the government's preference shares
As I understand Monday's FT, the government has realised that it can't under/regulation law buy (enough) preference shares in banks, so it's forced to buy voting shares.
the government's preference shares
. . .
1) Where is the "money" comming from? is it more funny stuff that will lead to inflation? Is debt the answer to debt -what kind of "rock of stablity" is that?
Nope, you're not wrong. Plus, there's been no talk of restricting traders bonuses2) This talk of being tough on bankers is bollox. The retiring ones walk away with mega millions. The bonuses wont happen "this year" i.e before April. Then they will be paid in shares - shares of a bank we own. This looks like more corporate welfare than ever to me. Am I wrong?
The one hing markets don't like is uncertainty, this is what has caused the reqcent equity volatility. Once uncertainty has been removed ie the news has been announced, markets can adjust prices accordingly.3) The supreme renewed confidence of the markets aint neccessarily good news. are they just pleased they've been given more money to fuck about with and pay themselves with like the junkies so many of them are?
I'd say not as the refinancing is going towards existing bad debt, not the creation of new debt4) If the govt injects £Xbn, does that mean 10 times as much can be leant out with fraudulent fractional reserve banking, thus merely delaying and deepening the crisis?
Looks like to me with the details being announced on the DMO website tomorrow.
But, it would seem rational to expect the new gilts to be of the same maturity as the forecast Govt stake (5 years - 10 years??).
Issue that amount of paper into that sort of maturity bucket is going to massively steepen the yield curve (ie 5-10 years rates much higher than short-term rates.
So . . . companies will be forced to borrow short-term as they can't afford to borrow medium/long term
Which is what f**ked everything up to begin with. (ie short term rates being lower than long term rates)
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"I congratulate you on these remarkable achievements, an era that history will record as the beginning of a new golden age for the City of London ... I believe it will be said of this age, the first decades of the 21st century, that out of the greatest restructuring of the global economy, perhaps even greater than the industrial revolution, a new world order was created."
Todays news is a disgrace: we've just paid £20billion for a 60% stake in a bank (RBS) that's only worth £12billion (that 60% stake is therefore worth about £7billion).
I make that a loss of £13billion. The government should have bought the bank outright. Why didn't it? What value does wasting that £13billion have? I can only imagine it supports the illussion of indepedence for the bank (i.e. not really state controlled). Seems like a traversty to me.
Gordon Brown's Mansion House speech to the city last year,
Was he really stupid enough not to know this was coming?
Does it make more sense if you think of it the other way around? Not in terms of states controlling banks, but of investors controlling states?Can anyone explain the above to me? I've been asking around and looking for commentary in the press but haven't found anything.
sourceFinancial capitalists took the lead as a social force in demanding the defeat of those domestic social forces they blamed for creating the inflationary pressures which undermined the value of their assets. The further growth of financial markets, increasingly characterized by competition, innovation and flexibility, was central to the resolution of the crisis of the 1970s. Perhaps the most important aspect of the new age of finance was the central role it played in disciplining and integrating labour. The industrial and political pressures from below that characterized the crisis of the 1970s could not have been countered and defeated without the discipline that a financial order built upon the mobility of capital placed upon firms. 'Shareholder value' was in many respects a euphemism for how the discipline imposed by the competition for global investment funds was transferred to the high wage proletariat of the advanced capitalist countries. New York and London's access to global savings simultaneously came to depend on the surplus extracted through the high rates of exploitation of the new working classes in 'emerging markets'. At the same time, the very constraints that the mobility of capital had on working class incomes in the rich countries had the effect of further integrating these workers into the realm of finance. This was most obvious in terms of their increasing debt loads amidst the universalization of the credit card. But it also pertained to how workers grew more attuned to financial markets, as they followed the stock exchanges and mutual funds that their pension funds were invested in, often cheered by rising stocks as firms were restructured without much thought to the layoffs involved in this.
Both the explosion of finance and the disciplining of labour were a necessary condition for the dramatic productive transformations that took place in the 'real economy' in this era. The leading role that finance came to play over the past quarter century, including the financialization of industrial corporations and the greatest growth in profits taking place in the financial sector, has often been viewed as undermining production and representing little else than speculation and a source of unsustainable bubbles. But this fails to account for why this era - a period that was longer than the 'golden age' - lasted so long. It also ignores the fact that this has been a period of remarkable capitalist dynamism, involving the deepening and expansion of capital, capitalist social relations and capitalist culture in general, including significant technological revolutions. This was especially the case for the US itself, where financial competition, innovation, flexibility and volatility accompanied the reconstitution of the American material base at home and its expansion abroad. Overall, the era of finance-led neoliberalism experienced a rate of growth of global GDP that compares favourably with most earlier periods over the last two centuries.[16]
It is, in any case, impossible to imagine the globalization of production without the type of financial intermediation in the circuits of capital that provides the means for hedging the kinds of risks associated with flexible exchange rates, interest rates variations across borders, uncertain transportation and commodity costs, etc. Moreover, as competition to access more mobile finance intensified, this imposed discipline on firms (and states) which forced restructuring within firms and reallocated capital across sectors, including via the provision of venture capital to the new information and bio-medical sectors which have become leading arenas of accumulation. At the same time, the very investment banks which have now been undone in the current crisis spread their tentacles abroad for three decades through their global role in M&A and IPO activity, during the course of which relationships between finance and production, including their legal and accounting frameworks, were radically changed around the world in ways that increasingly resembled American patterns. This was reinforced by the bilateral and multilateral international trade and investment treaties which were increasingly concerned with opening other societies up to New York's and London's financial, legal and accounting services.
Does it make more sense if you think of it the other way around? Not in terms of states controlling banks, but of investors controlling states?
With both the government and the people held hostage via dependence on a vast credit ponzi scheme and the threat of capital flight?