to work smarter, use their imagination and intelligence better, understand how UK terrorism networks work and how radicalisation takes place, and use resources already there - police intel, community intel - to keep better records, to use IT more effectively, and to stop being so arrogant ( and so politicised) and question its own judgement more frequently. All of this si there in the report if you wade through it all, and know the timeline, backstory and what has been taken out and redacted.
As to why this didn't get the coverage it deserved - that cunt of a Speaker resigned that very same day. Half an hour before our press conference, (and 3 hours after I called back Jacqui Smith's PPS and declined a meeting with her that afternoon on the grounds that if she was not prepared to offer an inquiry there was no point: we had interviews to do. I'll go and see her next week, if she is still there.) We did get quite a bit of coverage though, and we got the Mail to call for an inquiry, which is a big breakthrough
I took some time out after it all to let the dust settle because I'd worked flat out for weeks every weekend and evening and I needed a break from it all. I will get round to writing up a critique but it's something I'm working on with lawyers, ex police officers and other expert witnesses and I'd rather keep powder dry: there's more coming up on this in a few week's time, and this time, we get to control the timing. Judicial review proceedings still in play. Legal proceedings preclude me from saying more.
Badger Kitten
oof
Oh yeah, and I met MSK's brother in law yesterday, for 2 hours, in a cafe by Edgware rd ( he was visiting London with a friend and had read my blog and wanted to get in touch) and he wants an inquiry as well. He's a nice guy. His family have had an awful time. They didn't know what his sister's husband done until the police raided them after the bombings ( I refer to the brother in law and his family, and his mother). He thought MSK was having an affair, and that explained the weird behaviour and frequent absences and secrecy. He didn't know him very well, feels like he didn't know him at all, now.
They don't buy the conspiracy theories, by the way. They know he did it. They want to know, with all the surveillance, why he wasn't stopped.
They don't buy the conspiracy theories, by the way. They know he did it. They want to know, with all the surveillance, why he wasn't stopped.
Given your criteria how many people in the investigation would have been flagged 'code red' - and how does his compare to the number of people MI5 were able to place under surveillance with their resources at the time?
I suppose I need to go and read the whole report. In your view does this 'phone network' diagram exaggerate the complexity and number of people involved?
I suppose I need to go and read the whole report. In your view does this 'phone network' diagram exaggerate the complexity and number of people involved?
Badger Kitten
oof
It's a red herring, that diagram. It's not how many people Khyam was in contact with, but whether he was in contact with ones who should have flagged code red. Man in post office or pizza parlour, no, man who is in on the final meal with detonator maker, is meeting original crevice target Q the facilitator and driving hundreds of miles to have meetings with main target Omar Khyam, yes.
Interestingly in 2004 an operation called 'Operation DO*** ( redacted) was begun to try to identify 2 extremists known as 'Ibrahim' and 'Zubair': Ibrahim was MSK.
You do need to read the whole report, not just the media take on it, which is largely running the post ISC press con line, ( their press con was at 11am). The ISC had a year to get ready and think what their message was: we had a few hours to respond to the publication of a 100+ page report on the day, a day in which the news agenda was swamped by the Speaker's resignation.
Interestingly in 2004 an operation called 'Operation DO*** ( redacted) was begun to try to identify 2 extremists known as 'Ibrahim' and 'Zubair': Ibrahim was MSK.
You do need to read the whole report, not just the media take on it, which is largely running the post ISC press con line, ( their press con was at 11am). The ISC had a year to get ready and think what their message was: we had a few hours to respond to the publication of a 100+ page report on the day, a day in which the news agenda was swamped by the Speaker's resignation.
Where's that from? The report?
What metrics are used ordering the nodes? What determines their distance from the centre of the cloud?
From BK's account of MSK's contacts, above, I suspect that given a couple of days to play with the software I could redraw that to make it (a) bleeding obvious MSK was a code "red! Panic!" target.
Given no knowledge at all I could probably re-draw it to depict him as (b) of no interest whatsoever.
Badger Kitten
oof
M15's resources were fairly poor in 2004, but of more concern was their shoddy record keeping, failure to communicate and share intel with police and special branch and their inability to act decisely or imaginatively unless confronted with the very narrow criteria for surveillance action: someone had to be actually caught on tape talking about a bomb in the UK, and a member of the public had actually reported the stash of fertilizer for the explosives for them to 'get' Khyam as a serious player - weeks before the attack he planned was to happen. That was a hell of a lucky break.
Having nicked Khyam, they belatedly started to learn how far off beam they had been, how people can go from fraud, consorting with attack-planning terrorists, sympathy and support for jihad and UK attacks in a matter of weeks, to being actual UK attack-planners. This was Omar Khyam's pattern and he was their main target! And it's not exactly rocket science - plenty of terrorism psychology experts could have filled them in. Their job is to be intelligent intelligence services - which means knowing what you are looking for, what the signs are. A good copper can spot dodgy behaviour, a gamekeeper has a sense of who the local poachers are, an immigration official is trained to look out for certain patterns. Surely those in charge of protecting the UK from terrorism should be able to spot bloody terrorists and if they can't follow them, get the cops onto it?
They claim to have only really 'got' fraud - training camp - meeting extremists = DANGEROUS' link after 7/7, but they were starting to go back and look at the Khyam Crevice network in more detail in late 2004. This included people like MSK aka 'Ibrahim'
In May 2005 Zeeshan Siddique, who'd trained with MSK in terrorist camps set up for British men to learn to attack British targets was arrested in Pakistan and by his account, tortured by ISI officers with M15 popping in and out after torture sessions to ask question. He knew who 'Ibrahim' was - and finding who Ibrahim was had been made the subject of Operation DO*** in 2004. Other people arrested with info on MSK in 2004 included Salahuddin Amin, convicted in Crevice, and Barbar, who became a US FBI supergrass and gave evidence in the 7/7 trial and the Crevice trial.
They knew they needed to pick up 'Ibrahim'; they claim not to have known that he was under their noses in early Feb - to end March 2004 and that he was really MSK.
Having nicked Khyam, they belatedly started to learn how far off beam they had been, how people can go from fraud, consorting with attack-planning terrorists, sympathy and support for jihad and UK attacks in a matter of weeks, to being actual UK attack-planners. This was Omar Khyam's pattern and he was their main target! And it's not exactly rocket science - plenty of terrorism psychology experts could have filled them in. Their job is to be intelligent intelligence services - which means knowing what you are looking for, what the signs are. A good copper can spot dodgy behaviour, a gamekeeper has a sense of who the local poachers are, an immigration official is trained to look out for certain patterns. Surely those in charge of protecting the UK from terrorism should be able to spot bloody terrorists and if they can't follow them, get the cops onto it?
They claim to have only really 'got' fraud - training camp - meeting extremists = DANGEROUS' link after 7/7, but they were starting to go back and look at the Khyam Crevice network in more detail in late 2004. This included people like MSK aka 'Ibrahim'
In May 2005 Zeeshan Siddique, who'd trained with MSK in terrorist camps set up for British men to learn to attack British targets was arrested in Pakistan and by his account, tortured by ISI officers with M15 popping in and out after torture sessions to ask question. He knew who 'Ibrahim' was - and finding who Ibrahim was had been made the subject of Operation DO*** in 2004. Other people arrested with info on MSK in 2004 included Salahuddin Amin, convicted in Crevice, and Barbar, who became a US FBI supergrass and gave evidence in the 7/7 trial and the Crevice trial.
They knew they needed to pick up 'Ibrahim'; they claim not to have known that he was under their noses in early Feb - to end March 2004 and that he was really MSK.
Badger Kitten
oof
The ISC report says M15 had 52 'essential' targets in 2004 who they could not cover at all. MSK was not even an essential target. He was one of 19 'desirables' post Crevice. 'Ibrahim' was thought to be essential and the subject of a 'find out who Ibrahim is' operation ( DO***) in 2004 as said earlier: Ibrahim was MSK, who they had down as 'UDM E' ( unidentified male E) during Crevice surveillance when tracking Khyam. 'Ibrahim' started coming up as an extremist from Yorkshire who'd been to training camps as early as 2003/4.
If nothing else, this info about M15's lack of officers for surveillance ops should calm the paranoid who think M15 and the CIA have resources to follow them about and hassle them, read their every conspiraloon site burbling and generally make their lives a misery.
If nothing else, this info about M15's lack of officers for surveillance ops should calm the paranoid who think M15 and the CIA have resources to follow them about and hassle them, read their every conspiraloon site burbling and generally make their lives a misery.
It won't ...
Whilst there are (and always have been) problems with communication between different agencies (and, to be honest, even between units within the same agency, particularly between units which focus on intelligence and those which focus on operations) and there are certainly problems with conflicting computer systems which add a degree of difficulty to the exchange of information which need not be there, there is one point I think you should bear in mind when compiling your critique and it is this:
This was not the only operation which was being conducted by MI5 / SB / Police at the time. Issues about resources need to take account of all operations and other operational commitments, not just potential targets within this one single operation.
Badger Kitten
oof
I have done. I have a detailed timeline starting in 1999 with as much info about who/what/when as I can find on it.
I don't know if M15 and the police or politicians know the full detail though; one of the most startling pieces of info in the report (p88) is that the Home Office and CPS were unable to supply details of who was convicted for terrorism offences between March 2004 - present. The ISC remark ( p98) ' The Committee is both disappointed and concerned that such a simple, yet essential piece of the evidence base - the succesful conviction of terrorists - was not only unused but was not even available. This is basic information that should have been analysed to assess how well aspects of the strategy were working and what changes needed to be made - particularly in terms of legislation''.
Crevice was at the time both the largest op they had ever run, and a clear sign of radicalised UK citizens in the British jihadi network planning to attack the UK with intent and capability.
They then got dragged into Operation RHYME, the dhiren Barot case, which sucked up even more resources. This was a bit of a mess - the US outed Mohammed Noor Khan, a Pakistani computer op who the UK and Pakistani intel services had 'flipped' and was supplying info on jihadi networks in the UK and elsewhere, and then also outed Dhiren barot, sparking a major scramble to arrest people they were investigating and getting info about. But Barot, whilst dangerous in intent, only had plans from 2001, that were unlikely to have been executable. Whilst this diversion of resources went on, the Crevice network continued its planning and those not picked up in spring 2004 carried on plotting to attack. In Nov 2004 Tanweer, MSK & Mutkar Said Ibrahim ( 21/7) went to Pakistan to get instructions, probably from al Hadi, about how to make peroxide based bombs to attack transport networks.
This was real, live, dangerous new stuff in other worlds, yet resources were diverted away due to US posturing ( the news about Noor Khan and Barot was leaked in August 2004, Noor Khan had been arrested in June 04 and flipped July 04). The leak was timed to coincide with John Kerry's Democratic Convention - and a brilliant speech by a young senator called Obama. It pulled the news agenda back onto Bush's war on terror and made his approval ratings rise.
Operation RHYME sucked up even more resource than Crevice, and meant M15 did not go back and hunt down the rest of the Crevice gang until months had passed.
All this is said in sorrow not in anger: I've never said I'd sue or that I want people to be sacked. I do think though, if I can educate myself on radicalisation patterns, networks of jihadis and find out for myself how to evaluate threats in my spare time, it should not be beyond the wit of those paid to do this.
Badger Kitten
oof
Detective Boy, what do you think of these remarks by a top cop?
there's more if you are interested, I can PM it
a top retired cop said:
there's more if you are interested, I can PM it
I have just now read through the report up to the start of the annexes. In 2004 they ranked people into "essential, desirable, other".
When you say "code red" do you mean "essential"?
As I understand it the report says that putting MSK at the meal on 21/02/04 was only deduced retrospectively in autumn 2005 via voice analysis from a car wire-tap and there was no visual sighting or identification of MSK at the time. MSK was only identified as linked to the Afghanistan trip in mid-July 2005, ie retrospective to 7/7.
Regarding the meetings 02/02/04 and 28/02/04 it says:
Having read the report I can't really see what information there was in 2004 that would justify ranking the UDMs as "essential". They were apparently ranked as "desirable" and some addresses, number and possible names were obtained, but that this data didn't link to anything else known at that time.
The actual numbers of people ranked as "essential, desirable, other" in the Crevice case has been redacted, but the commentary suggests that there wasn't even full coverage of all those ranked "essential".
(See page 41 "The constraints on MI5")
source: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/210852/20090519_77review.pdf
(#86, page: 27)
When you say "code red" do you mean "essential"?
As I understand it the report says that putting MSK at the meal on 21/02/04 was only deduced retrospectively in autumn 2005 via voice analysis from a car wire-tap and there was no visual sighting or identification of MSK at the time. MSK was only identified as linked to the Afghanistan trip in mid-July 2005, ie retrospective to 7/7.
Regarding the meetings 02/02/04 and 28/02/04 it says:
(#74, page 25) *UDMs = unidentified males
Having read the report I can't really see what information there was in 2004 that would justify ranking the UDMs as "essential". They were apparently ranked as "desirable" and some addresses, number and possible names were obtained, but that this data didn't link to anything else known at that time.
The actual numbers of people ranked as "essential, desirable, other" in the Crevice case has been redacted, but the commentary suggests that there wasn't even full coverage of all those ranked "essential".
(See page 41 "The constraints on MI5")
source: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/210852/20090519_77review.pdf
Badger Kitten
oof
They decided he was not 'essential' because they did not read him as anything other than a petty fraudster, because they were incredibly literal.
The point I'm making is that
a) meeting Q
b) driving about using counter surveillance techniques whilst travelling hundreds of miles to meet the man by then at centre of massive UK bomb plot op in same month flag went up and whilst demonstrating exact same behavioural profile as main op short of being caught on tape discussing feriliser bomb which member of public has tipped you off about...
should have put him on top code red list.
And yes, I already said they did not have full coverage of essentials. In Evan's words, they could 'only hit the crocodiles nearest the boat'. Even mor ereason to be better at prioritising/categorising
The fundamental problem seems to have been not categorising essentials right. Not how many of them there were, but who they put in the category in the first place.
The point I'm making is that
a) meeting Q
b) driving about using counter surveillance techniques whilst travelling hundreds of miles to meet the man by then at centre of massive UK bomb plot op in same month flag went up and whilst demonstrating exact same behavioural profile as main op short of being caught on tape discussing feriliser bomb which member of public has tipped you off about...
should have put him on top code red list.
And yes, I already said they did not have full coverage of essentials. In Evan's words, they could 'only hit the crocodiles nearest the boat'. Even mor ereason to be better at prioritising/categorising
The fundamental problem seems to have been not categorising essentials right. Not how many of them there were, but who they put in the category in the first place.
It is certainly a valid question.
Police procedures for managing investigations - reactive initially, but rapidly extended into proactive operations such as the ones we are talking about - changed beyond all recognition in the late 90s. Where decisions of the senior investigating officer were previously recorded in a bound book, with no particular recommended format or subjects to be considered (if, in fact, they were recorded at all!!), a whole new regime, with self-carbonated, serially-numbered decision logs and a requirement for time and date stamping was brought in. That is now absolutely standard practice within the police.
The Byford Report into the Yorkshire Ripper case led to major changes to the handling of information in major enquiries - MIRSAP (standard operating practices for major investigation rooms to ensure that all material followed a defined process and all possible actions (lines of enquiry) were identified and prioritised) and the HOLMES system (the computer system used to manage large major enquiries) came out of that. Again both have been standard practice within the police for a long time ... but more in relation to reactive investigations than proactive ones.
I am not aware of MI5 using either HOLMES, MIRSAP or police-standard decision logs. It would not surprise me to find out they are not.
To be fair though, intelligence work is different from an actual investigation ... and that is what MI5 (and police intelligence units) are familiar with. Intelligence gathering would not really lend itself to using HOLMES / MIRSAP / decision logs and there are different processes, systems and procedures (not least the application of standard analytical techniques to the information gathered) which are appropriate. Again though, I do not know whether or not MI5 use these (though I would be very surprised to find that they do not, albeit they may be different procedures / systems from those of the police, hence the problems with exchanging information).
At some point though, an intelligence-gathering operation becomes an actual proactive investigation. At that stage it is necessary to recognise that different procedures, processes, systems, etc. are needed. That is something that intelligence units are not good at - they live their lives in a dark place where they are not gathering evidence as such and they are not worried about ensuring that what they are doing will be admissible in Court. Although they have made significant improvements since they started getting involved in criminal investigations (again in the 90s when the IRA and Russian threats were seen to have receded), it is still a bit of a mystery to them.
It would be interesting to see who had primacy of the operation at various stages as it was progressed, and how it was being dealt with. I suspect one of the major problems will turn out to be that it was not recognised that it had changed from an intelligence gathering operation into a proactive investigation or, at least, that if the change was recognised, it was not accompanied by a change of processes, procedures and systems.
If you want to PM me any more of the comments, I'd be happy to have a scan through them. It would also be useful to consider when the retired officer retired (and how "top" they were), and what they have been doing since to give a view on their comments.
Badger Kitten
oof
Ta very much, pm on way
No sorry, I don't accept your argument about who should have been categorised as "essential" (I don't know why you are using the term "code red").
'Meeting someone' is insufficent criteria for ranking someone as "essential", even if it involves driving between Leeds, Slough and Crawley. Given limitless resources you could intensively investigate every single person a targets meets. In the case of these UDMs they were photograhed, followed back to Wesk Yorkshire and had their car registrations and destination addresses noted down. These were checked and no 'connections' were found. What further checks could have been done? What connections were there to be made at the time? What further action are you saying should have been taken? If you started investigation and surveillance on people who met this broad criteria you would need vast amounts of resources that MI5 says it doesn't have. They state that they needed to focus their resources on people involved in the bomb plot.
What was the 'behavioural profile'? Driving up and down the A27 instead of staying in the car park? You can't really deduce very much from that, other than someone is paranoid, wants to show off their car or wanted a private word away from the guys who transferred to the other car and stayed parked up. MSK was driving around in his own car registered with his real name and address, so hardly hard-core anti-surveillance behaviour.
IIRC the report doesn't list the number of essential/desirable/other people covered by Crevice. Have you got any further evidence that they were categorising people wrongly, as the report goes through everything in detail and I just can't see any inconsistency in how they decided that the UDMs were "desirable" not "essential". I can't see much (any?) information about how many people got put into each category either.
The actual number *is* relevant because if you put too many into your 'most important' category then you defeat the whole point of having prioritisation in the first place.
I think "meeting whom" is one of the keys to BK's argument.
In that diagram, it doesn't look as though they've licensed the patented Google algorithm: weight pages (people) according to the weight of the pages (people) that link to them.
Badger Kitten
oof
1. I'm using the term 'code red' because it evokes better the situation: MSK et al did after all go on to commit the worst English-soil terror atrocity in 50 years and the first suicude bombing in W Europe. 'Essential' and 'desirable' sound smug, and have now been dropped by M15; they are now 'Priority 1 and Priority 2' and the 2004 methods of categorisation - individuals, not networks - have been dropped. There are now entirely revised systems of working with SB, and regional M15 offices. Police and M15 are now supposed to operate on a 'need to share' basis, not a 'need to know' basis.
That, more than anything, tells you how bad the failure was: within a few years, they actually fundamentally changed the system. They failed, and their unprecedentedly quick step changes indicates how bad and how systemic the failings were. M15 do not change unless they have to, and certainly not that quickly
2. 'Meeting someone' isn't a biggie. Meeting Q,the man whose emir is al Hadi, whose emir is the AlQ European Ops director; Q who sends men to join AlQ and fight jihad, Q who sent Omar Khyam to the camps with money and equipment, that's Khyam, the suddenly-main target of the biggest surveillance op ever, in the month that Khyam was found to be attack-planning, in the week that Khwaljah the detonator maker comes to the Uk to go through the last stages of detonation, with the fertiliser in the warehouse and the gang all set...MSK meeting Q in the company of Khyam, the main target - that's a biggie.
3. However you try and justify it, the fact is that 7/7 was the one that got through, and the briefing was, they were unknowns, peripherals, not identified, not recognised as a threat - yet they clearly WERE a threat, because they killed 52 and injured 800+ . That they were on the radar at all was dragged out of the ISC, and was only in in the first ISC report grudgingly.
The second ISC report shreds the first. It's breathtaking how much it shows report one up. But remember this. We had to threaten to take the Home Sec to court to get them to cover some of the q's, to get them to do the second report at all, and even then, even then all they wanted to do was exonerate M15. That second report is as long as it is only - ONLY - because we asked those q's and then released the q's to the media, forcing answers. Do not assume the ISC reports are fair, or balanced: the Chair of the ISC admitted before he started review 2 that he had already prejudged it, that it would reach the same conclusions - on Newsnight, May 2007.
That second report is a persuasive, partisan apologia. It should be viewed like the defence statement of a wife whose husband is on trial.
It is yet another partial look at a mass murder done for politics' sake- but a trained investigator with fewer ties to politics and M15 would have gone much harder, deeper, further, with devastating effect. The MPS on the ISC are not judges, QCs, forensic investigators or security service trained, they are well meaning worthies ffs, they are capable politicians, not independent investigators or trained cross examiners - and it shows. Their questioning is weak and flabby, and any QC in court would demolish them. M15 are trained liars: the outcome of this report is highly political, the people writing it are handpicked by the PM, answer to him, not the House, and the report is heavily redacted : what did you think it was going to say, other than M15 not to blame?
Personally I think this is a classic case where "the people" need to see the decision making process exposed to proper and robust scrutiny in a public forum of some sort ... another job for a "Grand Jury" type hearing to review the behind-the-scenes decisions of a committee or administrative body. The evidence should be heard in public (subject to any reasonable restrictions on the grounds of national security / interference with ongoing investigations as decided by the judge in charge) and be subject to cross-examination by lawyers acting on behalf of interested parties / the Grand Jury itself.
Justice must not only be done, but be seen (and heard) to be done.
Justice must not only be done, but be seen (and heard) to be done.
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